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Summary of dissertation 
Inflation targeting (IT) regime has become a popular monetary policy framework across 
countries. Since the early 1990’s, advanced countries have adopted an IT regime while 
developing countries have adopted an IT regime since the late 1990’s. As of 2013, fourteen 
advanced countries and fifteen developing countries have adopted an IT regime to achieve 
better macroeconomic conditions. The main feature of an IT regime is an explicit inflation 
target and strong central bank legal commitments to the transparency, accountability, and 
credibility of price stability in conducting monetary policies (e.g., Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin 
& Savastano, 2001). Policy makers expect that an IT regime may have favorable effects on 
macroeconomic stability with low inflation and the stability of inflation and output. There 
have existed many studies on the economic effects of this regime theoretically and 
empirically. However, the adoption of IT may have several effects in various contexts. Thus, 
this dissertation attempts to discuss how the IT adoption relates to three aspects: (i) income 
velocity (domestic economy); (ii) exchange market pressure (external economy); (iii) central 
bank credibility (institutional factor). This dissertation is composed of three studies: the first 
study examines the impact of an IT regime on income velocity, the second study investigates 
the impact of an IT regime on the exchange market pressure, and the third study analyses the 
impact of an IT regime on credibility of the central bank.  
The first study attempts to examine how inflation targeting relates to the variability 
of income velocity and its components across 84 developing countries during the period 
from 1990 to 2013. Developing economies tend to prefer or rely upon monetary policy rule 
with monetary aggregates due to institutional constraints on monetary policy conduct. 
Although inflation targeting has been adopted as an alternative monetary policy framework 
in various developing countries, many developing countries are still adopting monetary 
aggregates targeting due to unmatured money and financial markets. However, monetary 
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aggregates targeting often fails to achieve the macroeconomic stability. One crucial 
condition for monetary aggregates to be effective is the stability of income velocity. Income 
velocity is more volatile in developing countries than in advanced countries so that stability 
of income velocity is crucial to achieve macroeconomic stability under monetary aggregates 
targeting. Taylor (2000) highlights that monetary targeting and inflation targeting can 
coexist and monetary aggregates would be an appropriate instrument to achieve inflation 
target in developing countries. If the adoption of IT stabilizes income velocity, monetary 
authorities can justify monetary aggregates as an appropriate instrument under an IT regime. 
Thus, the first study attempts to examine the relationship between an IT regime and income 
velocity in developing countries. The results suggest that inflation targeting would help 
stabilize income velocity in developing countries. In addition, a decomposition analysis of 
income velocity generally shows that inflation targeting would reduce the volatilities of 
inflation, real output growth, and money growth. Our results provide empirical support for 
the argument that stable income velocity associated with inflation targeting could improve 
the effectiveness of monetarism, such that monetary aggregates can serve as an appropriate 
instrument under inflation targeting regime in developing countries. 
The second study examines how inflation targeting (IT) relates to the variabilities of 
exchange market pressure and its components over 101 developing countries, of which 16 
are IT countries. Fundamental domestic policies, including monetary policy, may affect a 
country’s external sector. Since foreign exchange markets often induce unstable external 
conditions, sound monetary arrangement is required for developing economies, which often 
confront foreign exchange market instability, to absorb exchange market pressures under a 
globalized world. To capture such market pressures, this study uses the sum of the nominal 
exchange rate depreciation and the percentage change of international reserves holdings 
scaled by the base money. Taylor (2001) and Rose (2007) highlight that examining the link 
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between an IT regime and the external economy is a crucial matter for financial regulators 
since an IT regime is not only domestically focused policy framework but also related to the 
exchange rate stability. If IT regime helps stabilize the exchange market pressures, policy 
makers will achieve the favorable external conditions and macroeconomic stability under an 
IT regime. Thus, the second study attempts to investigate the relationship between an IT 
regime and exchange market pressure in developing countries. The empirical results show 
that an IT regime helps stabilize exchange market pressure, and it reduces the volatility of 
changes in international reserves. This result reflects the argument that the policy 
commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of monetary policy conduct, and thus 
monetary authorities would not be required to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
under an IT regime. 
The third study examine whether the IT adoption helps improve the credibility of 
central bank, which could be captured by the central banks’ independence and transparency, 
over 83 advanced and developing countries during the period from 1998 to 2010. The 
credibility of monetary policy is crucial for macroeconomic and financial stability. Some 
literatures discuss that the monetary policy credibility is closely related to the institutional 
structure of central banks and their structural reforms (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2002; 
Eijffinger et al., 2006). Recently, central banks’ institutional reforms on independence and 
transparency has prevailed in developing countries that often face economic and financial 
instability as well as political pressures. The conventional theory argues that central bank 
independent (CBI) reduces the time-inconsistency problem and the inflationary bias. In 
addition, the recent trend of central bank independence has demanded accountability, 
legitimacy considerations and guidance, which call for central bank transparency (CBT). 
CBT also improves the credibility as it allows the market participants to assess the 
consistency of the central bank’s actions with their mandates. At the same time, the adoption 
iv 
of IT is one of the crucial monetary policy frameworks, which is expected to increase the 
credibility. Thus, the third study attempts to examine the link between the adoption of IT 
and the credibility of the central bank, which can be captured by CBI and CBT in both 
advanced and developing countries and to discuss the differences between them. Our results 
find that an IT regime helps improve central bank transparency in both advanced and 
developing countries. More interestingly, our analysis reveals a clear difference in the IT 
effect on central bank independence between advanced and developing economies. The IT 
adoption improves independence in advanced countries, but lowers in developing countries. 
The negative effect of an IT regime on independence in developing countries reflects the 
argument that monetary authorities in developing countries might still be required to 
coordinate with other political or governmental institutions in conducting the monetary 
policy objectives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Inflation targeting (IT) regime has become popular as an alternative monetary policy 
framework since the early 1990’s. New Zealand is the first IT adoption country since it has 
adopted in 1990. As of 2013, fourteen advanced countries and fifteen developing countries 
have adopted an IT regime to achieve better macroeconomic conditions. The main feature 
of an IT regime is an explicit inflation target and strong central bank legal commitments to 
the transparency, accountability, and credibility of price stability in conducting monetary 
policies (e.g., Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin & Savastano, 2001). An official announcement of an 
inflation target improves a central bank’s credibility and helps to lower inflation and the 
volatilities of inflation and real output (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 1997; 
Mishkin, 1999).  
Policy makers expect that an IT regime may have favorable effects on 
macroeconomic stability with low inflation and the stability of inflation and output. There 
have existed many studies on the economic effects of this regime theoretically and 
empirically. On the theoretical front, clear predictions have not been made regarding the 
effectiveness of IT. Several studies, including Bernanke and Woodford (2005), Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2005), Mishkin (2000, 2004), and Sims (2005), suggest that the current 
lack of institutional development and inconsistencies among macroeconomic conditions in 
developing countries could undermine the success of IT and result in worse outcomes. 
However, a number of other studies, such as Svensson (1997), Mishkin (1999), and 
Bernanke et al. (1999), argue that as the credibility of central banks is initially very low in 
emerging economies, the adoption of IT renders monetary policies more credible, thereby 
contributing to better macroeconomic outcomes in these economies.  
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Several empirical studies have also been conducted to explore the beneficial effects 
of the IT adoption and to check the empirical validity of the theoretical arguments. In general, 
most studies have applied two empirical methodologies such as difference-in-difference 
(DID) and propensity score matching (PSM) to discuss the effectiveness of an IT regime. 
Early empirical studies apply the DID approach and most studies do not find evidence that 
an IT regime can improve economic performance measures, such as inflation, inflation 
variability, and output volatility in advanced countries. Empirical studies focusing on 
developing and emerging economies, such as the work of Goncalves and Salles (2008), 
Batini and Laxon (2007), and Thornton (2016), follow Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) DID 
method. They show the mixed evidence the beneficial impacts of an IT regime in developing 
and emerging countries.  
Because of some drawbacks of the DID approach, the latter studies (e.g., Balima et 
al., 2017; de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Kadria & Ben Aissa, 2015, 2016; 
Lin, 2010; Lin & Ye, 2007, 2009; Lucotte, 2012; Samarina et al., 2014; Vega & Winkelried, 
2005) apply the PSM method to discuss IT effects in advanced countries, developing 
countries, or both.  Vega and Winkelried (2005) find that an IT regime can reduce inflation 
and its volatility in advanced and developing economies, suggesting that IT serves as an 
effective policy approach in both advanced and developing countries. Most studies find 
different results between advanced and developing countries by indicating that IT reduces 
inﬂation and its volatility in developing countries but does not affect advanced economies 
(Lin & Ye, 2007, 2009; De Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Samarina et al., 2014). 
Several empirical studies, mainly focusing on the IT impacts on inflation, output, and their 
volatilities generally show that IT is effective in developing countries although less effective 
in developed countries. However, the IT adoption might have several effects in various 
contexts. Thus, this dissertation attempts to examine the relationship between an IT regime 
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and three contents: the first content is how an IT regime relates to the income velocity, the 
second content is how an IT regime relates to the exchange market pressure, and the third 
content is how an IT regime relates to the credibility of the central bank.  
The first study examines the IT effect on income velocity. Although an IT regime 
has become popular even in developing countries, many developing countries are still 
adopting monetary aggregates targeting due to unmatured money and financial markets. 
However, monetary aggregates targeting is often ineffective with the frequently failure of 
macroeconomic stability. It is widely acknowledged that one crucial condition for monetary 
targeting to be effective is the stable relationship between money aggregates and nominal 
output, as demonstrated by income velocity in money, i.e., the stability of income velocity 
(see, e.g., Estrella & Mishkin, 1997; Mishkin, 2006). Unstable income velocity is one of the 
main reasons for ineffective monetary aggregates targeting (Mishkin, 2006). Income 
velocity is more volatile in developing countries than in advanced countries (Park, 1970). 
Thus, stability of income velocity is crucial to achieve macroeconomic stability under 
monetary aggregates targeting. Taylor (2000) highlights that monetary targeting and 
inflation targeting can coexist and monetary aggregates would be an appropriate instrument 
to achieve inflation target in developing countries due to real interest rate uncertainty. If an 
IT regime helps stabilize income velocity, monetary authorities can justify monetary 
aggregates targeting as an effective policy measure under an IT regime. Thus, the first study 
attempts to examine the relationship between an IT regime and income velocity in 
developing countries.  
The second study investigates the impact of an IT regime on the exchange market 
pressure. Developing countries have often experienced foreign exchange market instability. 
Since foreign exchange markets are closely related to external conditions of an economy, 
foreign exchange market turmoil often induce the instability of external economy so that a 
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sound monetary policy arrangement is important to absorb foreign exchange market 
pressures for their macroeconomic stability. In the literatures (see Eichengreen et al.,1994; 
Klaassen & Jager, 2011), exchange market pressure consists of two elements (i) exchange 
rate depreciation and (ii) losses in international reserves (associated with foreign exchange 
intervention). Taylor (2001) and Rose (2007) highlight that examining the link between an 
IT regime and the external economy is a crucial matter for financial regulators since an IT 
regime is not only domestically focused policy framework but also related to the exchange 
rate stability. If IT regime helps stabilize the exchange market pressures, policy makers will 
achieve the favorable external conditions and macroeconomic stability under an IT regime. 
Thus, the second study attempts to investigate the relationship between an IT regime and 
exchange market pressure in developing countries.  
The third study examines the effect of an IT regime on the credibility of the central 
bank. Achieving macroeconomic and financial stability requires monetary policy credibility, 
which is closely related to institutional structure of central banks and their structural reforms. 
Recently, central banks` institutional reform has prevailed in developing countries that often 
face economic and financial instability as well as political pressures. In the literatures, central 
banks` monetary policy credibility is closely related to (i) independence from the 
government and (ii) transparency to the public (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts,2002; Eijffinger et 
al., 2006). Some literatures (Garriga, 2016; Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014) constructed these 
indices to measure the central bank credibility. On the other hand, IT adoption is one of the 
crucial monetary policy reforms, which is expected to increase the monetary policy 
credibility. If an IT regime induces central bank credibility, policy makers might achieve 
favorable macroeconomic outcomes under IT regime. Thus, the third study will also examine 
the relationship between an IT regime and central bank credibility which is closely related 
to the institutional structure of central banks, particularly independence and transparency.  
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This dissertation applies the propensity score matching (PSM) method and entropy 
balancing method to discuss how the IT adoption relates to the following three contents, 
particularly in developing countries: income velocity relating to domestic economy; 
exchange market pressure relating to external economy; and central bank credibility relating 
to institutional factor. The empirical results in the first study generally suggest that inflation 
targeting would help stabilize income velocity in developing countries and monetary 
aggregates can serve as an appropriate instrument under IT regime in developing countries. 
The results in the second study show that an IT regime helps stabilize exchange market 
pressure, and it reduces the volatility of changes in international reserves. This result reflects 
the argument that the policy commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of 
monetary policy conduct, and thus monetary authorities would not be required to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market under an IT regime.  
The results in the third study find that an IT regime helps improve central bank 
transparency in both advanced and developing countries. More interestingly, our analysis 
reveals a clear difference in the IT effect on central bank independence between advanced 
and developing economies. The IT adoption improves independence in advanced countries 
but lowers it in developing countries. The negative IT effect on independence in developing 
countries reflects the argument in the political economy context that central authorities in 
developing countries give parts of the power to a central bank by allowing the central bank 
to fully control monetary policy (an IT regime) and to make it more transparent. However, 
at the same time central authorities attempt to keep their power by reducing the autonomy 
or independence of the central bank. 
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Chapter 2  
Inflation targeting and income velocity in developing 
economies: Some international evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
Inflation targeting (IT) regimes have recently been prevailed in several countries, including 
developing countries. The main feature of an IT regime is an explicit quantitative inflation 
target and strong central bank legal commitments to the transparency, accountability, and 
credibility of price stability when implementing monetary policies (e.g., Mishkin, 2000; 
Mishkin & Savastano, 2001). The main argument underlying this concept is that an official 
announcement of an inflation target improves a central bank’s credibility and helps to lower 
inflation and the volatilities of inflation and real output (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; 
Svensson, 1997; Mishkin, 1999). Indeed, as of 2013, fifteen non-OECD countries have 
adopted the IT regime. Moreover, many developing countries are still pursuing monetary 
targeting because of institutional constraints, such as the underdevelopment of money and 
financial markets with strict financial regulations and fiscal dominance with the lack of 
central bank independence (Roger, 2009). It is widely acknowledged that one crucial 
condition for monetary targeting to be effective is the stable relationship between money 
aggregates and nominal output, as demonstrated by income velocity in money, i.e., the 
stability of income velocity (see, e.g., Estrella & Mishkin, 1997; Mishkin, 2006).  
Taylor (2000) argues that an IT regime is not alternative to monetary policies that 
focus on monetary aggregates.1 He emphasizes that an IT regime must apply a policy rule to 
                                                          
1 There is no inconsistency between inflation targeting and monetary aggregates as the instrument in the policy 
rule, although some discussions indicate that inflation targeting serves as an alternative to monetary aggregate 
targeting. In fact, monetary aggregates might be applied as a plausible instrument to meet inflation targets due 
to the presence of real interest rate uncertainty in emerging economies (see, e.g., Taylor, 2000). 
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achieve the target and suggests that policies with monetary aggregates are preferable in 
developing countries because of substantial uncertainties related to measuring real interest 
rates or relatively large shocks in investments and net exports. More importantly, the stability 
of income velocity is of great importance for monetary aggregates to be a sound instrument 
in developing countries. Park (1970) notes that income velocity is more volatile in 
developing economies than in advanced economies because of their unstable economic, 
social, and political systems; volatile inflation patterns; and high degree of monetization (e.g., 
Driscoll & Lahiri, 1983; Chowdhury, 1994; Owoye, 1997). Moreover, several studies, 
including Lin and Ye (2007), indicate that volatile income velocity contributed to the 
breakdown of monetarism in the 1980s and has rendered monetary aggregate targeting an 
unreliable monetary framework. Because of unstable income velocity found in developing 
economies, Lin and Ye’s (2007) argument is more persuasive and convincing when applied 
to discussions of policy effectiveness in developing economies. Thus, the behaviors of 
income velocity have been of interest to monetary authorities in developing countries 
pursuing monetary aggregates as an effective form of monetary conduct.  
With the importance of stable income velocity and the recent trend of IT regime 
adoption, a crucial question concerns whether the IT regime can help stabilize income 
velocity in developing economies. If so, monetary authorities could justify the control of 
monetary aggregates as an effective policy measure under an IT regime. This study attempts 
to address such a crucial issue by empirically investigating the relationship between an IT 
regime and the behaviors of income velocity in developing economies. To the best of our 
knowledge, few studies have examined the role of income velocity in relation to the effects 
of the IT regime. Exceptions may include the work of Lin and Ye (2007), who analyze this 
issue for 22 advanced countries (7 of which are IT countries) by applying the propensity 
score matching (PSM) method to account for self-selection problems of policy adoption. 
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Their findings fail to show clear evidence of an IT effect on income velocity variability in 
advanced countries. Since macroeconomic conditions in developing economies differ from 
those of advanced economies and stabilizing income velocity is more critical for monetary 
policy decisions in developing economies, this study extends the work of Lin and Ye (2007) 
on advanced economies and discusses the IT effects on income velocity variability in 
developing economies.  
This study applies the PSM method to analyze the behaviors of income velocity in 
relation to the adoption of the IT regime in 84 developing countries from 1990 to 2013 
following the work of Balima et al. (2017), de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), 
Lin (2010), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), Lucotte (2012), Samarina et al. (2014), and Vega and 
Winkelried (2005). Policy debates have been conducted to determine the countries that have 
actually adopted the IT regime in an effective manner (Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 2005; 
Mishkin, 2004; Sims, 2005; Svensson, 1997). Among the various definitions of an adoption 
year, this study uses the ‘loose’ and ‘strict’ type of adoption years following Rose (2007), 
Lin (2010), and Samarina et al. (2014), with a loose adoption year representing the earliest 
adoption year in which inflation targets are announced without strong commitments and a 
strict adoption year representing the latest year in which credible commitments are made to 
achieve inflation targets with a single inflation target via monetary policies.  
In addition, given that income velocity can be decomposed into price levels, real 
outputs, and money holdings (real output and real money holdings) as in the conventional 
Fisher equation, we also investigate how the behaviors of each component of income 
velocity change during pre- and post-IT periods. This decomposition allows us to discuss 
issues of monetary channels that emerge once an IT regime is adopted by identifying the 
sources of the behavioral evolution of income velocity. Furthermore, this study attempts to 
examine heterogeneous features of the performance of an IT regime. Empirical studies, such 
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as the work of Carare and Stone (2006), Mishkin (2004), and Fraga et al. (2003), indicate 
that heterogeneity in economic and institutional development should play an important role 
in determining the performance of an IT regime because emerging economies face differing 
levels of economic and institutional development compared with those found in advanced 
economies. Lin and Ye (2009) explore the heterogeneous features of IT effects and show 
that the performance of an IT regime in terms of inflation and its volatility is more effective 
in developing countries with favorable preconditions of IT adoption and fiscal positioning 
but less effective in countries presenting substantial limitations in terms of exchange rate 
fluctuations. Our study follows the work of Lin and Ye (2009) in evaluating the 
heterogeneous effects of an IT regime on the volatility of income velocity and related 
variables of interest. 
To check the validity of the results derived from the PSM method, this study further 
applies the difference-in-difference (DID) approach as an alternative method. The DID 
approach is also widely used in the IT-related literature (e.g., Ball & Sheridan, 2005; Batini 
& Laxton, 2007; Goncalves & Salles, 2008; Thornton, 2016; Samarina et al., 2014), although 
the approach suffers from several critical methodological problems (e.g., the identification 
of IT adoption years for countries that have never adopted an IT regime). The empirical 
analysis shows clear evidence supporting the role of an IT regime in stabilizing income 
velocity in developing countries; however, our results are inconsistent with the findings of 
Lin and Ye (2007), who do not observe IT effects on income velocity variability in advanced 
countries. Monetary frameworks in developing countries tend to rely on the control of money 
aggregates because of the presence of immature money and financial markets along with 
highly regulated financial operations and stringent credit and interest rate controls. Taylor 
(2000) stresses that because of the presence of several institutional constraints on monetary 
policy conduct, monetary authorities in developing economies might prefer or rely on 
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monetary policy rule with monetary aggregates to achieve an inflation target, particularly 
under conditions of stable income velocity. Our results on the effects of IT on income 
velocity provide empirical support for Taylor’s (2000) suggestion that monetary aggregates 
would be appropriate instruments under an IT regime in developing countries.  
In addition, our decomposition analysis of income velocity shows that IT would 
reduce the volatilities of inflation, real output growth, and money aggregate growth. Many 
empirical studies have examined the relationships between income velocity and 
macroeconomic conditions, such as money holdings and inflation rates. 2  For example, 
Owoye’s (1997) study on income velocity patterns in 30 less-developed countries shows that 
income velocity volatility is mainly a result of money growth in most sampled countries and 
indicates that fluctuations in real output and inflation rates are also central to the 
determination of income velocity volatility depending on the sampled country. Our empirical 
findings related to the decomposition of income velocity are partly consistent with the 
findings of Owoye (1997). IT adoption enables developing countries to satisfy crucial 
conditions for the effective use of monetary aggregates, which require the presence of money 
demand stability as well as income velocity stability as argued by Estrella and Mishkin 
(1997) and Mishkin (2006). Concerning heterogeneous effects, our estimations show that an 
IT regime is more effective at stabilizing income velocity in developing countries that satisfy 
favorable preconditions of IT adoption under a floating exchange rate regime.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a literature review on IT 
regime adoption is presented. In section 3, we estimate the average treatment (IT) effects on 
the treated (ATT) by applying PSM methods; present our empirical results on the effects of 
an IT regime on inflation, inflation volatility, income velocity volatility, real output growth 
volatility, money growth volatility, and real money balance growth volatility; explore the 
                                                          
2 See Ezekiel and Adekunle (1969), Park (1970), Melitz and Correa (1970), and Chowdhury (1994) for 
traditional approaches on income velocity. 
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heterogeneous effects of adopting an IT regime; and report the results of our alternative DID 
analysis. In section 4, our conclusions are presented.  
2.2 Literature review  
The IT regime has been widely adopted by several central banks as a policy measure. Since 
then many researchers have conducted studies on the economic effects of this regime 
theoretically and empirically. On the theoretical front, clear predictions have not been made 
regarding the effectiveness of IT. Several studies, including Bernanke and Woodford (2005), 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005), Mishkin (2000, 2004), and Sims (2005), suggest that 
the current lack of institutional development and inconsistencies among macroeconomic 
conditions in developing countries could undermine the success of IT and result in worse 
outcomes. However, a number of other studies, such as Svensson (1997), Mishkin (1999), 
and Bernanke et al. (1999), argue that as the credibility of central banks is initially very low 
in emerging economies, the adoption of IT renders monetary policies more credible, thereby 
contributing to better macroeconomic outcomes in these economies.  
Several empirical studies have also been conducted to explore the effectiveness of 
IT regimes to check the empirical validity of the theoretical arguments. In general, the 
literature has addressed this issue by applying two empirical methodologies: DID and PSM.3 
Early empirical studies, such as the work by Neumann and von Hagen (2002), apply the DID 
approach. However, such studies can suffer from endogeneity problems because the initial 
levels of inflation may influence the likelihood of a country adopting an IT regime. Ball and 
Sheridan’s (2005) study on advanced economies solves such endogeneity problems by 
                                                          
3 Some studies have applied panel estimation techniques, including dynamic panel estimations, to discuss the 
effectiveness of an IT regime. For example, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Willard (2012) show that 
an IT regime plays a less significant role in improving macroeconomic performance. In addition, Brito and 
Bystedt (2010) indicate that an IT regime would not improve economic performance (e.g., inflation and output 
growth) in developing countries. Moreover, Alpanda and Honig (2014) show that the effects of IT regimes on 
inflation depend on the degree of central bank independence. Pontines (2013) applies a generalization of the 
bivariate selection model (Heckman, 1979) to take into account the self-selection problem and presents that an 
IT regime lowers exchange rate volatility in developing countries but increases it in advanced countries. 
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considering these initial conditions as an independent variable in DID model specifications, 
and the authors do not find evidence that an IT regime can improve economic performance 
measures, such as inflation, inflation variability, and output volatility. Ball’s (2010) updated 
study on the DID approach also fails to identify significant impacts of an IT regime on 
economic performance (e.g., inflation and output) in advanced economies. Empirical studies 
focusing on developing and emerging economies, such as the work of Goncalves and Salles 
(2008), Batini and Laxon (2007), and Thornton (2016), follow Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) 
DID method.  
However, Ball and Sheridan’s (2005) DID approach suffers from some critical 
methodological problems. Bertrand et al. (2004) highlight that consistency among the “pre” 
and “post” periods for every country occurs only when all IT countries have adopted an IT 
regime at the same time. However, because IT regimes have been adopted by different 
countries at different times, the “pre” and “post” periods are not consistent for all IT 
countries; therefore, we must identify adoption timing arbitrarily for non-IT countries. 
Moreover, as noted by Lin and Ye (2007), the DID method fails to solve self-selectivity 
problems related to policy adoption. Because of these drawbacks of the DID approach, recent 
works (e.g., Balima et al., 2017; de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Kadria & 
Ben Aissa, 2015, 2016; Lin, 2010; Lin & Ye, 2007, 2009; Lucotte, 2012; Samarina et al., 
2014; Vega & Winkelried, 2005) apply the PSM approach to discuss IT effects in advanced 
countries, developing countries, or both. Vega and Winkelried (2005) find that an IT regime 
can reduce inflation and its volatility in advanced and developing economies, suggesting that 
IT serves as an effective policy approach in both advanced and developing countries. 
However, several studies on the framework of the PSM approach present different results on 
the effectiveness of an IT regime for different country groups.4 For example, Lin and Ye 
                                                          
4 Several works have studied the effects of IT regimes on some macroeconomic conditions other than inflation, 
inflation volatility, and output volatility via the PSM method. For example, Lin (2010) shows that the IT regime 
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(2007) show a less clear impact of an IT regime on inflation and its volatility in advanced 
countries, and Lin and Ye (2009) find significant impacts of an IT regime in developing 
countries. De Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) also find different results 
between advanced and developing countries by showing that IT reduces inﬂation and its 
volatility in developing countries but does not affect advanced economies. Samarina et al. 
(2014) employ the DID and PSM methods and show that the IT regime reduces inﬂation in 
developing countries but not in advanced economies. 
Income velocity variability is our main focus, and several studies have empirically 
tested whether an IT regime can help stabilize income velocity. Exceptions include the work 
of Lin and Ye (2007), who apply the PSM approach to investigate the impacts of an IT 
regime on the volatility of income velocity in advanced countries. Their empirical results 
show no evidence that an IT regime contributes to the stability of income velocity. However, 
their study focuses only on the effectiveness of an IT regime in advanced countries, and to 
the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive studies have been conducted on this issue with 
regard to developing countries. Since income velocity is more volatile in developing 
countries than advanced countries (Park, 1970) and volatile income velocities render 
targeting monetary aggregates an unreliable monetary framework (Lin & Ye, 2007), the 
effectiveness of an IT regime in stabilizing income velocity should be crucial for monetary 
policies applied in developing countries. 
 
 
                                                          
reduces levels of real and nominal exchange rate volatility while increasing international reserves in developing 
countries, although it intensifies exchange rate instability and reduces international reserves in advanced 
economies. Lucotte (2012) indicates that IT regimes have a positive significant effect on tax revenue collection 
in developing countries. Kadria and Ben Aissa (2015, 2016) evaluate the time-varying treatment effects of IT 
adoption using the propensity score matching approach and conclude that an IT regime can help reduce budget 
deficits in emerging economies. In addition, Kadria and Ben Aissa (2015) show that the positive effect of an 
IT regime on exchange rate volatility diminishes over time in emerging countries. Balima et al. (2017) show 
that IT adoption reduces levels of sovereign debt risk. 
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2.3 Empirical analysis 
2.3.1 Methodology and data 
Following Ball and Sheridan (2005), previous empirical studies on IT regimes have applied 
the DID method (Goncalves & Salles, 2008; Batini & Laxon, 2007; Thornton, 2016). 
However, as noted in the previous section, the DID method can suffer from identification 
problems related to the time of IT regime adoption among non-IT countries as well as from 
self-selectivity problems related to policy adoption (Bertrand et al., 2004; Lin & Ye, 2007). 
Recently, several studies have employed the PSM framework to mitigate such problems (e.g., 
Balima et al., 2017; de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Lin, 2010; Lin & Ye, 
2007, 2009; Lucotte, 2012; Samarina et al., 2014; Vega & Winkelried, 2005). The PSM 
method is a statistical matching technique that estimates the effect of a treatment by taking 
into account observed covariates that predict receiving the treatment and it attempts to 
mitigate biases resulting from the presence of confounding variables in estimates of 
treatment effects obtained from simple comparisons of the outcomes between units with 
treatment versus those without treatment.  
A country’s decision to adopt an IT regime can be endogenous since the policy 
approach is often influenced by various macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and institutional 
conditions. We also apply the PSM method to investigate the effectiveness of an IT regime 
for developing countries. The PSM method involves the application of a two-step procedure. 
As a first step, this study estimates the propensity score of each country studied, which is the 
conditional probability that a country will adopt an IT regime based on the country’s 
characteristics: 
              P(X) = Prob(D = 1|X) = E(D|X),      (1) 
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where D is a treatment or IT dummy that takes a value of one when a country uses an IT 
regime and a value of zero otherwise and X is the matrix of the country’s characteristics. 
Following the work of Lin and Ye (2007), we apply a probit model to estimate propensity 
scores.  
Concerning the IT dummy used a dependent variable, a clear consensus has not been 
reached on the exact date by which each country has implemented an IT regime, although 
the correct identification of adoption years is crucial to evaluating the effects of an IT regime. 
Vega and Winkelried (2005) propose two types of IT adoption dates, soft and full-fledged 
adoption dates, and they define soft IT as a simple announcement of numerical inflation 
targets and a transition to a complete IT regime (i.e., the partial adoption of an IT regime) 
and full-fledged IT as a complete IT regime (i.e., the explicit adoption of an IT regime in the 
absence of nominal anchors other than inflation targets). Similarly, Rose (2007) proposes 
two types of adoption dates (default and conservative dates) that are nearly consistent with 
the adoption dates of Vega and Winkelried (2005). In this study, we use two types of 
adoption years (‘loose’ and ‘strict’ adoption years) that correspond to the soft and full-
fledged adoption dates proposed by Vega and Winkelried (2005), respectively, as in the 
studies of de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) and Samaria et al. (2014). Table 
2.1 shows a list of IT countries with loose and strict adoption years, and Table 2.2 presents 
the non-IT countries included in our sample.  
The probit model applies several variables that are expected to drive IT regime 
selection following de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Lin and Ye (2007), and 
Samaria et al. (2014).5 The model includes the one-year lagged inflation rate. Some studies, 
                                                          
5 As noted by Lin and Ye (2007), finding an appropriate statistical model that explains the probability of IT 
adoption is not the main goal of estimating propensity scores. Under conditional independence assumptions, 
the exclusion of variables that systematically affect the likelihood of IT adoption but do not affect outcome 
variables, such as inflation and its volatility, is not problematic in the case of probit regressions (see Persson, 
2001, for a more detailed explanation). 
16 
including Truman (2003), Lin and Ye (2009), Masson et al. (1997), and Minella et al. (2003), 
suggest that a country tends to adopt an IT regime when its inflation rate is at a reasonably 
low level because announcing a target far from the actual inflation rate can lose the 
credibility of its central bank. We also consider the real per capita GDP growth rate to 
capture a country’s level of economic development, which is expected to be a precondition 
of IT adoption (Truman, 2003; Lin & Ye, 2007). The model also incorporates broad money 
growth into the model because high levels of broad money growth are expected to decrease 
the likelihood of IT adoption because of the presence of strong inflationary pressures. In 
addition, fiscal balance is also included in the model. As noted in Mishkin (2004) and de 
Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), under a government’s balanced budget, debt 
monetization or government budget financing by a central bank are not needed, particularly 
for developing countries. Thus, sound fiscal conditions can be a precondition for the 
adoption of an IT regime. However, studies on fiscal theory of price levels initiated by 
Woodford (2001) suggest that the determination of price levels is a fiscal phenomenon; 
therefore, the control of money is not sufficient for determining paths of inflation. In this 
case, the presence of sound fiscal conditions implies less inflationary pressure, which can 
reduce the motivations for IT adoption. 
To control for economic conditions related to external trade and finance, we 
incorporate the fixed exchange rate regime dummy, trade openness, and financial openness 
in the probit model. Some studies, including Hu (2006), find that the flexibility of exchange 
rates would enhance a country’s motivations for adopting IT regimes. The exchange rate 
nominal anchor should be subordinate to IT because the rigidity of exchange rates is not 
suitable for IT policies in the long-run (Brenner & Sokoler, 2010). In addition, trade 
openness or integration with international markets reduces the inflation biases of central 
banks (Romer, 1993; Rogoff, 2003), which might not necessitate the adoption of an IT 
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regime. Moreover, financial integration can affect the nature of central bank monetary 
conduct, including motivations to adopt IT policies in the midst of globalization processes 
(de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Mishkin, 2004; Samarina et al., 2014; Truman, 
2003). Furthermore, we include time trends in the probit model following de Mendonca and 
de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) and Samarina et al. (2014). 
Data on inflation, real GDP per capita, broad money, imports and exports were 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), whereas data on 
fiscal balance were obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO). Trade openness is 
calculated from the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. We use the de facto 
exchange rate arrangement classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to define 
the dummy of a fixed exchange rate regime, which takes a value of one when a country 
adopts a fixed exchange rate regime (categories 1 to 3) and a value of zero otherwise.6 To 
measure the degrees of financial openness, we use the Chinn-Ito capital account openness 
index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). Some developing countries have experienced 
periods of hyper-inflation or hyper-growth of broad money. Because the presence of such 
outlier values may significantly influence the estimates, two techniques are commonly used 
to remove outliers. The first approach involves fully excluding countries that have 
experienced extremely high inflation rates (the inflation rate exceeds a specified level) in at 
least one year over the course of the sample period. The second approach involves discarding 
only the observations occurring in periods that show extremely high inflation rates. Samarina 
et al. (2014) use the first approach, whereas Goncalves and Salles (2008) and Lin and Ye 
                                                          
6  In general, two different classifications are used as measures of exchange rate regimes. As a de jure 
classification, the International Monetary Fund publishes the self-reported exchange rate regime statuses of 
member countries. However, a country’s actual choice of exchange rate regimes often differs from its self-
reported status. Thus, many studies use the de facto classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
Although countries, particularly developing countries, facing ‘fear to floating’ conditions (Calvo & Reinhart, 
2002) may officially announce the adoption of a floating regime, they often involve foreign market 
intervention; therefore, in practice, their actual regimes can be viewed as managed exchange rate regimes. 
Hence, we also use a de facto exchange rate regime classification. 
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(2009) use the second approach. We applied the latter approach by excluding only the 
observations of outliers based on inflation and broad money growth rates above 70 percent. 
We consider 84 developing countries, of which 15 countries are IT countries, for the period 
from 1990 to 2013.  
As a second step, we estimate the ATT by using propensity scores estimated from 
the probit model in the first step according to the following equation: 
 
             ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1] − E[Yi0|Di = 1],     (2) 
 
where Di is the IT dummy for country i; Yi1 and Yi0 are potential outcomes of the IT and 
non-IT regimes (two counterfactual situations), respectively; Yi0|Di = 1 is the value of the 
outcome of our interest that would have been observed of the IT country had not adopted an 
IT regime; and Yi1|Di = 1 is the value of the outcome that is actually observed in the same 
country. A crucial problem concerns the difficulty of estimating the ATT because of the 
unobservable value of E[Yi0|Di = 1]. When a country’s choice of IT regime is random, the 
ATT can be estimated from differences in the sample means of the outcome variable between 
the groups of the IT and non-IT countries.  
However, as noted for the first step, IT regime selection is not random in the sense 
that such a choice is systematically correlated with a set of observable covariates that also 
affect the outcome variable, thereby creating problems in the selection of observables (e.g., 
Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al., 1998). To mitigate such a problem, we apply the 
PSM method following Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) and Lin (2010), who use a control group 
of non-IT countries to mimic a randomized experiment. Once the propensity score p(X) is 
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given, the ATT is estimated under two main assumptions, i.e., conditional independence and 
common support assumptions7, as follows: 
 
              ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1, p(Xi)] − E[Yi0|Di = 0, p(Xi)]               (3) 
 
By utilizing the propensity scores estimated via the probit model, we apply four PSM 
methods that are commonly used in the literature to estimate the ATT. The first matching 
method is the nearest-neighbor matching without replacement, which matches each treated 
observation to the n control observations that have the closest propensity scores, but each 
control observation is used no more than one time as a match for a treated observation. We 
use two nearest-neighbor matching estimators: n = 1  and n = 3 . The second method 
involves radius matching, where each treated observation is matched with control 
observations with estimated propensity scores that fall within a specified radius. We use two 
radius matching estimators: r = 0.05  and r = 0.1 . The next method involves kernel 
matching method, which matches each treated observation to control observations with 
weights inversely proportional to the distance between the treated and control observations. 
We use two kernel matching methods: Gaussian and Epanechnikov. The latter matching 
                                                          
7 The PSM method applied in this study is based on the method presented in Lin and Ye (2007, 2009). An 
initial assumption indicates that the assignment of treatments (IT regime selection) is independent of potential 
outcomes conditional on the observed covariates X, i.e., Y0, Y1 ⊥ D|X. As suggested by Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) 
and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), under the conditional independence assumption, the average treatment 
effect (ATE) is equal to the average treatment effect on the treated ( ATT), and ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1] −
E[Yi0|Di = 1] is rewritten as ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1, Xi] − E[Yi0|Di = 0, Xi]. Heckman et al. (1998) note that the 
ATT can be estimated consistently under a weaker independence assumption of E[Yi0|Di = 1, Xi] =
E[Yi0|Di = 0, Xi] , which requires that the outcomes of non-IT countries are independent of IT adoption 
decisions based on the observed covariates X. Such a weaker assumption generally yields different values of 
ATE  and ATT . However, as the number of observed covariates increases, the ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1, Xi] −
E[Yi0|Di = 0, Xi] equation becomes more difficult to estimate. To solve this high-dimensional set of observed 
covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) recommend that treatment and control observations be matched 
based on propensity scores p(Xi), which are estimated from the probit model. The second assumption (0 <
p(Xi) < 1) suggests that every observation comes with a non-zero probability of IT regime adoption, which 
requires the presence of comparable control observations for each treated observation.  
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method involves applying the regression-adjusted local linear matching approach developed 
by Heckman et al. (1998).  
2.3.2 Empirical results 
Our main interest is to determine how IT adoption affects income velocity variability in 
developing countries. By definition, income velocity is composed of price levels, real 
outputs, and broad money (or real output and real money balance). Thus, we attempt to 
evaluate IT effects by estimating the treatment effect of an IT regime on the volatility of 
income velocity as well as on the volatilities of its components to discuss sources of income 
velocity variability. Similar to the works of Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), we measure the 
volatilities of income velocity, inflation, output growth, broad money growth, and real 
money balance growth as the standard deviation of variables over the previous seven years.8 
Concerning the timing of IT adoption, we use two different IT adoption years as noted in the 
previous subsection. We identify developing countries based on the IMF’s country 
classification.9 
2.3.2.1 Estimating propensity scores 
The distribution of measured baseline covariates should be performed independent of the 
treatment assignments conditional on the true propensity score. Thus, we should confirm 
that our probit model is adequately specified by examining whether the distribution of 
observed covariates is similar between the treated and control observations with the same 
estimated propensity score. We conduct balancing tests that generally support the balancing 
                                                          
8 Our volatility measures are calculated by the standard deviation of the gap between the current variable and 
its seven-year moving average over the past seven years. 
9 To ensure that the treatment and control groups are comparable, Lin and Ye (2009) and Lin (2010) exclude 
some non-IT countries with substantially different features (e.g., real GDP per capita) from IT countries. We 
also follow their method by constructing a different dataset by excluding some non-IT countries whose real 
GDP per capita levels are lower than those of the smallest IT country. The estimated results generally coincide 
with the results of the original dataset (see Table 2.8).  
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properties for our covariates.10 Once the probit model is specified, we first estimate the 
propensity scores. As discussed in the previous subsection, we expect to find negative 
coefficient signs for the one-year lagged inflation rate, broad money growth, trade openness, 
fixed exchange rate regime, and fiscal balance and positive coefficient signs for the real per 
capita GDP growth rate and financial openness.  
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the probit model for the loose IT and strict 
IT regimes.11 Most estimates are generally consistent with our expected signs except for the 
coefficient on broad money growth, which shows insignificant results. The estimation results 
indicate that countries with higher inflation rates for the previous period, sound fiscal 
conditions, higher levels of trade openness, and a fixed exchange rate regime are less likely 
to adopt an IT regime. In addition, countries with higher GDP per capita growth and more 
financial openness are more likely to adopt an IT regime. These results generally coincide 
with the findings of previous studies (e.g., de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Lin 
& Ye, 2007).  
 
                                                          
10 Once the balancing condition (D ⊥ X|p(X)) is satisfied, a conclusion can be made as to whether the treatment 
and control groups with similar propensity scores follow the similar distribution of observed characteristics 
(covariates) independent of the treatment status. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present the mean values of the covariates 
of the treatment and control groups and the p-value of a balancing test for the loose and strict IT regimes, 
respectively. We report three balancing tests for income velocity volatility (the test results for other outcome 
variables are available on request). The null hypothesis of the balancing test is that the mean values of the 
covariates are similar for both the treatment and control groups. For the balancing tests of the strict IT regime, 
the mean values of all variables of both the IT and non-IT countries after matching become similar with the 
evidence that the p-values fail to reject the null hypothesis. However, the balancing test results for the loose IT 
regime are less convincing for some covariates. The null of identical means is rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level for financial openness under the nearest-neighbor matching condition (p-value of 0.09) as 
well as under lagged inflation and GDP per capita growth based on radius (p-values of 0.06 and 0.04) and 
kernel matching (p-values of 0.07 and 0.05). Thus, matching generally helps reduce the bias in distributions of 
observables for the IT and non-IT country groups. 
11 For the robustness checks of our empirical results, we follow the work of Lin and Ye (2009) and examine 
whether the results are sensitive to alternative specifications of the probit model by adding government debt to 
GDP ratio and the turnover rate of central bank governors, which are obtained from Ali Abbas et al. (2010) 
and Cukierman et al. (1992), respectively. The turnover index was supplemented with data from Crowe and 
Meade (2007) and Dreher et al. (2008). In addition, we also check whether our results are robust to different 
sample periods by estimating the original probit model over the alternative sample period from 1990 to 2007. 
These robustness checks do not undermine our results (see the estimated results of the probit models and the 
ATTs in Tables 2.11 and 2.12, respectively). 
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2.3.2.2 Average treatment effects 
Once the propensity scores are estimated, we estimate the ATT by applying matching 
methods. We first attempt to ensure the sharing of the same support or to confirm the highly 
and reasonably comparability between the treatment and control groups. As in the works of 
Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) and Thornton and Vasilakis (2017), we reconstruct the dataset that 
satisfies the common support assumption by sorting all observations based on estimated 
propensity scores and discarding control units with propensity scores that fall below the 
lowest treatment unit value and exceed the highest treatment unit value. Table 4 reports the 
matching results for the loose and strict IT regimes based on the modified samples. The first 
seven columns of Table 2.4 report the results of the loose IT regime, and the last seven 
columns show the results of the strict IT regime. We present the estimated ATTs of the seven 
types of matching methods with analytical standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors. 
Many studies have generally highlighted the effectiveness of IT regimes in terms of inflation 
levels in developing countries, whereas other studies, such as Thornton (2016), doubt their 
effectiveness. The first row of Table 4 highlights the important role of an IT regime in 
reducing the inflation level, although less clear negative effects are observed under a loose 
IT regime. This result is consistent with the findings of Samarina et al. (2014), Lin and Ye 
(2009) and de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) on the IT effects in developing 
countries.  
The main concern in this study is on the variabilities of income velocity and its 
components as the outcome variables, which allows us to discuss the role of stable income 
velocities in the monetary policy frameworks of developing countries. The second row of 
Table 4 shows the ATT results of the IT regime in terms of income velocity volatility, and 
the last four rows present the ATT estimates of the IT regime for volatilities in inflation, 
output growth, money growth, and real money balance growth. The estimated results show 
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that income velocity volatility is negatively significant irrespective of the choice of the IT 
regime, which indicates that IT adoption helps stabilize income velocity in developing 
countries. In addition, the results clearly show that IT adoption reduces volatilities of 
inflation and output growth in loose and strict IT regimes. Moreover, IT adoption reduces 
volatilities of money growth and real money balance growth in a loose IT regime, whereas 
the estimated ATTs are negative, although insignificant for a strict IT regime. The 
decomposition analysis generally shows that a reduction in income velocity volatility 
originates from all of its components (inflation, real output growth, money growth, and real 
money balance growth), although less clear results on money growth and real money balance 
growth in the case of a strict IT regime. Our results on the role of IT policies in stabilizing 
income velocity variability in developing countries stands in sharp contrast with the findings 
of Lin and Ye (2007), who showed an insignificant link between IT adoption and income 
velocity volatility in advanced countries. 
Historically, as a solution after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the mid-
1970s, many countries initiated a monetary targeting framework. Inspired by monetarists’ 
quantity theory of money, central banks, mainly those in advanced countries, started to apply 
monetary aggregates as intermediate targets through their monetary policy conduct (Argy et 
al., 1990; Mishkin, 2006; Woodford, 2008). During this period, the success of monetary 
targeting required the presence of a strong relationship between targeted monetary 
aggregates and inflation and/or nominal income, i.e., income velocity, along with stability 
in money demand (Estrella & Mishkin, 1997; Mishkin, 2006). An early study by Ritter 
(1959) also stresses that income velocity instability generates ineffective monetary policies. 
However, many countries experienced periods of volatile income velocity with the unstable 
money demand in the 1980s, thereby inducing the breakdown of monetarism and monetary 
targeting (Lin & Ye, 2007). Roger (2009) notes that many advanced countries started to 
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abandon monetary targeting in the 1980s and all advanced countries had abandoned it by the 
late 1990s.  
However, developing economies adopted monetary targeting in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and some are still pursuing this monetary framework. According to historical arguments on 
monetary frameworks, stable income velocity is central to successful monetary targeting in 
developing economies. Early studies, such as Park (1970) and Melitz and Correa (1970), 
show international variations in income velocity, with Park (1970) finding that less-
developed countries are generally characterized by higher levels of income velocity 
variability than advanced countries because of their unstable economic, social, and political 
systems; volatile inflation patterns; and the large degree of monetization (see, e.g., Driscoll 
& Lahiri, 1983; Chowdhury, 1994; Owoye, 1997). Owoye (1997) investigates sources of 
income velocity volatility in less-developed countries and shows that income velocity 
volatility is mainly a result of money growth in most sampled countries, and fluctuations of 
real output and inflation rates are also central in determining income velocity volatility 
depending on sampled countries. As the IT regime has recently become more popular, some 
developing countries have also adopted it as a monetary policy framework. With the 
importance of stable income velocity and the current trend of the adoption of an IT regime, 
one crucial question concerns whether an IT regime can help stabilize income velocity in 
developing economies. If so, then monetary targeting can serve as a reliable framework. Our 
estimation results support the effectiveness of an IT regime in decreasing income velocity 
variability and could provide monetary authorities in developing countries with the 
justification of the control of monetary aggregates as an effective policy measure applied 
under an IT regime.  
More importantly, our analysis results can also be linked to Taylor’s (2000) argument 
for policy consistency. Recent discussions on IT in emerging economies suggest that an IT 
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regime serves as an alternative to monetary aggregate targeting. However, Taylor (2000) 
argues that there is no inconsistency between IT and monetary aggregates as an instrument 
of policy rule and suggests that an IT regime does not serve as an alternative to policies that 
focus on monetary aggregates. Taylor (2000) also describes a policy rule for achieving 
targets under an IT regime. As a policy rule, an instrument can involve a short-term overnight 
interest rate, although monetary bases or other monetary aggregates can also be used as 
instruments. As noted by Poole (1970), the choice of a policy rule between interest rates and 
monetary bases (or other monetary aggregates) as instruments is essential. Monetary 
aggregates would be the preferred instrument when considerable uncertainty is involved in 
measuring real interest rates or when relatively significant shocks to investment or net 
exports occur. Moreover, when income velocity is relatively stable, monetary aggregates 
would be the better instrument. Taylor (2000) stresses that the preference for the interest rate 
as the instrument primarily reflects income velocity uncertainty, but developing economies 
often face the circumstances where real interest rate is difficult to measure and the overnight 
nominal interest rate is not a good policy measure. 12  In addition, developing countries 
experience several institutional constraints on monetary policy conduct (e.g., the 
underdevelopment of money and financial markets with strict financial regulations). Thus, 
monetary authorities in developing economies might prefer or rely on monetary policy rules 
with monetary aggregates to achieve inflation targets, particularly under conditions of stable 
income velocity. Our results showing the IT effects on income velocity provide empirical 
support for Taylor’s (2000) suggestion that monetary aggregates will be the appropriate 
instrument under an IT regime. 
                                                          
12 Taylor (2000) notes that such circumstances may be present in emerging countries. In a high inflation period, 
measuring the real interest rate and risk premiums is difficult. In a high growth period, determining and 
measuring the equilibrium real interest rate is also difficult. 
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 Concerning the sources of the IT role in reducing income velocity variability, our 
estimation results generally show that IT adoption would reduce volatilities of inflation and 
real output growth irrespective of the choice of the loose or strict IT regimes. This finding 
implies that an IT regime contributes to price stability as well as macroeconomic stability in 
developing countries. In addition, the estimation results suggest that an IT regime also helps 
stabilize volatilities of money growth and real money balance growth, i.e., the stability of 
money demand, in developing countries, although the results of a strict IT regime show less 
clear evidence. Based on our results showing favorable IT effects on income velocity 
variability, the findings of the decomposition analysis are generally consistent with the 
results of Owoye (1997), who shows that volatility in income velocity is related to money 
growth, inflation, and real outputs. In addition, our decomposition analysis supports the 
notion that IT adoption offers substantial economic benefits of macroeconomic stabilization 
by securing real outputs and inflation stability. Moreover, our results on IT effects suggest 
that IT adoption enables developing countries to satisfy crucial conditions necessary to 
support the effective role of monetary aggregates, which require the presence of income 
velocity stability as well as money demand stability as argued by Estrella and Mishkin 
(1997) and Mishkin (2006). 
2.3.3 Heterogeneity in treatment effects 
Substantial heterogeneity social and economic development is known to occur in developing 
countries. Many studies have shown that the causes and consequences of IT adoption can be 
associated with various economic and institutional characteristics of developing countries 
(e.g., Carare & Stone, 2006; Fraga et al., 2003; Fry et al., 2000; Masson et al., 1997; Minella 
et al., 2003; Mishkin, 2004; Mishkin & Savastano, 2001; Svensson, 2002; Lin & Ye, 2009). 
Thus, examining the heterogeneous effects of IT adoption on income velocity variability is 
critical for conducting policy evaluations of developing countries. Lin and Ye (2009) analyze 
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the crucial heterogeneities of average treatment effects of IT adoption on inflation and its 
variability, and our study also evaluates four possible sources of heterogeneity following Lin 
and Ye (2009). As a first possible source, IT effects can depend on whether a country 
satisfies the precondition of IT adoption, which is captured by the estimated propensity score. 
The second source concerns time lagged effects of IT adoption based on the argument that 
it often takes some time for monetary policy to be effective. The third and fourth sources 
concern the roles of fiscal conditions and exchange rate arrangements in determining the 
effects of IT adoption, respectively. Mishkin (2004) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) note 
that the performance of an IT regime would be influenced by government fiscal positions 
and levels of exchange rate flexibility. 
Table 2.5 presents the estimated results of the four sources of heterogeneous effects 
of loose and strict IT regimes on our outcome variable of income velocity volatility. The 
first column shows the results of the OLS regression of income velocity volatility on the IT 
regime, which presents the consistent finding of the negative coefficient with the matching 
analysis of the previous subsection. In the second column, we include the estimated 
propensity score and interaction term of the IT regime and the difference between the 
estimated propensity score and its sample mean to evaluate how IT effects are dependent on 
the precondition of IT adoption. The results show that coefficients on the IT dummy are 
negative for the loose and strict IT regimes, whereas those on the interaction term are 
negative, although less significant for the strict IT regime. These results imply that the 
treatment effect of the IT regime for the mean of the propensity score is significantly 
negative with the estimated coefficients of −0.07 and −0.06 for the loose and strict IT 
regimes, respectively. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term highlights 
the presence of heterogeneity. The negative coefficient suggests that the effectiveness of an 
IT regime is more apparent for countries with high estimated propensity scores that reflect 
28 
more favorable preconditions for IT adoption. IT would lead to an additional reduction in 
income velocity volatility (standard deviation) of 0.03 points for every 10 percent increase 
in the propensity score.  
To examine the role of the time length on IT effects, the third column includes the 
interaction term of the IT dummy and the time length (year) from IT adoption.13 The results 
show that the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative for the loose IT 
regime, and it is negative but less significant for the strict IT regime. The effectiveness of 
the IT regime is dependent on the time length since the IT adoption; therefore, IT is likely 
to become effective at reducing income velocity variability over time. In addition, we test 
the role of exchange rate arrangements in heterogeneous IT effects by including a fixed 
exchange rate dummy and an interaction term for the IT dummy and a fixed exchange rate 
dummy in the model. The estimation results shown in the fourth column illustrate that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive irrespective of whether loose or 
strict IT regimes are involved. The treatment effect on income velocity volatility would be 
zero when a country adopts a fixed exchange rate regime. IT reduces income velocity 
volatility under a flexible exchange rate regime, but it fails to influence volatility under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. An IT regime would be effective in reducing income velocity 
volatility only under a floating exchange rate regime. Moreover, we examine the role of a 
fiscal disciple by incorporating fiscal balance and its interaction term with the IT dummy. 
The fifth column shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant for the 
loose and strict IT regimes; thus, no evidence is observed for the heterogeneous effects on 
IT regime performance. 
 
 
                                                          
13 As in Lin and Ye (2009), this study does not include the time length variable in the regression because the 
value of the time length variable is the same as the interaction term of the IT dummy and time length.  
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2.3.4 Alternative method 
In addition to the PSM method, we also apply the DID method as an alternative approach. 
The PSM method can serve as an appropriate method of addressing selection biases in 
observed covariates in the adoption of an IT regime. However, as noted in the literature (e.g., 
Pearl, 2000), the PSM method is limited because it controls only for observed covariates and 
unobserved covariates or factors may induce hidden bias. In addition, the PSM method 
requires the use of large samples with substantial common regions of treatment and control 
groups. The DID method can properly address selection biases originating from time-
invariant unobserved characteristics by differentiating between the pre-period and post-
period, and it can also be used to estimate treatment effects by comparing pre- and post-
treatment differences from the outcomes of treatment and control groups.  
The main assumption of the DID method is that the outcomes of treatment and 
control groups would follow the same time trends in the absence of treatment. When the 
parallel trend assumption holds and we can credibly rule out the presence of any other time-
variant changes that may confound the treatment, the DID method is a trustworthy approach 
to apply. However, a crucial methodological problem related to the DID method identified 
in our study concerns the identification of adoption dates for non-IT countries that have 
never adopted an IT regime. Another problem may be related to potential violations of the 
parallel time trend condition because the timing of IT adoption varies across IT countries. 
Although the DID method can suffer from such issues, we attempt to ascertain the empirical 
validity of our baseline results derived from the matching analysis. The DID approach is 
widely used in the IT-related literature (e.g., Ball & Sheridan, 2005; Batini & Laxton, 2007; 
Goncalves & Salles, 2008; Thornton, 2016; Samarina et al., 2014). Following previous work, 
we apply the DID method as follows: 
              Xi,post − Xi,pre = β0 + β1Xi,pre + β2ITi + εi,     (4) 
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where X denotes the outcome of interest;  Xi,pre and Xi,post are the outcomes of country i for 
the pre- and post-IT adoption periods, respectively; ITi is the IT adoption dummy; and εi is 
the error term. As outcomes, we use the level of inflation and the volatilities of income 
velocity, inflation, real output growth, money growth, and real money balance growth for 
the pre- and post-IT periods. The level of inflation for the two periods is calculated from its 
average over 10 years before and after IT adoption. The volatilities of income velocity and 
of other variables are measured from their standard deviation for 10 years before and after 
IT adoption as in the work of Thornton (2016).14 Following previous work, including that of 
Ball and Sheridan (2005), we include the initial (pre-IT) outcome level as an independent 
variable.15 We exclude some countries with missing data for the 10-year pre- and post-IT 
periods as well as outliers based on inflation and money growth data.  
Table 2.6 presents the average outcome variables of the pre- and post-IT periods, and 
Table 7 shows the estimated effects of the loose and strict IT regimes on our outcome 
variables. Our analysis of income velocity volatility suggests that IT adoption helps stabilize 
income velocity irrespective of the choice of the IT regime. This result of our DID approach 
is consistent with the PSM analysis shown in the previous subsection. Concerning the 
components of income velocity, our DID approach generally shows that coefficients on the 
IT dummy are negative, although less significant for some cases, thus revealing results that 
                                                          
14 As in the works of Goncalves and Salles (2008), Thornton (2016), and Samarina et al. (2014), we use the IT 
adoption year to separate the pre- and post-periods for IT countries. However, non-IT countries do not have an 
IT adoption year because they have not adopted an IT regime. To measure the outcomes of pre- and post-
periods for non-IT countries, we consider the hypothetical IT adoption year by taking the average of the 
adoption year for all IT countries. Hypothetical adoption years are designated as 2001 and 2002 for the loose 
and strict IT regimes, respectively.  
15 The correlation between IT and Xi,pre  would lead to a bias because a high Xi,pre  value could affect the 
likelihood of a country adopting an IT regime. Another issue occurs when Xi,pre is very high because a more 
significant reduction in the variable may simply reflect a mean reversion rather than a direct contribution from 
the IT regime. See, e.g., Ball and Sheridan (2005, 2010), Goncalves and Salles (2008), and Samarina et al. 
(2014). 
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are consistent with the findings of the PSM method. Thus, our PSM results are robust, and 
an IT regime would generally reduce the volatilities of each component of income velocity.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This study has applied the PSM method to examine whether IT helps stabilize income 
velocity variability. The PSM method has commonly been used to eliminate self-selection 
bias, although it may suffer from issues related to small samples as well as hidden biases 
derived from unobserved covariates or factors (Pearl, 2000). Thus, to confirm the empirical 
validity of our PSM results, this study has also applied another method widely used in IT-
related studies, the DID method. The empirical results of both methods have indicated that 
IT would help stabilize income velocity in developing countries. Thus, our findings have 
shown clear support for Taylor’s (2000) argument that monetary authorities in developing 
economies would prefer using monetary policy rule with monetary aggregates to achieve 
inflation targets under stable income velocity. In addition, our empirical results regarding IT 
effects on income velocity have highlighted that monetary authorities can pursue monetary 
aggregates as an effective policy measure under an IT regime. Moreover, our decomposition 
analysis of income velocity variability has provided evidences that IT lessens volatilities of 
inflation, real output growth, and money growth. Furthermore, our analysis of heterogeneous 
effects has revealed that an IT regime would be effective in reducing income velocity 
volatility under the favorable preconditions of IT adoption and floating exchange rate regime 
application. The time length also influences the effectiveness of an IT regime, and IT is 
likely to become more effective in lowering income velocity volatility over time. 
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Table 2.1. Inflation targeting developing countries and starting years 
Country Starting Year 
 Inflation targeting (loose) Inflation targeting (strict)   
Armenia 2006 2006 
Brazil 1999 1999 
Chile 1991 2000 
Colombia 2000 2000 
Ghana 2003 2007 
Guatemala 2005 2006 
Hungary 2001 2001 
Indonesia 2005 2006 
Mexico 1995 2001 
Peru 2002 2002 
Philippines 2002 2002 
Poland 1999 1999 
Thailand 2000 2000 
Turkey  2002 2006 
South Africa 2000 2000 
Note: Targeting dates are taken from De Mendonca and De Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Thornton (2016), Rose 
(2007), and Lin and Ye (2009). 
 
 
Table 2.2. Control group countries  
United Arab Emirates Gabon Oman 
Argentina Gambia, The Pakistan 
Antigua and Barbuda Grenada Papua New Guinea 
Burundi Guyana Qatar 
Benin Honduras Rwanda 
Burkina Faso India Saudi Arabia 
Bangladesh Jamaica Sudan 
Bahrain Jordan Senegal 
Bahamas, The Kenya Solomon Islands 
Belize St. Kitts and Nevis Sierra Leone 
Bolivia St. Lucia Suriname 
Botswana Sri Lanka Swaziland 
Central African Republic Morocco Seychelles 
China Madagascar Chad 
Cote d'Ivoire Maldives Togo 
Cameroon Mali Trinidad and Tobago 
Congo, Rep. Myanmar Tunisia 
Cabo Verde Mauritius Uruguay 
Costa Rica Malawi St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Dominica Malaysia Venezuela, RB 
Algeria Niger Vanuatu 
Ecuador Nigeria  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Nicaragua  
Fiji Nepal  
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Table 2.3. Estimates of propensity scores (probit model) 
 Loose IT Strict IT 
Inflation (lag) -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
GDP per capita growth  3.947*** 
(1.122) 
3.168*** 
(1.134) 
Broad money growth 0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Fiscal balance -0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Fixed exchange rate regime -1.750*** 
(0.140) 
-1.930*** 
(0.150) 
Trade openness -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Financial openness 0.159*** 
(0.042) 
0.224*** 
(0.045) 
No. of obs. 1393 1393 
Pseudo-R2 0.37 0.46 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 2.4. Estimates of the treatment effects 
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear  
Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  
 r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Inflation  -1.498 
(0.972) 
[0.907]* 
-2.271 
(1.282)* 
[1.316]* 
-1.372 
(0.950) 
[1.089] 
-1.412 
(0.926) 
[1.053] 
-1.392 
(0.919) 
[1.107] 
-1.342 
(0.952) 
[1.082] 
-1.363 
(1.395) 
[1.125] 
-1.283 
(0.684)* 
[0.689]* 
-1.996 
(1.069)* 
[0.806]* 
-1.720 
(1.035)* 
[0.573]*** 
-1.692 
(0.989)* 
[0.553]*** 
-1.745 
(0.984)* 
[0.513]*** 
-1.748 
(1.038)* 
[0.555]*** 
-1.650 
(0.261) 
[0.534]*** 
Income velocity volatility -0.193 
(0.034)*** 
[0.032]*** 
-0.151 
(0.040)*** 
[0.038]*** 
-0.135 
(0.038)*** 
[0.028]*** 
-0.137 
(0.036)*** 
[0.031]*** 
-0.140 
(0.036)*** 
[0.030]*** 
-0.136 
(0.038)*** 
[0.029]*** 
-0.140 
(0.053)*** 
[0.029]*** 
-0.118 
(0.031)*** 
[0.030]** 
-0.070 
(0.042)* 
[0.032]** 
-0.065 
(0.047) 
[0.028]** 
-0.071 
(0.045) 
[0.027]*** 
-0.072 
(0.045) 
[0.028]*** 
-0.064 
(0.047) 
[0.029]** 
-0.064 
(0.049) 
[0.025]** 
Inflation volatility -3.013 
(0.478)*** 
[0.503]*** 
-3.396 
(0.542)*** 
[0.585]*** 
-3.069 
(0.400)*** 
[0.495]*** 
-3.075 
(0.390)*** 
[0.481]*** 
-3.053 
(0.386)*** 
[0.449]*** 
-3.070 
(0.400)*** 
[0.476]*** 
-3.081 
(0.685)*** 
[0.484]*** 
-3.050 
(0.478)*** 
[0.485]*** 
-2.317 
(0.623)*** 
[0.629]*** 
-2.289 
(0.478)*** 
[0.491]*** 
-2.250 
(0.457)*** 
[0.438]*** 
-2.276 
(0.455)*** 
[0.445]*** 
-2.299 
(0.480)*** 
[0.484]*** 
-2.221 
(0.758)*** 
[0.452]*** 
Real output growth volatility -2.228 
(0.360)*** 
[0.374]*** 
-2.574 
(0.403)*** 
[0.506]*** 
-2.374 
(0.258)*** 
[0.399]*** 
-2.452 
(0.251)*** 
[0.425]*** 
-2.447 
(0.249)*** 
[0.398]*** 
-2.383 
(0.259)*** 
[0.413]*** 
-2.430 
(0.557)*** 
[0.388]*** 
-1.836 
(0.346)*** 
[0.378]*** 
-1.645 
(0.475)*** 
[0.430]*** 
-1.758 
(0.319)*** 
[0.346]*** 
-1.800 
(0.305)*** 
[0.346]*** 
-1.803 
(0.304)*** 
[0.316]*** 
-1.753 
(0.320)*** 
[0.343]*** 
-1.735 
(0.645)*** 
[0.316]*** 
Money growth volatility -1.626 
(0.513)*** 
[0.524]*** 
-1.429 
(0.547)*** 
[0.620]*** 
-1.116 
(0.569)** 
[0.543]*** 
-1.173 
(0.558)** 
[0.515]** 
-1.177 
(0.554)** 
[0.546]** 
-1.120 
(0.570)** 
[0.524]** 
-1.152 
(0.631)* 
[0.511]** 
-0.635 
(0.509) 
[0.499] 
-0.114 
(0.633) 
[0.637] 
-0.265 
(0.681) 
[0.577] 
-0.272 
(0.657) 
[0.534] 
-0.293 
(0.654) 
[0.573] 
-0.259 
(0.682) 
[0.620] 
-0.340 
(0.774) 
[0.573] 
Real money balance growth volatility -1.971 
(0.527)*** 
[0.528]*** 
-1.359 
(0.578)** 
[0.562]** 
-1.259 
(0.564)** 
[0.496]** 
-1.291 
(0.553)** 
[0.500]*** 
-1.310 
(0.549)** 
[0.503]*** 
-1.263 
(0.565)** 
[0.518]** 
-1.344 
(0.603)** 
[0.492]*** 
-1.248 
(0.529)** 
[0.554]** 
-0.370 
(0.634) 
[0.638] 
-0.620 
(0.676) 
[0.564] 
-0.662 
(0.653) 
[0.554] 
-0.670 
(0.651) 
[0.540] 
-0.587 
(0.677) 
[0.610] 
-0.709 
(0.773) 
[0.533] 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** 
indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.5. Heterogeneity in the treatment effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Loose IT      
IT -0.105*** 
(0.017) 
-0.072*** 
(0.027) 
-0.082*** 
(0.030) 
-0.229*** 
(0.032) 
-0.148*** 
(0.026) 
PS  0.181** 
(0.075) 
0.102* 
(0.058) 
0.205*** 
(0.061) 
0.079 
(0.051) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg)  -0.305*** 
(0.094) 
   
IT*Time   -0.009** 
(0.004) 
  
Fixed exchange rate regime    0.017 
(0.024) 
 
IT*Fixed exchange rate regime    0.238*** 
(0.044) 
 
Fiscal balance     0.005** 
(0.002) 
IT*Fiscal balance     -0.007 
(0.005) 
No of obs. 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 
Strict IT      
IT -0.104*** 
(0.018) 
-0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.061* 
(0.035) 
-0.155*** 
(0.031) 
-0.089*** 
(0.028) 
PS  -0.012 
(0.061) 
0.040 
(0.050) 
-0.005 
(0.052) 
-0.045 
(0.044) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg)  -0.111 
(0.085) 
   
IT*Time   -0.004 
(0.004) 
  
Fixed exchange rate regime    -0.018 
(0.024) 
 
IT*Fixed exchange rate regime    0.184*** 
(0.048) 
 
Fiscal balance     0.004* 
(0.002) 
IT*Fiscal balance     -0.003 
(0.005) 
No of obs. 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.6. Descriptive statistics, developing countries 
  Pre-
adoption  
Post-
adoption 
Difference 
 
Loose IT     
IT Inflation  18.99 7.23 -11.76 
 Income velocity volatility 0.53 0.30 -0.23 
 Inflation volatility 8.84 3.90 -4.94 
 Real output growth volatility 3.28 2.77 -0.51 
 Money growth volatility 9.66 6.00 -3.66 
 Real money balance growth volatility 9.81 6.98 -2.83 
Non-IT Inflation  9.81 6.04 -3.77 
 Income velocity volatility 0.51 0.43 -0.08 
 Inflation volatility 6.97 3.71 -3.26 
 Real output growth volatility 4.03 3.38 -0.65 
 Money growth volatility 9.30 7.69 -1.61 
 Real money balance growth volatility 9.60 8.46 -1.14 
Strict IT     
IT Inflation  15.85 5.56 -10.29 
 Income velocity volatility 0.47 0.24 -0.23 
 Inflation volatility 9.02 2.13 -6.89 
 Real output growth volatility 3.15 2.66 -0.49 
 Money growth volatility 9.45 6.36 -3.09 
 Real money balance growth volatility 8.95 6.80 -2.15 
Non-IT Inflation  9.31 6.06 -3.25 
 Income velocity volatility 0.51 0.41 -0.10 
 Inflation volatility 6.77 3.50 -3.27 
 Real output growth volatility 3.99 3.25 -0.74 
 Money growth volatility 9.76 7.01 -2.75 
 Real money balance growth volatility 10.15 7.78 -2.38 
Note: Average values of the outcome variables over 10 years during the pre- and post-IT periods. 
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Table 2.7. Estimates of the difference-in-difference method 
 Inflation Income 
velocity 
volatility 
Inflation 
volatility 
Real 
output 
growth 
volatility 
Money 
growth 
volatility 
Real 
money 
balance 
growth 
volatility 
Loose IT       
IT  -1.615 
(0.981) 
-0.140** 
(0.062) 
-0.065 
(0.894) 
-0.488 
(0.501) 
-1.815** 
(0.869) 
-1.547* 
(0.866) 
Initial value -0.695*** 
(0.052) 
-0.535*** 
(0.067) 
-0.860*** 
(0.056) 
-0.836*** 
(0.111) 
-0.666*** 
(0.097) 
-0.694*** 
(0.102) 
Constant 3.044*** 
(0.457) 
0.189*** 
(0.035) 
2.730*** 
(0.425) 
2.722*** 
(0.439) 
4.586*** 
(0.833) 
5.521*** 
(0.988) 
No of obs. 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.88 0.48 0.77 0.62 0.50 0.49 
Strict IT       
IT  -2.573*** 
(0.899) 
-0.148** 
(0.059) 
-1.596*** 
(0.406) 
-0.484 
(0.498) 
-0.608 
(1.132) 
-0.813 
(1.099) 
Initial value -0.684*** 
(0.064) 
-0.550*** 
(0.069) 
-0.901*** 
(0.041) 
-0.880*** 
(0.062) 
-0.856*** 
(0.064) 
-0.869*** 
(0.076) 
Constant 3.111*** 
(0.501) 
0.180*** 
(0.033) 
2.831*** 
(0.348) 
2.772*** 
(0.333) 
5.608*** 
(0.666) 
6.444*** 
(0.828) 
No of obs. 84 84 84 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.85 0.48 0.86 0.69 0.66 0.62 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are shown 
in the parentheses. 
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Table 2.8: Estimates of the treatment effects (excluding some non-IT countries in terms of real GDP per capita in 2013) 
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  
 r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Inflation  -1.985 
(1.002)** 
[1.137]* 
-1.581 
(1.607) 
[1.118] 
-1.187 
(1.418) 
[0.822] 
-1.533 
(1.336) 
[0.789]* 
-1.477 
(1.318) 
[0.803]* 
-1.272 
(1.413) 
[0.805] 
-1.496 
(1.649) 
[0.796]* 
-0.861 
(0.660) 
[0.721] 
-1.713 
(1.149) 
[0.772]** 
-1.698 
(1.446) 
[0.575]*** 
-1.621 
(1.408) 
[0.554]*** 
-1.700 
(1.400)** 
[0.567]*** 
-1.718 
(1.446) 
[0.597]*** 
-1.610 
(0.948)* 
[0.567]*** 
Income velocity volatility -0.092 
(0.029)*** 
[0.030]*** 
-0.135 
(0.046)*** 
[0.039]*** 
-0.115 
(0.041)*** 
[0.036]*** 
-0.116 
(0.038)*** 
[0.031]*** 
-0.114 
(0.037)*** 
[0.033]*** 
-0.121 
(0.040)*** 
[0.034]*** 
-0.118 
(0.055)** 
[0.036]*** 
-0.061 
(0.031)** 
[0.033]* 
-0.043 
(0.048) 
[0.029] 
-0.056 
(0.044) 
[0.028]** 
-0.057 
(0.043) 
[0.026]** 
-0.056 
(0.043) 
[0.025]** 
-0.055 
(0.044) 
[0.025]** 
-0.047 
(0.049) 
[0.025]* 
Inflation volatility -1.634 
(0.421)*** 
[0.472]*** 
-2.932 
(0.687)*** 
[0.674]*** 
-2.936 
(0.548)*** 
[0.582]*** 
-2.907 
(0.514)*** 
[0.577]*** 
-2.908 
(0.506)*** 
[0.570]*** 
-2.988 
(0.546)*** 
[0.559]*** 
-2.921 
(0.818)*** 
[0.587]*** 
-1.187 
(0.401)*** 
[0.486]** 
-2.226 
(0.689)*** 
[0.687]*** 
-2.417 
(0.594)*** 
[0.648]*** 
-2.313 
(0.577)*** 
[0.593]*** 
-2.304 
(0.574)*** 
[0.603]*** 
-2.406 
(0.596)*** 
[0.614]*** 
-2.149 
(0.847)** 
[0.627]*** 
Real output growth volatility -1.248 
(0.213)*** 
[0.233]*** 
-1.835 
(0.326)*** 
[0.268]*** 
-1.913 
(0.297)*** 
[0.268]*** 
-1.956 
(0.280)*** 
[0.249]*** 
-1.930 
(0.276)*** 
[0.253]*** 
-1.915 
(0.296)*** 
[0.253]*** 
-1.872 
(0.381)*** 
[0.252]*** 
-1.419 
(0.219)*** 
[0.226]*** 
-1.854 
(0.322)*** 
[0.364]*** 
-1.855 
(0.327)*** 
[0.289]*** 
-1.814 
(0.318)*** 
[0.230]*** 
-1.813 
(0.317)*** 
[0.309]*** 
-1.856 
(0.328)*** 
[0.307]*** 
-1.731 
(0.406)*** 
[0.313]*** 
Money growth volatility -1.058 
(0.477)** 
[0.497]** 
-2.021 
(0.718)*** 
[0.731]*** 
-1.985 
(0.727)*** 
[0.710]*** 
-2.040 
(0.688)*** 
[0.644]*** 
-1.985 
(0.679)*** 
[0.629]*** 
-2.047 
(0.724)*** 
[0.642]*** 
-2.156 
(0.709)*** 
[0.596]*** 
-0.464 
(0.487) 
[0.539] 
-1.328 
(0.686)* 
[0.784]* 
-1.608 
(0.853)* 
[0.718]** 
-1.412 
(0.831)* 
[0.718]** 
-1.431 
(0.828)* 
[0.654]** 
-1.599 
(0.855)* 
[0.698]** 
-1.588 
(0.749)** 
[0.705]** 
Real money balance growth volatility -1.334 
(0.515)*** 
[0.558]** 
-1.879 
(0.762)** 
[0.613]*** 
-1.806 
(0.746)** 
[0.542]*** 
-1.824 
(0.706)*** 
[0.549]*** 
-1.801 
(0.697)*** 
[0.548]*** 
-1.854 
(0.743)** 
[0.564]** 
-1.891 
(0.735)*** 
[0.506]*** 
-0.430 
(0.507) 
[0.521] 
-1.105 
(0.694) 
[0.721] 
-1.432 
(0.868)* 
[0.663]** 
-1.273 
(0.846) 
[0.594]** 
-1.280 
(0.843) 
[0.620]** 
-1.431 
(0.870) 
[0.606]** 
-1.404 
(0.746)* 
[0.661]** 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** indicate the 
significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2.9. Balancing property (Loose IT) 
  Nearest-neighbor matching  Radius matching (r=0.10) Kernel matching (Gaussian) 
  Mean  Bias P-value Mean  Bias  P-value Mean  Bias  P-value 
  Treated Control Reduction  Treated Control Reduction  Treated Control Reduction  
Before matching             
 Lagged inflation 6.64 7.25  0.393 6.64 7.25  0.393 6.64 7.25  0.393 
 GDP per capita growth 0.03 0.02  0.005 0.03 0.02  0.005 0.03 0.02  0.005 
 Broad money growth 13.47 13.02  0.644 13.47 13.02  0.644 13.47 13.02  0.644 
 Fixed exchange rate regime 0.25 0.81  0.000 0.25 0.81  0.000 0.25 0.81  0.000 
 Trade openness 69.17 81.73  0.000 69.17 81.73  0.000 69.17 81.73  0.000 
 Financial openness 0.42 -0.12  0.000 0.42 -0.12  0.000 0.42 -0.12  0.000 
 Fiscal balance -2.11 -1.94  0.714 -2.11 -1.94  0.714 -2.11 -1.94  0.714 
After matching             
 Lagged inflation 6.72 8.15 -135.6 0.112 6.72 8.22 -145.9 0.063 6.72 8.21 -145.0 0.065 
 GDP per capita growth 0.03 0.03 63.8 0.454 0.03 0.04 -11.8 0.043 0.03 0.04 -8.4 0.049 
 Broad money growth 13.38 13.56 60.4 0.885 13.38 14.18 -79.6 0.502 13.38 14.16 -73.7 0.515 
 Fixed exchange rate regime 0.26 0.26 98.7 0.891 0.26 0.26 98.7 0.889 0.26 0.26 99.5 0.959 
 Trade openness 69.87 73.44 71.6 0.399 69.87 70.49 95.1 0.877 69.87 70.43 95.6 0.888 
 Financial openness 0.38 0.09 46.5 0.090 0.38 0.18 63.0 0.236 0.38 0.17 61.5 0.218 
 Fiscal balance -2.09 -2.40 -84.9 0.490 -2.09 -2.01 55.8 0.863 -2.09 -2.01 55.7 0.864 
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Table 2.10. Balancing property (Strict IT) 
  Nearest-neighbor matching  Radius matching (r=0.10) Kernel matching (Gaussian) 
  Mean  Bias P-value Mean  Bias  P-value Mean  Bias  P-value 
  Treated Control Reduction  Treated Control Reduction  Treated Control Reduction  
Before matching             
 Lagged inflation 5.35 7.36  0.008 5.35 7.36  0.008 5.35 7.36  0.008 
 GDP per capita growth 0.03 0.02  0.027 0.03 0.02  0.027 0.03 0.02  0.027 
 Broad money growth 12.59 13.05  0.653 12.59 13.05  0.653 12.59 13.05  0.653 
 Fixed exchange rate regime 0.24 0.80  0.000 0.24 0.80  0.000 0.24 0.80  0.000 
 Trade openness 70.05 81.68  0.002 70.05 81.68  0.002 70.05 81.68  0.002 
 Financial openness 0.58 -0.13  0.000 0.58 -0.13  0.000 0.58 -0.13  0.000 
 Fiscal balance -2.25 -1.94  0.530 -2.25 -1.94  0.530 -2.25 -1.94  0.530 
After matching             
 Lagged inflation 5.36 5.51 92.8 0.808 5.36 6.06 65.4 0.234 5.36 6.04 66.3 0.247 
 GDP per capita growth 0.03 0.02 54.4 0.380 0.03 0.04 16.2 0.126 0.03 0.04 19.3 0.141 
 Broad money growth 12.59 12.74 69.0 0.895 12.59 13.02 8.8 0.705 12.59 13.04 4.1 0.692 
 Fixed exchange rate regime 0.24 0.31 87.0 0.198 0.24 0.23 99.1 0.928 0.24 0.24 99.9 0.988 
 Trade openness 70.08 72.31 80.8 0.585 70.08 71.53 87.5 0.726 70.08 71.55 87.3 0.723 
 Financial openness 0.56 0.39 75.4 0.340 0.56 0.49 89.2 0.672 0.56 0.47 86.4 0.596 
 Fiscal balance -2.23 -2.52 4.7 0.553 -2.23 -2.22 97.0 0.983 -2.23 -2.16 78.1 0.878 
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Table 2.11. Estimates of propensity scores (probit model) 
 Adding  
Government debt to GDP 
Adding 
 Turnover rate of central bank 
governors 
Alternative sample period 
1990-2007  
 Loose IT Strict IT Loose IT Strict IT Loose IT Strict IT 
Inflation (lag) -0.011* 
(0.007) 
-0.052*** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.071*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.050*** 
(0.013) 
GDP per capita growth  4.178*** 
(1.179) 
3.446*** 
(1.194) 
5.045*** 
(1.729) 
3.593** 
(1.776) 
3.768*** 
(1.251) 
2.368* 
(1.302) 
Broad money growth 0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Fiscal balance -0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.037*** 
(0.011) 
Fixed exchange rate regime -1.799*** 
(0.139) 
-1.952*** 
(0.149) 
-1.415*** 
(0.221) 
-1.831*** 
(0.251) 
-1.658*** 
(0.164) 
-1.939*** 
(0.178) 
Trade openness -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Financial openness 0.150*** 
(0.042) 
0.214*** 
(0.045) 
0.060 
(0.071) 
0.176** 
(0.072) 
0.125*** 
(0.048) 
0.212*** 
(0.052) 
Government debt to GDP -0.022** 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
- - - 
 
- 
Turnover rate of central bank governors - - -0.851 
(0.568) 
-0.672 
(0.814) 
- 
 
- 
No. of obs. 1362 1362 570 570 1155 1155 
Pseudo-R2 0.38 0.46 0.29 0.44 0.35 0.46 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 
5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 2.12. Estimates of the treatment effects 
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear  
Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear   r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Adding Government debt to GDP 
Inflation  -1.150 
(0.820) 
[0.902] 
-2.026 
(1.079)* 
[1.205]* 
-1.544 
(0.926)* 
[1.013] 
-1.557 
(0.897)* 
[1.054] 
-1.518 
(0.895)* 
[0.915]* 
-1.522 
(0.928) 
[1.023] 
-1.464 
(1.168) 
[1.972] 
-1.835 
(0.712)*** 
[0.657]*** 
-1.820 
(0.988)* 
[0.729]** 
-1.835 
(1.035)* 
[0.578]*** 
-1.699 
(0.992)* 
[0.550]*** 
-1.781 
(0.984)* 
[0.554]*** 
-1.853 
(1.036)* 
[0.598]*** 
-1.689 
(1.361) 
[0.563]*** 
Income velocity volatility -0.183 
(0.033)*** 
[0.035]*** 
-0.162 
(0.037)*** 
[0.043]*** 
-0.163 
(0.037)*** 
[0.034]*** 
-0.160 
(0.035)*** 
[0.030]*** 
-0.159 
(0.035)*** 
[0.033]*** 
-0.164 
(0.037)*** 
[0.036]*** 
-0.161 
(0.047)*** 
[0.033]*** 
-0.131 
(0.032)*** 
[0.031]*** 
-0.069 
(0.043) 
[0.034]** 
-0.070 
(0.047) 
[0.028]** 
-0.075 
(0.045)* 
[0.028]*** 
-0.076 
(0.045)* 
[0.029]*** 
-0.070 
(0.047) 
[0.028]** 
-0.069 
(0.057) 
[0.027]*** 
Inflation volatility -3.443 
(0.477)*** 
[0.507]*** 
-3.722 
(0.553)*** 
[0.593]*** 
-3.476 
(0.394)*** 
[0.507]*** 
-3.471 
(0.377)*** 
[0.500]*** 
-3.432 
(0.377)*** 
[0.473]*** 
-3.480 
(0.395)*** 
[0.491]*** 
-3.475 
(0.710)*** 
[0.481]*** 
-2.923 
(0.481)*** 
[0.532]*** 
-2.281 
(0.636)*** 
[0.597]*** 
-2.527 
(0.478)*** 
[0.544]*** 
-2.406 
(0.459)*** 
[0.480]*** 
-2.400 
(0.456)*** 
[0.460]*** 
-2.482 
(0.478)*** 
[0.497]*** 
-2.364 
(0.739)*** 
[0.495]*** 
Real output growth volatility -2.349 
(0.371)*** 
[0.361]*** 
-2.770 
(0.425)*** 
[0.556]*** 
-2.596 
(0.255)*** 
[0.441]*** 
-2.468 
(0.244)*** 
[0.416]*** 
-2.475 
(0.243)*** 
[0.390]*** 
-2.590 
(0.255)*** 
[0.459]*** 
-2.464 
(0.493)*** 
[0.400]*** 
-2.106 
(0.361)*** 
[0.386]*** 
-1.801 
(0.470)*** 
[0.419]*** 
-1.875 
(0.314)*** 
[0.335]*** 
-1.899 
(0.302)*** 
[0.342]*** 
-1.890 
(0.300)*** 
[0.342]*** 
-1.859 
(0.315)*** 
[0.331]*** 
-1.831 
(0.598)*** 
[0.340]*** 
Money growth volatility -1.407 
(0.483)*** 
[0.511]*** 
-1.284 
(0.578)** 
[0.613]** 
-1.083 
(0.556)* 
[0.518]** 
-1.175 
(0.538)** 
[0.497]** 
-1.162 
(0.538)** 
[0.515]** 
-1.084 
(0.557)* 
[0.510]** 
-1.124 
(0.627)* 
[0.513]** 
-0.928 
(0.534)* 
[0.537]* 
-0.295 
(0.680) 
[0.663] 
-0.275 
(0.673) 
[0.561] 
-0.175 
(0.652) 
[0.535] 
-0.241 
(0.648) 
[0.550] 
-0.300 
(0.673) 
[0.588] 
-0.290 
(0.834) 
[0.553] 
Real money balance growth volatility -1.856 
(0.506)*** 
[0.498]*** 
-1.639 
(0.596)*** 
[0.591]*** 
-1.412 
(0.552)** 
[0.508]*** 
-1.443 
(0.534)*** 
[0.468]*** 
-1.419 
(0.534)*** 
[0.510]*** 
-1.434 
(0.553)*** 
[0.534]*** 
-1.476 
(0.660)** 
[0.501]*** 
-1.421 
(0.544)*** 
[0.555]*** 
-0.657 
(0.703) 
[0.655] 
-0.590 
(0.669) 
[0.587] 
-0.572 
(0.649) 
[0.559] 
-0.611 
(0.645) 
[0.585] 
-0.612 
(0.669) 
[0.600] 
-0.662 
(0.815) 
[0.497] 
Adding Turnover rate of central bank governors 
Inflation  -0.166 
(1.367) 
[1.467] 
0.415 
(1.344) 
[1.445]* 
-0.769 
(1.556) 
[1.289] 
-0.824 
(1.509) 
[1.251] 
-0.793 
(1.499) 
[1.226] 
-0.655 
(1.554) 
[1.312] 
-0.549 
(1.536) 
[1.313] 
-2.227 
(1.123)** 
[1.196]* 
-1.948 
(1.029)* 
[1.311] 
-1.900 
(1.542) 
[1.133]* 
-2.764 
(1.394)** 
[0.939]*** 
-2.631 
(1.387)* 
[0.945]*** 
-1.879 
(1.558) 
[1.072]* 
-2.067 
(1.389) 
[1.007]** 
Income velocity volatility -0.231 
(0.061)*** 
[0.061]*** 
-0.243 
(0.055)*** 
[0.063]*** 
-0.256 
(0.036)*** 
[0.052]*** 
-0.260 
(0.035)*** 
[0.048]*** 
-0.257 
(0.034)*** 
[0.050]*** 
-0.261 
(0.036)*** 
[0.051]*** 
-0.265 
(0.080)*** 
[0.052]*** 
-0.216 
(0.056)*** 
[0.062]** 
-0.258 
(0.067)*** 
[0.072]** 
-0.253 
(0.051)*** 
[0.065]*** 
-0.229 
(0.046)*** 
[0.057]*** 
-0.231 
(0.046)*** 
[0.060]*** 
-0.259 
(0.051)*** 
[0.063]*** 
-0.245 
(0.071)*** 
[0.062]*** 
Inflation volatility -4.140 
(0.872)*** 
[0.888]*** 
-4.029 
(0.798)*** 
[0.957]*** 
-4.303 
(0.581)*** 
[0.777]*** 
-4.120 
(0.560)*** 
[0.738]*** 
-4.094 
(0.557)*** 
[0.722]*** 
-4.284 
(0.580)*** 
[0.790]*** 
-4.420 
(1.092)*** 
[0.738]*** 
-4.910 
(1.013)*** 
[1.028]*** 
-4.938 
(0.975)*** 
[1.118]*** 
-4.746 
(0.720)*** 
[1.025]*** 
-4.893 
(0.657)*** 
[0.880]*** 
-4.776 
(0.657)*** 
[0.936]*** 
-4.765 
(0.724)*** 
[0.887]*** 
-4.813 
(1.183)*** 
[0.972]*** 
Real output growth volatility -1.498 
(0.458)*** 
[0.491]*** 
-1.425 
(0.406)*** 
[0.549]*** 
-1.542 
(0.282)*** 
[0.464]*** 
-1.601 
(0.272)*** 
[0.459]*** 
-1.557 
(0.270)*** 
[0.446]*** 
-1.543 
(0.281)*** 
[0.474]*** 
-1.564 
(0.646)** 
[0.457]*** 
-2.360 
(0.639)*** 
[0.682]*** 
-2.631 
(0.627)*** 
[0.885]*** 
-2.899 
(0.389)*** 
[0.861]*** 
-2.634 
(0.359)*** 
[0.725]*** 
-2.611 
(0.359)*** 
[0.723]*** 
-2.942 
(0.391)*** 
[0.852]*** 
-2.723 
(0.852)*** 
[0.826]*** 
Money growth volatility -2.734 
(0.869)*** 
[0.813]*** 
-2.339 
(0.836)*** 
[0.824]*** 
-2.670 
(0.838)*** 
[0.744]*** 
-2.560 
(0.817)*** 
[0.722]*** 
-2.561 
(0.813)*** 
[0.682]*** 
-2.642 
(0.837)*** 
[0.698]*** 
-2.694 
(0.988)*** 
[0.753]*** 
-2.866 
(0.962)*** 
[0.999]*** 
-2.871 
(0.940)*** 
[0.981]*** 
-2.511 
(1.047)** 
[0.870]*** 
-2.511 
(0.983)** 
[0.834]*** 
-2.529 
(0.983)*** 
[0.816]*** 
-2.570 
(1.052)** 
[0.818]*** 
-2.546 
(1.083)** 
[0.807]*** 
Real money balance growth volatility -3.294 
(0.930)*** 
[0.863]*** 
-2.981 
(0.912)*** 
[0.969]*** 
-3.298 
(0.853)*** 
[0.773]*** 
-3.198 
(0.830)*** 
[0.758]*** 
-3.182 
(0.826)*** 
[0.759]*** 
-3.318 
(0.852)*** 
[0.771]*** 
-3.364 
(1.126)*** 
[0.750]*** 
-3.595 
(1.075)*** 
[1.079]*** 
-3.703 
(1.052)*** 
[1.086]*** 
-3.548 
(1.105)*** 
[1.031]*** 
-3.242 
(1.039)*** 
[0.926]*** 
-3.328 
(1.039)*** 
[1.003]*** 
-3.614 
(1.110)*** 
[1.010]*** 
-3.491 
(1.241)*** 
[1.047]*** 
Alternative sample period 1990-2007  
Inflation  -1.787 
(1.275) 
[1.188] 
-1.002 
(1.379) 
[1.305] 
-0.996 
(1.097) 
[1.080] 
-1.061 
(1.067) 
[1.072] 
-1.055 
(1.061) 
[1.141] 
-0.924 
(1.100) 
[1.060] 
-1.132 
(1.794) 
[1.101] 
-1.654 
(0.779)** 
[0.755]** 
-1.835 
(0.963)* 
[0.818]** 
-1.749 
(1.234) 
[0.699]** 
-1.991 
(1.118)* 
[0.611]*** 
-1.992 
(1.115)* 
[0.619]*** 
-1.732 
(1.239) 
[0.671]*** 
-1.822 
(1.176) 
[0.615]*** 
Income velocity volatility -0.190 
(0.040)*** 
[0.046]*** 
-0.186 
(0.050)*** 
[0.053]*** 
-0.195 
(0.039)*** 
[0.037]*** 
-0.187 
(0.037)*** 
[0.035]*** 
-0.189 
(0.037)*** 
[0.035]*** 
-0.194 
(0.039)*** 
[0.037]*** 
-0.194 
(0.050)*** 
[0.032]*** 
-0.176 
(0.040)*** 
[0.043]*** 
-0.133 
(0.062)** 
[0.048]*** 
-0.095 
(0.055)* 
[0.038]** 
-0.107 
(0.049)** 
[0.033]*** 
-0.104 
(0.049)** 
[0.033]*** 
-0.096 
(0.055)* 
[0.037]*** 
-0.108 
(0.057)* 
[0.033]*** 
Inflation volatility -3.718 
(0.608)*** 
[0.630]*** 
-4.008 
(0.590)*** 
[0.719]*** 
-3.960 
(0.446)*** 
[0.609]*** 
-3.862 
(0.431)*** 
[0.543]*** 
-3.867 
(0.428)*** 
[0.538]*** 
-3.988 
(0.446)*** 
[0.550]*** 
-3.960 
(0.782)*** 
[0.569]*** 
-3.683 
(0.633)*** 
[0.674]*** 
-3.570 
(0.765)*** 
[0.842]*** 
-3.458 
(0.586)*** 
[0.689]*** 
-3.465 
(0.530)*** 
[0.627]*** 
-3.420 
(0.530)*** 
[0.557]*** 
-3.451 
(0.588)*** 
[0.650]*** 
-3.494 
(0.955)*** 
[0.604]*** 
Real output growth volatility -2.696 
(0.457)*** 
[0.444]*** 
-2.685 
(0.391)*** 
[0.557]*** 
-2.935 
(0.270)*** 
[0.447]*** 
-2.862 
(0.261)*** 
[0.394]*** 
-2.882 
(0.258)*** 
[0.429]*** 
-2.909 
(0.270)*** 
[0.433]*** 
-2.920 
(0.638)*** 
[0.414]*** 
-2.717 
(0.460)*** 
[0.523]*** 
-2.448 
(0.554)*** 
[0.581]*** 
-2.268 
(0.377)*** 
[0.439]*** 
-2.452 
(0.341)*** 
[0.433]*** 
-2.404 
(0.340)*** 
[0.408]*** 
-2.268 
(0.378)*** 
[0.455]*** 
-2.448 
(0.702)*** 
[0.436]*** 
Money growth volatility -1.635 
(0.654)** 
[0.668]** 
-1.586 
(0.677)** 
[0.704]** 
-1.457 
(0.663)** 
[0.623]** 
-1.475 
(0.648)** 
[0.607]** 
-1.473 
(0.645)** 
[0.632]** 
-1.497 
(0.663)** 
[0.617]** 
-1.457 
(0.849)* 
[0.586]** 
-0.881 
(0.694) 
[0.729] 
-0.459 
(0.784) 
[0.798] 
-0.334 
(0.874) 
[0.807] 
-0.455 
(0.816) 
[0.753] 
-0.465 
(0.815) 
[0.682] 
-0.318 
(0.876) 
[0.771] 
-0.379 
(0.865) 
[0.732] 
Real money balance growth volatility -1.520 
(0.670)** 
[0.670]** 
-1.753 
(0.700)** 
[0.736]** 
-1.618 
(0.658)** 
[0.598]*** 
-1.584 
(0.644)** 
[0.570]*** 
-1.566 
(0.641)** 
[0.589]*** 
-1.642 
(0.659)** 
[0.584]*** 
-1.596 
(0.880)* 
[0.646]** 
-1.425 
(0.729)* 
[0.736]* 
-0.767 
(0.832) 
[0.835] 
-0.543 
(0.869) 
[0.900] 
-0.674 
(0.814) 
[0.777] 
-0.661 
(0.813) 
[0.787] 
-0.534 
(0.871) 
[0.869] 
-0.637 
(0.914) 
[0.792] 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** indicate the significant 
level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Chapter 3  
Inflation targeting and exchange market pressure in 
developing economies: Some international evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Developing countries have frequently experienced foreign exchange market turmoil so that 
the policy choice is of particular important for their macroeconomic stability. Fundamental 
domestic policies, including monetary policy, may affect a country’s external sector. Since 
foreign exchange markets often induce unstable external conditions, sound monetary 
arrangement is required for developing economies to absorb pressures from foreign 
exchange markets under a globalized world (Weymark, 1997, 1998).16 To capture such 
market pressures, Girton and Roper (1977) define exchange market pressure (EMP) as the 
sum of the nominal exchange rate depreciation and the percentage change of international 
reserves holdings scaled by the base money (see Eichengreen et al., 1994; Bussiere & 
Fratzscher, 2006; Klaassen & Jager, 2011).17 Currency depreciation only captures turmoil or 
crisis initiated mainly by ‘successful’ speculative attacks that lead to deviation from the fixed 
exchange rate with consequent currency depreciation. The concept of EMP incorporates 
instances of ‘unsuccessful’ speculative attacks that reflect declines in international reserves 
associated with monetary authority’s intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
                                                          
16 Weymark (1997, 1998) examine the effectiveness of exchange rate management to mitigate the EMP through 
changes in exchange rate or in international reserves, or both. 
17 The monetary approach to the balance of payment is based on fixed exchange rate, while that to exchange 
rate determination is based on perfectly flexible exchange rate. However, most countries have neither a fixed 
nor a perfectly flexible regime. To overcome limitations of the traditional approaches, Girton and Roper (1977) 
develop the EMP measure, which can be used in fixed, flexible, and managed floating exchange rate regimes. 
In a fixed regime, the depreciation rate is zero. In a flexible regime, the change of international reserves is zero. 
In a managed floating regime, the exchange market pressure is absorbed by either currency depreciation, or 
reserve losses, or a combination of the two.  
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Inflation targeting (IT) has been adopted across advanced countries since the early 
1990s. Some emerging and developing countries have also introduced an IT regime since 
the late 1990s, although this regime has not been prevailed yet.18 As an IT regime is not only 
a domestically focused policy framework but also related to the exchange rate regime 
(Taylor, 2001; Rose, 2007), examining whether an IT adoption has any beneficial effect on 
the external economy is a crucial issue for financial regulators. Although several studies 
investigate the domestic effects of an IT regime, its international effects are largely 
unexplored.19 Exception may include the works of Rose (2007) and Lin (2010), which 
present that the IT regime helps stabilize exchange rate and accumulate international 
reserves. However, past studies investigate the link of an IT regime with exchange rate and 
international reserves independently and do not focus on the relationship between an IT 
regime and EMP which reflects both of the two elements. Thus, this study extends the 
present IT-related literature by evaluating the role of an IT regime as a monetary framework 
in determining EMP in developing countries. In addition, we attempt to verify the IT effects 
on the volatilities of exchange rate depreciation and international reserves changes, which 
enables us to discuss how the IT adoption relates to policy stances in the foreign exchange 
market.  
This study applies the propensity score matching (PSM) method to mitigate self-
selection problems, following several works on the IT effects (Lin & Ye, 2007, 2009; Lin, 
2010; Vega & Winkelried, 2005; de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Samarina et 
al., 2014). The main result shows clear evidence supportive of the IT role in stabilizing EMP 
                                                          
18 The main feature of an IT regime is an explicit quantitative inflation target and strong central bank legal 
commitments (e.g., Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin & Savastano, 2001). The main argument is that an official 
announcement of an inflation target improves a central bank’s credibility and helps to lower inflation and the 
volatilities of inflation and real output (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 1997; Mishkin, 1999). As of 
2013, fifteen non-OECD countries have adopted an IT regime. 
19 Recent studies on the IT effects on the domestic economic variables include Ball and Sheridan (2005), Vega 
and Winkelried (2005), Batini and Laxton (2007), Goncalves and Salles (2008), Lin and Ye (2009), de 
Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Samarina et al. (2014), Thornton (2016), Kadria and Aissa (2016), 
and Balima et al. (2017).  
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in developing countries. In addition, our analysis of the decomposition of EMP reveals that 
an IT regime helps stabilize international reserves holdings, while it does not affect exchange 
rate volatility significantly. Some studies highlight that an IT regime is often related to a 
floating exchange rate regime (Rose, 2007; Lin & Ye, 2009; Taylor, 2001). Hu (2006) and 
Brenner and Sokoler (2010) argue that the flexibility of exchange rate motivates monetary 
authority to adopt an IT regime, and its rigidity is not suitable for IT policies in the long run. 
However, our results show no clear evidence that IT adoption induces exchange rate stability. 
At the same time, the policy commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of 
monetary policy conduct, along with less speculative behaviors of market participants. In 
this case, a central bank tends not to, or is not required to, intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, so that changes in international reserves would become more stable under an IT 
regime. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains methodology and 
the empirical results with some policy implications. Section 3 concludes. 
3.2 Empirical analysis 
3.2.1 Methodology  
This study evaluates the IT effects on EMP over 101 developing countries from 1990 to 
2014 by applying the PSM method that involves a two-step procedure. Among various 
definitions of an IT adoption year, this study uses the ‘loose’ and ‘strict’ types of adoption 
years, following Rose (2007), Lin (2010), and Samarina et al. (2014). A loose adoption year 
represents the earliest adoption year in which inflation targets are announced without strong 
commitments, and a strict adoption year represents the latest year in which credible 
commitments are made to achieve inflation targets with a single inflation target via monetary 
policies. This study identifies developing countries based on the IMF’s country classification, 
and our treatment group includes 16 IT countries and control group contains 85 non-IT 
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countries.20 Table 3.1 shows a list of IT countries with loose and strict adoption years, and 
Table 3.2 presents non-IT countries in our sample. 
We apply four PSM methods. The first matching method is the nearest-neighbor 
matching without replacement, which matches each treated observation to the n control 
observations that have the closest propensity scores, but each control observation is used no 
more than one time as a match for a treated observation. We use two nearest-neighbor 
matching estimators: n = 1 and n = 3. The second method involves radius matching, where 
each treated observation is matched with control observations with estimated propensity 
scores that fall within a specified radius. We use two radius matching estimators: r = 0.05 
and r = 0.1 . The next involves kernel matching method, which matches each treated 
observation to control observations with weights inversely proportional to the distance 
between the treated and control observations. We use two kernel matching methods: 
Gaussian and Epanechnikov. The last matching method involves applying the regression-
adjusted local linear matching approach developed by Heckman et al. (1998).  
The PSM method includes a two-step procedure. This study first applies a probit 
model to estimate the propensity score, which is the conditional probability that a country 
adopts an IT regime based on the country’s characteristics: 
 
            P(X) = Prob(D = 1|X) = E(D|X), 
 
where D is a treatment or IT dummy that takes one when a country adopts an IT regime and 
zero otherwise, and X is the matrix of the country’s characteristics that are expected to drive 
IT regime selection, following de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Lin and Ye 
                                                          
20 To ensure that the treatment and control groups are comparable, Lin and Ye (2009) and Lin (2010) exclude 
some non-IT countries with substantially different features (e.g., real GDP per capita) from IT countries. 
Following their method, we exclude some non-IT countries whose real GDP per capita levels are lower than 
those of the smallest IT country.  
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(2007), and Samaria et al. (2014).21 The model includes the one-year lagged inflation rate, 
real per capita GDP growth rate, broad money growth, and fiscal balance. To control for 
external economic conditions, we also incorporate the measures of exchange rate flexibility, 
trade openness, and financial openness.22 Trade openness is calculated from the ratio of the 
sum of exports and imports to GDP. The data are taken from World Development Indicators 
(WDI), World Economic Outlook (WEO), Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) de facto exchange 
rate arrangement classification, and Chinn and Ito’s (2008) capital account openness index.  
As a second step, we estimate the ATT by using estimated propensity scores: 
 
            ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1] − E[Yi0|Di = 1], 
 
where Di is the IT dummy for country i; Yi1 and Yi0 are potential outcomes of IT and non-IT 
regimes (two counterfactual situations), respectively; Yi0|Di = 1 is the value of the outcome 
that would have been observed if the IT country had not adopted an IT regime; and Yi1|Di =
1 is the value of the outcome that is actually observed in the same country. A crucial problem 
concerns the difficulty of estimating the ATT because of the unobservable value of 
E[Yi0|Di = 1]. When a country’s choice of IT regime is random, the ATT can be estimated 
from differences in the sample means of the outcome variable between the groups of the IT 
and non-IT countries.  
                                                          
21 As noted by Lin and Ye (2007), finding an appropriate statistical model that explains the probability of IT 
adoption is not the main goal of estimating propensity scores. Under conditional independence assumptions, 
the exclusion of variables that systematically affect the likelihood of IT adoption but do not affect outcome 
variables, such as inflation and its volatility, is not problematic in the case of probit regressions (see Persson, 
2001).  
22 According to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) classification, the fine grid classification includes fourteen 
categories, and the coarse grid version aggregates these into five categories. By using the coarse grid 
classification, we construct the classification of the exchange rate flexibility with three categories (fixed, 
intermediate, and flexible). 
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However, IT regime selection is not random in the sense that such a choice is 
systematically correlated with a set of observable covariates that also affect the outcome 
variable, thereby creating problems in the selection of observables (e.g., Dehejia & Wahba, 
2002; Heckman et al., 1998). To mitigate such a problem, we apply the PSM method, which 
uses a control group of non-IT countries to mimic a randomized experiment. As suggested 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), treatment and control observations can be matched based 
on propensity scores p(X) to solve high-dimensional set of observed covariates. Once p(X) 
is given, the ATT is estimated under two main assumptions, i.e., conditional independence 
and common support assumptions, as follows: 
 
            ATT = E[Yi1|Di = 1, p(Xi)] − E[Yi0|Di = 0, p(Xi)]. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
Our main interest is to determine how IT adoption affects variability of EMP in developing 
countries. Since EMP is composed of exchange rate depreciation and changes in 
international reserves, we attempt to evaluate IT effects by estimating the treatment effect of 
an IT regime on the volatilities of each EMP component. Similar to the works of Lin (2010), 
we measure the volatilities of EMP, exchange rate depreciation, and changes in international 
reserves scaled by base money as the standard deviation of the twelve monthly observations 
for each year. The data is obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS). We first 
estimate the propensity scores by using a probit model. Table 3.3 presents the estimation 
results for the loose IT and strict IT regimes. Countries with higher inflation rates for the 
previous period, sound fiscal conditions, and higher levels of trade openness are less likely 
to adopt an IT regime. In addition, countries with the higher degrees of financial openness 
and exchange rate flexibility are more likely to adopt an IT regime. These results generally 
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coincide with the findings of previous studies (e.g., de Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 
2012; Lin & Ye, 2007; Lin, 2010).  
Once the propensity scores are estimated, we estimate the ATT by applying matching 
methods. We first ensure the sharing of the same support or confirm the highly and 
reasonably comparability between the treatment and control groups. As in the works of Lin 
and Ye (2007, 2009) and Thornton and Vasilakis (2017), we reconstruct the dataset that 
satisfies the common support assumption by sorting all observations based on estimated 
propensity scores and discarding control units with propensity scores that fall below the 
lowest treatment unit value and exceed the highest treatment unit value.  
Table 3.4 reports the ATT on the volatilities of EMP and its components for the loose 
and strict IT regimes.23 The first seven columns report the results of the loose IT regime, and 
the last seven show the results of the strict IT regime. Our results show that EMP volatility 
is negatively significant irrespective of the choice of the IT regime, which indicates that IT 
adoption helps stabilize EMP in developing countries. In addition, the results clearly show 
that IT adoption reduces volatility of changes in international reserves in loose and strict IT 
regimes. The average estimated ATTs on the volatilities of EMP and changes in international 
reserves are about −4 ~ −2 % and −3 ~ −2 %, respectively. On the other hand, our analysis 
presents no clear evidence that IT adoption would affect volatility of exchange rate changes, 
although some studies suggest that an IT regime is often related to a floating exchange rate 
regime (Hu, 2006; Rose, 2007; Lin & Ye, 2009; Brenner & Sokoler, 2010; Taylor, 2001). 
Our analysis of the decomposition of EMP generally shows that a reduction in EMP 
volatility originates from the international reserves component under an IT regime. The 
policy commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of monetary policy conduct, 
                                                          
23 For robustness checks, we also estimate the ATT by using an alternative sample including some non-IT 
countries that were excluded from our baseline analysis to ensure the comparability of treatment and control 
groups. The results are generally consistent with the baseline findings (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8).  
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which can mitigate speculative behaviors of market participants. Thus, once an IT regime is 
adopted, central banks may not necessitate the intervention in the foreign exchange market 
so that international reserves holdings become more stable. 
For the better understanding, we also evaluate the IT effect for sub-samples of 
developing countries by dividing our full sample of developing countries into the groups of 
low- and middle-income developing countries. 24  Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the probit 
estimates and the ATTs on the volatilities of EMP and its components for each of the two 
groups of low- and middle-income developing countries, respectively. Our results show clear 
evidence that the IT adoption has a beneficial impact on the volatilities of EMP and changes 
in international reserves in middle-income developing countries. However, our analysis fails 
to present clear evidence of the IT effectiveness in low-income developing countries. These 
results imply that the IT adoption would enhance the policy credibility mainly in middle-
income developing countries.  
3.3 Conclusion 
This study has applied the PSM method to examine whether an IT regime helps stabilize 
EMP and its two components. The empirical results have indicated that an IT regime would 
help stabilize EMP. In addition, our analysis has provided evidences that an IT regime 
lessens volatility of changes in international reserves, while our results show no clear 
evidence that an IT regime affects exchange rate variability. These findings suggest that the 
policy commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of monetary policy conduct. 
Under an IT regime, central banks would not be required to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market. More interestingly, our findings have also shown that an IT regime is more beneficial 
for middle-income developing countries rather than for low-income developing countries. 
                                                          
24 The developing countries whose real GDP per capita in 2013 is below and above 6, 000 USD are classified 
into the low- and middle- income developing countries, respectively. For the robustness check, we also estimate 
our models by using the critical real GDP per capita of 8,000 USD. The results are qualitatively similar.  
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Table 3.1. Inflation targeting developing countries and starting years 
Country Starting Year 
 Inflation targeting (loose) Inflation targeting (strict)   
Armenia 2006 2006 
Brazil 1999 1999 
Chile 1991 2000 
Colombia 2000 2000 
Ghana 2003 2007 
Guatemala 2005 2006 
Hungary 2001 2001 
Indonesia 2005 2006 
Mexico 1995 2001 
Peru 2002 2002 
Philippines 2002 2002 
Poland 1999 1999 
Romania 2005 2006 
Thailand 2000 2000 
Turkey  2002 2006 
South Africa 2000 2000 
Note: Targeting dates are taken from De Mendonca and De Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Thornton (2016), Rose 
(2007), and Lin and Ye (2009). 
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Table 3.2. Control group countries 
Afghanistan Gabon Niger 
Albania Gambia, The  Nigeria 
Algeria Georgia Oman 
Angola Grenada Pakistan 
Anguila Guinea Panama 
Antigua and Barbuda Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea 
Argentia Guyana Paraguay 
Aruba Haiti Qatar 
Azerbaijan Honduras Russian Federation 
Bahamas, The Hong Kong, China Rwanda 
Bahrain India Samoa 
Bangladesh Iran, Islamic Rep. Sao Tome and Principe 
Barbados Iraq Senegal 
Belarus Jamaica Serbia, Republic of 
Belize Jordan Seychelles 
Benin Kazakhstan Sierra Leone 
Bhutan Kenya Solomon Islands 
Bolivia Kuwait Sri Lanka 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Kyrgyz Republic St. Kitts and Nevis 
Botswana Lao PDR St. Lucia 
Brunei Lebanon St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Bulgaria Lesotho Sudan 
Burundi Liberia Suriname 
Cambodia Libya Swaziland 
Cameroon Macao Syrian Arab Republic 
Cape Verde Macedonia, FYR Tajikistan 
Central African Republic Madagascar Tanzania 
Chad Malawi Togo 
China Malaysia Tonga 
Comoros Maldives Trinidad and Tobago 
Congo, Rep. Mali Tunisia 
Costa Rica Manaco Uganda 
Croatia Mauritania Ukraine 
Djibouti Mauritius United Arab Emirates 
Dominica Mongolia Uruguay 
Dominican Republic Montserrat Vanuatu 
Ecuador Morocco Venezuela 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mozambique Vietnam 
El Salvador Myanmar Yemen, Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea Namibia Zambia 
Eritrea Nepal Zimbabwe 
Ethiopia Netherlands Antilles  
Fiji Nicaragua  
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Table 3.3. Estimates of propensity scores 
 Loose IT Strict IT 
Inflation (lag) -0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.060*** 
(0.011) 
GDP per capita growth  2.944** 
(1.156) 
1.592 
(1.288) 
Broad money growth -0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Fiscal balance -0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime 1.264*** 
(0.109) 
1.395*** 
(0.119) 
Trade openness -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Financial openness 0.137*** 
(0.042) 
0.199*** 
(0.045) 
No. of obs. 1329 1329 
Pseudo-R2 0.36 0.44 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 3.4. Estimates of the treatment effects 
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear  
Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  
 r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Exchange market pressure  -2.171 
(1.033)** 
[1.208]* 
-2.553 
(2.049) 
[1.357]* 
-2.171 
(1.929) 
[1.003]** 
-2.500 
(1.803) 
[0.915]*** 
-2.444 
(1.776) 
[0.867]*** 
-2.179 
(1.942) 
[0.934]** 
-2.244 
(1.710) 
[0.860]*** 
-1.806 
(0.869)** 
[0.980]* 
-3.667 
(1.078)*** 
[1.331]*** 
-3.770 
(1.985)* 
[1.267]*** 
-3.268 
(1.893)* 
[1.085]*** 
-3.399 
(1.876)* 
[1.180]*** 
-3.856 
(2.002)* 
[1.165]*** 
-3.481 
(1.216)*** 
[1.074]*** 
Exchange rate depreciation  -0.120 
(0.365) 
[0.381] 
-0.268 
(0.404) 
[0.491] 
-0.356 
(0.595) 
[0.450] 
-0.208 
(0.557) 
[0.375] 
-0.251 
(0.549) 
[0.357] 
-0.384 
(0.599) 
[0.461] 
-0.315 
(0.494) 
[0.397] 
-0.178 
(0.412) 
[0.409] 
-0.024 
(0.329) 
[0.459] 
-0.160 
(0.465) 
[0.404] 
-0.045 
(0.445) 
[0.370] 
-0.056 
(0.442) 
[0.378] 
-0.183 
(0.469) 
[0.417] 
-0.151 
(0.430) 
[0.431] 
Change in international reserve  -2.082 
(1.054)** 
[1.170]* 
-2.082 
(2.047) 
[1.351] 
-1.699 
(1.888) 
[0.922]* 
-2.016 
(1.767) 
[0.934]** 
-1.922 
(1.741) 
[0.917]** 
-1.693 
(1.900) 
[0.903]* 
-1.797 
(1.643) 
[0.926]* 
-1.530 
(0.954) 
[1.026] 
-2.999 
(1.085)*** 
[1.421]** 
-3.286 
(1.957)* 
[1.257]*** 
-2.710 
(1.869) 
[1.126]** 
-2.821 
(1.853) 
[1.094]*** 
-3.334 
(1.974)* 
[1.167]*** 
-2.961 
(1.169)** 
[1.109]*** 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** indicate the significant level 
of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.5. Estimates of propensity scores 
 Loose IT Strict IT 
Sub-sample: low-income developing countries 
Inflation (lag) 
 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.043*** 
(0.015) 
GDP per capita growth  2.487 
(1.608) 
2.712 
(1.895) 
Broad money growth -0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Fiscal balance 0.001 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
Exchange rate regime 0.656*** 
(0.153) 
0.807*** 
(0.167) 
Trade openness -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Financial openness 
 
0.180*** 
(0.054) 
0.233*** 
(0.061) 
No. of obs. 666 666 
Pseudo- R2 0.23 0.29 
Sub-sample: middle-income developing countries 
Inflation (lag) 
 
-0.041*** 
(0.012) 
-0.086*** 
(0.018) 
GDP per capita growth  5.132*** 
(1.526) 
2.593 
(2.408) 
Broad money growth -0.013** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Fiscal balance -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Exchange rate regime 1.984*** 
(0.204) 
2.005*** 
(0.204) 
Trade openness -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Financial openness 0.157** 
(0.065) 
0.204*** 
(0.068) 
No. of obs. 663 663 
Pseudo- R2 0.57 0.61 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 3.6. Estimates of the treatment effects  
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear  
Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  
 r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Sub-sample: low-income developing countries 
Exchange market pressure  
 
-1.057 
(1.388) 
[1.447] 
-0.745 
(1.467) 
[1.356] 
-0.916 
(1.205) 
[0.753] 
-1.069 
(1.103) 
[0.709] 
-1.203 
(1.087) 
[0.799] 
-0.896 
(1.214) 
[0.722] 
-0.693 
(1.762) 
[0.719] 
0.650 
(0.946) 
[1.376] 
0.159 
(1.332) 
[1.282] 
-0.337 
(1.316) 
[0.773] 
-0.312 
(1.194) 
[0.688] 
-0.520 
(1.179) 
[0.748] 
-0.371 
(1.329) 
[0.796] 
-0.442 
(1.006) 
[0.718] 
Exchange rate depreciation  -0.303 
(0.262) 
[0.371] 
-0.183 
(0.248) 
[0.617] 
-0.336 
(0.435) 
[0.227] 
-0.336 
(0.394) 
[0.220] 
-0.340 
(0.387) 
[0.237] 
-0.321 
(0.438) 
[0.219] 
-0.343 
(0.309) 
[0.227] 
0.212 
(0.251) 
[0.447] 
-0.026 
(0.536) 
[0.467] 
-0.010 
(0.286) 
[0.213] 
-0.024 
(0.265) 
[0.209] 
-0.039 
(0.262) 
[0.196] 
-0.005 
(0.288) 
[0.221] 
-0.083 
(0.264) 
[0.222] 
Change in international reserve  -1.096 
(1.416) 
[1.470] 
-0.697 
(1.463) 
[1.391] 
-0.931 
(1.148) 
[0.795] 
-1.182 
(1.053) 
[0.761] 
-1.241 
(1.040) 
[0.778] 
-0.940 
(1.156) 
[0.749] 
-0.783 
(1.802) 
[0.736] 
0.635 
(1.080) 
[1.550] 
-0.571 
(1.586) 
[1.692] 
-0.505 
(1.324) 
[0.805] 
-0.460 
(1.195) 
[0.778] 
-0.674 
(1.179) 
[0.781] 
-0.505 
(1.338) 
[0.782] 
-0.647 
(1.252) 
[0.797] 
Sub-sample: middle-income developing countries 
Exchange market pressure  -2.776 
(1.194)** 
[2.431] 
-5.951 
(9.094) 
[3.101]* 
-4.707 
(5.130) 
[2.582]* 
-5.000 
(4.700) 
[2.526]** 
-4.948 
(4.607) 
[2.372]** 
-4.769 
(5.154) 
[2.546]* 
-5.231 
(2.587)** 
[2.831]* 
-4.293 
(1.260)*** 
[1.413]*** 
-10.067 
(4.079)** 
[2.581]*** 
-8.670 
(6.215) 
[2.487]*** 
-8.790 
(5.607) 
[2.329]*** 
-8.783 
(5.590) 
[2.416]*** 
-8.572 
(6.125) 
[2.606]*** 
-8.050 
(3.041)*** 
[2.534]*** 
Exchange rate depreciation  0.613 
(0.462) 
[0.475] 
-0.623 
(0.856) 
[1.261] 
-0.809 
(0.560) 
[1.374] 
-0.198 
(0.518) 
[0.838] 
-0.308 
(0.509) 
[0.871] 
-0.816 
(0.563) 
[1.368] 
-0.469 
(1.148) 
[0.959] 
1.210 
(0.451) 
[0.498]** 
0.018 
(1.027) 
[0.865] 
-0.246 
(0.491) 
[0.990] 
-0.385 
(0.456) 
[0.916] 
-0.271 
(0.455) 
[0.915] 
-0.182 
(0.489) 
[0.943] 
-0.693 
(0.912) 
[1.006] 
Change in international reserve  -2.422 
(1.156)** 
[2.539] 
-4.954 
(9.084) 
[3.288] 
-3.481 
(5.117) 
[2.378] 
-4.253 
(4.687) 
[2.353]* 
-4.144 
(4.594) 
[2.206]* 
-3.530 
(5.141) 
[2.425] 
-4.192 
(2.384)* 
[2.415]* 
-3.297 
(1.234)*** 
[1.347]** 
-8.504 
(4.037)** 
[2.688]*** 
-6.999 
(6.213) 
[2.238]*** 
-7.049 
(5.606) 
[2.254]*** 
-7.144 
(5.588) 
[2.226]*** 
-6.936 
(6.123) 
[2.581]*** 
-6.067 
(2.957)** 
[2.321]** 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** indicate the significant level 
of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.7. Estimates of propensity scores (alternative sample) 
 Loose IT Strict IT 
Inflation (lag) -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
GDP per capita growth  3.753*** 
(0.894) 
2.688** 
(1.059) 
Broad money growth -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Fiscal balance -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Exchange rate regime 1.122*** 
(0.091) 
1.241*** 
(0.103) 
Trade openness -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Financial openness 0.142*** 
(0.036) 
0.200*** 
(0.039) 
No. of obs. 1825 1825 
Pseudo-R2 0.30 0.37 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented 
in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 3.8. Estimates of the treatment effects (alternative sample) 
 Loose IT       Strict IT       
 Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local 
linear  
Nearest-
neighbor 
3-nearest-
neighbor 
Radius   Kernel  Local linear  
 r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn r=0.05 r=0.10 Gaussian Epanechn 
Exchange market pressure  -5.171 
(2.184)** 
[1.729]*** 
-4.986 
(1.907)*** 
[2.767]* 
-4.190 
(1.435)*** 
[1.447]*** 
-3.967 
(1.307)*** 
[1.290]*** 
-4.058 
(1.286)*** 
[1.284]*** 
-4.372 
(1.445)*** 
[1.591]*** 
-4.121 
(3.514) 
[1.397]*** 
-2.879 
(1.292)** 
[2.475] 
-4.809 
(1.269)*** 
[2.145]** 
-5.869 
(1.642)*** 
[2.287]** 
-5.807 
(1.558)*** 
[2.235]*** 
-5.627 
(1.538)*** 
[1.954]*** 
-5.810 
(1.647)*** 
[2.290]** 
-6.179 
(2.080)*** 
[2.293]*** 
Exchange rate depreciation  -0.166 
(0.267) 
[0.284] 
-0.104 
(0.318) 
[0.322] 
-0.125 
(0.431) 
[0.242] 
-0.036 
(0.394) 
[0.206] 
-0.013 
(0.388) 
[0.219] 
-0.120 
(0.434) 
[0.238] 
-0.152 
(0.346) 
[0.247] 
0.296 
(0.238) 
[0.239] 
0.190 
(0.249) 
[0.279] 
0.154 
(0.493) 
[0.245] 
0.175 
(0.468) 
[0.239] 
0.187 
(0.462) 
[0.235] 
0.144 
(0.494) 
[0.243] 
0.102 
(0.303) 
[0.244] 
Change in international reserve  -4.492 
(2.133)** 
[1.821]*** 
-4.330 
(1.863)** 
[2.484]* 
-3.664 
(1.396)*** 
[1.415]*** 
-3.411 
(1.272)*** 
[1.266]*** 
-3.504 
(1.251)*** 
[1.260]*** 
-3.841 
(1.405)*** 
[1.549]*** 
-3.548 
(3.435) 
[1.395]** 
-2.397 
(1.293)* 
[2.229] 
-4.126 
(1.263)*** 
[2.199]* 
-5.272 
(1.603)*** 
[2.195]** 
-5.164 
(1.522)*** 
[2.192]** 
-4.976 
(1.503)*** 
[2.000]** 
-5.205 
(1.608)*** 
[2.192]** 
-5.541 
(2.085)*** 
[2.318]** 
Notes: 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for kernel and local linear regression matching. The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses and the bootstrapped standard errors are shown in brackets (they are based on 500 replications of the data). *, ** and *** indicate the significant level 
of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Chapter 4  
Inflation targeting and central bank credibility: Any 
difference between advanced and developing economies? 
4.1 Introduction 
Since monetary policy is a useful tool to quickly, but temporarily, achieve macroeconomic 
objectives, central banks influenced by political or governmental authorities tend to 
emphasize short-term economic expansions, leading to the inflationary policy bias 
(Cukierman, 1994; Walsh, 2005). One possible solution to mitigate such a policy bias is to 
allow central banks to be sufficiently independent from political influences in stabilizing 
inflation, thereby enhancing their credibility in financial markets. Indeed, many countries, 
particularly advanced countries, have granted autonomy to their monetary authorities in the 
past few decades. The monetary autonomy issue is more substantial in developing countries 
than it is in advanced countries. Fry (1998) suggests that macroeconomic policy including 
monetary policy in developing countries is often dominated by government fiscal positions. 
According to his fiscal dominance hypothesis of central bank independence, the size of the 
government`s deficit and the methods by which it is financed determine the central banks’ 
independence in developing countries. In line with these arguments, the notion of central 
bank independence (CBI) has emerged as an effective means of insulating monetary policy 
from political interference to achieve long-term economic stability without the monetization 
of public debt and the loss of inflation-fighting credibility (Bernhard, 2002; Garriga, 2016; 
Eijffinger & De Haan, 1996).25 
                                                          
25CBI generally refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence 
in the conduct of policy. Bernhard (2002) and Garriga (2016) argue that CBI is the central bank’s ability to 
control the instrument of monetary policy or, in contrast, is the set of restrictions to the influence of the 
government on the central bank’s arrangement of monetary policy. Eijffinger and De Haan(1996) highlight 
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The conventional theory on central bank independence relates to the inflationary bias 
inherent in monetary policy due to the time inconsistency problem (Kydland & Prescott, 
1977; Barro & Gordon, 1983). The ‘rules versus discretion’ literature initiated by Barro and 
Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) suggests that the credible delegation of monetary control 
to an independent central bank can mitigate the time-inconsistency problem and the 
inflationary bias.26 From empirical perspectives, most political scientists and economists 
generally agree with the theoretical argument that central bank independence lowers 
inflation. There have been many empirical studies performed on the role of central bank 
independence relating to various aspects, such as monetary policy, financial liberalization, 
political institutions, democratization, or responses to crises (Adam et al., 2011; Klomp & 
de Haan, 2009; Reenock et al., 2013; Rosas, 2006). Among them, some works, including 
Klomp and de Haan (2009) and Lohmann (2006), argue that central bank independence 
contributes to achieving price stability as well as financial stability. 
In the past, central banks tended to maintain confidentiality with less transparency. 
Some were engaged in commercial banking operations and did not release much information 
about public finances. However, the recent trend of central bank independence has demanded 
accountability, legitimacy considerations and guidance, which call for central bank 
transparency (CBT) (Crowe & Meade, 2008; Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014).27 Transparency 
                                                          
three types of independence of the central banks, such as personnel, financial, and policy independence. 
Personnel independence is the limitation to the influence of the government on the membership or tenure of 
the central bank board. Financial independence reflects restrictions to the capability of the government to use 
the central bank’s loans to finance government budget deficits. Policy independence implies the central bank’s 
ability to formulate and implement the monetary policy, such as setting the goals and/or choosing the monetary 
policy instrument to achieve its primary objective.  
26For the economics literature, see, e.g., Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Rogoff (1985), Lohmann (1992), 
Cukierman (1992), and Eijffinger and De Haan (1996). For the political science literature, see, e.g., Hirsch and 
Goldthorpe (1978), Beck (1984), Woolley (1984), Lindberg and Maier (1985), Mayer (1990), and Goodman 
(1992). 
27Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) highlight that the rise of central bank transparency can be seen as (1) 
improving the government’s response to the public; (2) a crucial element of accountability or a mechanism 
allowing the public to assess the consistency of the central bank’s actions with a mandate; (3) a way of making 
market participants more smoothly responsive to monetary policy decisions; and (4) a method of enhancing 
the credibility of the central bank’s commitment. 
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is an inverse concept of confidentiality. Transparency can be regarded as a necessary 
mechanism, which enables the public to assess the consistency of a central bank’s actions 
with its mandate and allows the private sector and financial operators to improve their 
expectations and business decisions (Blinder, 1998; Van der Cruijsen & Demertzis, 2007; 
Crowe & Meade, 2008). In addition, central bank transparency improves policy credibility 
as well as policy flexibility. A credible commitment makes a central bank flexible to deviate 
from a policy target when exceptional conditions occur since the public clearly understands 
that the deviation is temporary without an inconsistency with long-term targets.  
Since the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) has been widely adopted as an 
alternative monetary policy framework in advanced countries. Since the late 1990s, some 
emerging and developing countries have also introduced an IT regime, although this regime 
is not yet prevalent in all developing and emerging countries.28 The main feature of an IT 
regime is an explicit quantitative inflation target and strong central bank legal commitment 
to the transparency, accountability, and credibility of price stability when implementing 
monetary policies (Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin & Savastano, 2001). The argument underlying 
this feature is that an official announcement of an inflation target improves a central bank’s 
credibility and helps to lower inflation and the volatilities of inflation and real output 
(Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 1997; Mishkin, 1999).  
The conventional view is that the adoption of an IT regime as a reform in the 
monetary policy context increases the transparency of monetary policy conduct (Bernanke 
et al., 1999; Faust & Henderson, 2004; Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Mishkin & 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; Svensson, 1999). Crowe (2010) suggests that IT adoption 
contributes to the convergence in forecast errors, implying that it improves transparency. In 
addition, some studies, including Mishkin (1999) and Freedman and Otker-Robe (2010), 
                                                          
28Indeed, as of 2012, there were 12 advanced economies and 17 emerging and developing countries, according 
to the IMF classification (De Mendonca & De Guimaraes e Souza, 2012). 
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discuss the relationship between the introduction of IT and the independence of central banks. 
Mishkin (1999) argues that an IT regime can eliminate the political pressure on central banks 
to implement expansionary policies since it enables central banks to focus on price stability 
in the long run. Freedman and Otker-Robe (2010) highlight that IT countries have passed 
legislation providing the central bank with the authority to control monetary policy. In spite 
of growing debates on institutional reforms of central banks, few empirical studies have 
examined how IT adoption affects central banks’ transparency and independence as the 
institutional reforms, which are closely related to their credibility. Although several studies 
show the favorable macroeconomic effects of an IT regime, its direct impact on central bank 
independence and transparency in advanced and developing countries is still unexplored.29 
In addition, the central banks’ institutional reform has become more important for 
developing countries that often face economic and financial instability as well as political 
pressures. Thus, this study attempts to extend the present IT-related literature by addressing 
such issues in both advanced and developing countries and to discuss the differences between 
them. 
This study investigates how IT adoption relates to the transparency and independence 
of central banks by applying the entropy balancing method to mitigate self-selection 
problems, following several works on the treatment effects (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016; 
Huang & Yeh, 2014). Policy debates have been conducted to determine the countries that 
have actually adopted the IT regime in an effective manner (Caballero & Krishnamurthy, 
                                                          
29Recent studies on the IT effects on the domestic economic variables include Ball and Sheridan (2005),Vega 
and Winkelried (2005), Batini and Laxton (2007), Goncalves and Salles (2008), Lin and Ye (2009), de 
Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012), Samarina et al. (2014),and Thornton (2016). Several works have 
studied the effects of IT regimes on some macroeconomic conditions other than inflation, inflation volatility, 
and output volatility via the PSM method. For example, Lin (2010) shows that the IT regime reduces levels of 
real and nominal exchange rate volatility, while increasing international reserves in developing countries, 
although it intensifies the exchange rate instability and reduces international reserves in advanced economies. 
Lucotte (2012) indicates that IT regimes have a positive significant effect on tax revenue collection in 
developing countries. Kadria and Aissa (2016) conclude that an IT regime can help reduce budget deficits in 
developing economies. Balima et al. (2017) show that IT adoption reduces levels of sovereign debt risk. 
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2005; Mishkin, 2004; Sims, 2005; Svensson, 1997). Among various definitions of an 
adoption year, this study uses the ‘loose’ and ‘strict’ types of adoption years, following Rose 
(2007), Lin (2010), and Samarina et al. (2014). A loose adoption year represents the earliest 
adoption year in which inflation targets are announced without strong commitments, and a 
strict adoption year represents the latest year in which credible commitments are made to 
achieve inflation targets with a single inflation target via monetary policies. Moreover, this 
study attempts to examine heterogeneous features of the performance of an IT regime, as in 
the work of Carare and Stone (2006), Mishkin (2004), and Fraga et al. (2003). To check the 
validity of the results derived from the entropy balancing method, this study further applies 
the standard panel approaches, including the dynamic panel estimation method developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), as alternative methods, as in 
the works of Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016). 
The empirical analysis shows several important findings. First, the entropy balancing 
approach presents clear evidence supportive of the role of IT in improving central bank 
transparency in both advanced and developing countries. Second, more importantly, the 
results suggest a clear difference between advanced and developing countries in the IT 
effects on central bank independence. Advanced countries that have adopted an IT regime 
experience higher central bank independence, while developing countries with an IT 
adoption experience lower central bank independence. The standard panel approaches as 
alternative methods confirm the empirical validity of the results of the entropy balancing 
analysis. The negative effect of an IT regime on central bank independence in developing 
countries may reflect the argument in the political economy context that central banks are 
granted stringent monetary authority in pursuit of price stability at the expense of losing 
independence from political authorities that often tend to keep central banks under their 
authority.  
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Third, our analysis also presents heterogeneous effects on transparency and the 
independence of central banks. Concerning the IT effects on transparency, a more flexible 
exchange rate causes an IT regime to be less effective at improving transparency in advanced 
countries, while it causes an IT regime to be more effective at improving transparency in 
developing countries. Regarding the role of fiscal discipline in the effectiveness of an IT 
regime, developing countries with a high fiscal discipline have less motivation to improve 
transparency. On the other hand, the heterogeneous effects on independence reveal that the 
higher flexibility of the exchange rate causes an IT regime to be less effective at improving 
independence in advanced countries. In addition, the negative effect of an IT regime on 
independence decreases over time in developing countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review 
on the adoption of IT, central bank independence and transparency. In section 3, we estimate 
the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) by applying entropy balancing methods. 
Then, we present our empirical results of the IT effects on central bank transparency and 
independence and discuss their intuitions by identifying their differences between advanced 
and developing countries. Section 4 presents our conclusions.  
4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Measures of central bank independence and transparency 
Since the 1990s, many central banks in advanced countries have started adopting an IT 
regime and the credibility of a central bank has become more important for monetary 
authorities because a lower level of central bank credibility leads to less effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Central bank independence (CBI) and central bank transparency (CBT) 
might play a crucial role in improving the credibility of central banks since they may reduce 
time inconsistency problems of monetary policy and enable market participants to assess the 
consistency of a central bank’s actions with its mandate. With the increasing importance of 
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credibility in the conduct of monetary policy, we need appropriate measurements of CBI and 
CBT to capture the credibility of a central bank’s monetary policy. 
Cukierman (1994) highlights that there are four main types of CBI indices, such as 
legal indices derived from the charters of central banks, questionnaire-based indices, the 
actual turnover of central bank governors, and the political vulnerability of central banks. 
Some studies use measures of de facto CBI, which are based on questionnaires (Blinder, 
2000; Cukierman et al., 1992; Fry et al., 1996) or in terms of the turnover rate of central bank 
governors (Cukierman & Webb, 1995; Cukierman et al., 1992; De Haan & Siermann, 1996). 
The measures based on questionnaires may be less reliable partly because of their narrow 
coverage, problematic cross-sectional comparability, and little within-country variation 
(Garriga, 2016). Cukierman et al. (1992) suggests that the central bank governors’ turnover 
rate is an appropriate measure in predicting the impact of CBI in developing countries. 
Many empirical studies also apply de jure measures of CBI based on central banks 
statutes instead of applying de facto measures (Alesina et al., 1989; Cukierman, 1992; 
Cukierman, et al., 1992; Grilli et al., 1991). Alesina et al. (1989) and Grilli et al. (1991) build 
de jure measures of CBI based on various factors, such as political, financial, and economic 
independence.30 Cukierman et al. (1992) construct the CBI index (the CWN index) based on 
                                                          
30Alesina et al. (1989) construct the CBI index partly based on studies by Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988) 
that consider two dimensions of independence, such as political independence (the central bank’s ability to 
formulate and implement the monetary policy, such as setting the goals and/or choosing the monetary policy 
instrument) and financial independence (the degree of restrictions to the government’s ability to use central 
bank’s loans to finance government budget deficits).Alesina et al. (1989) emphasizes the criterion related to 
political aspects and suggest that the degree of CBI is affected by four main criteria: (i) institutional and formal 
relationships between central banks and the executives (for instance, the identification of the responsibility for 
(and frequency of) the appointment of a central bank’s governor, the presence of government officials on the 
board of directors of central banks, and the requirements of the government's approval of specific policies); (ii) 
informal relationships and contacts between a central bank and executive members; (iii) budgetary and 
financial relationships between a central bank and the executive; and (iv) macroeconomic relationships, such 
as the existence of rules forcing a central bank to accommodate fiscal policy.  
Grilli et al. (1991) distinguish two types of CBI: political independence (the ability of a central bank 
to choose the objectives of monetary policy) and economic independence (the ability of a central bank to choose 
its instruments). They measure political independence based on three aspects of a monetary regime: (i) the 
procedure for appointing the members of the central bank government bodies; (ii) the relationship between 
these bodies and the government; and (iii) the formal responsibilities of the central bank. In addition, they 
measure economic independence based on (i) the influence of the government in determining how much to 
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the legal independence reflecting the independence of the chief executive officer (CEO) of 
the central bank, the central banks’  independence in policy formation, its objective or 
mandate, and the stringency of limits on its lending to the public sector. Recently, Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2014) elaborate de jure measures of CBI by incorporating some legal 
aspects, such as limits on the reappointment of the CEO and board members, restrictions on 
government representation on the board, and the intervention of the government in exchange 
rate policy formulation, into the criteria of the CWN index. In addition, Garriga (2016) 
constructs the comprehensive dataset on the de jure CBI measures that identify statutory 
reforms affecting the CBI, their direction, and the attributes necessary to build the CWN 
index. Garriga (2016) highlights that de jure measures are suitable to explore the 
determinants of the independence of monetary institutions, although the indices of legal CBI 
have been criticized. 31  Bodea and Hicks (2014) also attempt to code CBI information 
annually and directly identify reform years in their coding of the reforms of the past twenty-
five years. They code the texts of approximately 80 countries for the year 1973 to 2008 to 
update the CWN index of CBI. CWN’s original data covers 72 countries for four decades 
(1950–59, 1960–72, 1973–79, and 1980–89). Recently, Bodea and Hicks (2015) updated 
their CBI data for 144 countries, covering the period from 1972 to 2015. 
Regarding the measurement of central bank transparency (CBT), Fry et al. (2000) is 
the first study to construct comprehensive measures of CBT. The strength of the measures 
of Fry et al.(2000) is its wide country coverage based on a survey of 94 central banks, and 
its limitation is the relatively restrictive definition of transparency. Fry et al. (2000) measure 
                                                          
borrow from the central bank; and (ii) the nature of the monetary instruments under the control of the central 
bank. Debelle and Fischer (1994) define political and economic independence as a goal and instrument 
independence, respectively. Arnone et al. (2009) also construct the CBI indicator based on the methodology 
proposed by Grilli et al. (1991). 
31 De jure measures are often criticized since laws do not consider all possible conditions that might affect the 
relationships between a central bank and the government. Moreover, the facts described in the laws often 
deviate from the actual practices, especially in developing countries, and even independent central banks can 
be influenced by the government’s appointments and threats to the bank (Lohmann, 1998).  
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transparency based on an equally weighted average of three indicators: (i) whether a central 
bank provides prompt public-explanations of its policy decisions; (ii) the frequency and form 
of forward-looking analysis provided to the public; and (iii) the frequency of bulletins, 
speeches, and research papers.32 Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) distinguish more aspects of 
transparency and consider more than one point in time. Their indices distinguish political 
transparency (openness about policy objectives), economic transparency (openness about 
data, models, and forecasts), procedural transparency (openness about the way decisions are 
made, achieved mainly through the release of minutes and votes), policy transparency 
(openness about the policy implications, achieved through prompt announcement and 
explanation of decisions), and operational transparency (openness about the implementation 
of those decisions—in other words, about control errors and macroeconomic disturbances 
affecting their magnitude). The advantage of this approach is its comprehensiveness, 
including multi-dimensional definitions of transparency, but its limitation is that the 
transparency index is constructed for only nine central banks.  
In general, most studies measure CBT using either a very limited number of central 
banks or a single point in time. Following the five elements of Eijffinger and Gerrats (2006), 
Crowe and Meade (2008) construct the measures of CBT covering 37 central banks over 2 
periods. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) replicate and extend the indices of Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) update their CBT index covering over 
100 central banks during 13 periods (1998 to 2010). This study uses the indices of CBI and 
CBT constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) in our baseline analysis. For the 
robustness check, we also consider the CBI index of Garriga (2016) and Bodea and Hicks 
(2015) as alternative measures of CBI. 
                                                          
32 Chortareas et al. (2002, 2003) adopt a slightly different approach, focusing on two aspects of CBT: (i) the 
publication of forecasts and (ii) the release of information on the monetary policy decisions; these two aspects 
correspond broadly to the categories of economic transparency and policy transparency, respectively.  
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4.2.2 Consequences and determinants of central bank independence and 
transparency 
Achieving macroeconomic and financial stability requires monetary policy credibility, 
which is closely related to CBI and CBT. 33  Concerning the consequences of CBI, an 
independent central bank can control inflation through the reduction of the risk of time 
inconsistency in monetary policy (Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Barro & Gordon, 1983; Haga, 
2015). Many studies show a negative effect of CBI on inflation, mainly focusing on 
advanced countries (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina & 
Summers, 1993; Eijffinger et al., 1998; Crowe & Meade, 2008; Dincer & Eichengreen, 
2014).34 However, some studies have doubted the negative relationship between CBI and 
inflation (Campillo & Miron, 1997; Forder, 1998; King & Ma, 2001; Daunfeldt & de Luna, 
2008; Jacome & Vasquez, 2008). Ismihan and Ozkan (2004) provide a theoretical 
explanation for the less significant relationship between CBI and inflation, arguing that 
although CBI contributes to lower inflation in the short term, the effects on growth make 
CBI less likely to achieve lower inflation in the long-term. Thus, the relationship between 
CBI and inflation is still controversial particularly in developing countries. Some studies 
suggest that CBI is significantly and negatively related to inflation in developing countries 
(Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman et al., 1992; De Haan & Kooi, 2000; Brumm, 2006; Garriga, 
2016), while others fail to present clear linkages between CBI and inflation in developing 
                                                          
33Both transparency and independence tend to enhance credibility (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2002). Eijffinger 
et al. (2006) indicate that transparency increases central bank credibility, flexibility and reputation.  
34Dreher et al. (2008) suggest the possibility of a reverse relationship between inflation and CBI, often based 
on turnover rates, since central bankers who have failed to control inflation have often been replaced. In 
addition, some studies examine how CBI not only relates to inflation but also to other macroeconomic 
conditions, such as inflation volatility and output, and the credibility of monetary policy (Bodea & Hicks, 2015; 
Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman et al., 2002; Cukierman et al., 1992; Persson & Tabellini, 1990; Rogoff, 1985; 
Dincer & Eichengreen, 2014; Garriga, 2016). Moreover, some empirical studies focus on the association 
between CBI and financial market performance (Klomp & de Haan, 2009; Kuttner & Posen, 2010; Moser & 
Dreher, 2010; Forch & Sunde, 2012).  
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countries (Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman et al., 1992; Campillo & Miron, 1997; Ismihan & 
Ozkan, 2004; Arnone et al., 2009; Sturm & de Haan, 2001). 
Regarding the consequences of CBT, many studies explore its effects on 
macroeconomic variables, including inflation and variabilities of inflation and output, using 
various forms of transparency. 35  By employing the CBT index of Fry et al. (2000), 
Chortareas et al. (2002) find that information disclosure reduces inflation, and Cecchetti and 
Krause (2002) show that a better macroeconomic performance consisting of inflation and 
output variabilities is associated with the transparency of central banks rather than with their 
independence. In addition, by using the index of CBT constructed by Demertzis and Hallett 
(2007) indicate that CBT helps reduce inflation variability but its impacts on the level of 
inflation and output and the variability of output in nine OECD countries are less clear. 
Moreover, Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, 2014) construct the index of CBT and find that 
transparency lowers inflation and the variabilities of inflation and output.  
Although many studies exist on the consequences of CBI and CBT, a relatively small 
number of empirical studies explore their determinants. D’Amato et al. (2009) evaluate the 
determinants of CBI and present that OECD countries experiencing higher inflation with 
lower political instability have more incentive to increase CBI, while non-OECD countries 
with more trade openness, higher GDP per capita, higher inflation, and less developed fiscal 
systems tend to have greater CBI. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) also evaluate the 
determinants of CBI and suggest that independence is likely to increase in countries with 
trade openness under IMF programs, while it tends to decrease in countries with a British 
                                                          
35Studies on the effect of transparency on financial markets also provide favorable results. Fratzscher (2006) 
suggests that transparency lowers the exchange rate volatility and uncertainty. De Goeij and Marquering (2006) 
and Ranaldo and Rossi (2010) find that the bond market reacts significantly to central bank communication. 
Neuenkirch (2012) provides the evidence that transparency lowers the bias in money market expectations and 
dampens their variation. Reeves and Sawicki (2007) suggest that the publication of the inflation report lowers 
stock market volatility. Papadamou et al. (2014) provide the empirical evidence that transparency helps 
stabilize stock market volatility, implying that it is beneficial for maintaining financial stability.  
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legal practice. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007, 2014) generally highlight the determinants of 
CBT and confirm that transparency is greater in countries with high-income levels, flexible 
exchange rate regimes, developed financial markets, and stable political systems. 
4.2.3 Inflation targeting 
During the past decades, the IT regime has been widely adopted by several central banks as 
a policy measure. On the theoretical front, clear predictions have not been made regarding 
the effectiveness of IT adoption. Several studies, including Bernanke and Woodford (2005), 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005), Mishkin (2000, 2004), and Sims (2005), suggest that 
the current lack of institutional development and inconsistencies among macroeconomic 
conditions in developing countries could undermine the success of IT and result in worse 
outcomes. However, a number of other studies, such as Svensson (1997), Mishkin (1999), 
and Bernanke et al. (1999), argue that as the credibility of central banks is initially low in 
emerging economies, the adoption of IT renders monetary policies more credible, thereby 
contributing to better macroeconomic outcomes in these economies.  
Some empirical studies investigate the driving factors for central banks to adopt the 
IT regime as a monetary policy conduct. Hu (2006) suggests that a country’s decision to 
adopt an IT regime may be influenced by several economic and institutional factors, such as 
fiscal position, financial depth, exchange rate flexibility, and the monetary autonomy of the 
central bank. Goncalves and Carvalho (2008, 2009) indicate that countries with lower debts, 
higher inflation, and flexible exchange rates are more likely to adopt an IT regime. Ismailov 
et al. (2016) find that the desires to keep or enhance anti-inflation credibility and a more 
flexible exchange rate without a nominal exchange rate anchor are the main driving forces 
to adopt an IT regime in high-income countries, while a high level of debts may hinder the 
countries’ desirability of IT adoption in low-income countries. On the other hand, there have 
been many empirical studies on how an IT regime affects macroeconomic variables. Among 
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them, Vega and Winkelried (2005), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), De Mendonca and de 
Guimaraes e Souza (2012), and Samarina et al. (2014) indicate that IT adoption lowers 
inflation, inflation volatility, and output volatility. 36  The possible reason of the IT 
effectiveness is that central banks may improve the credibility of their monetary policy by 
the adoption of the IT regime. 
In contract to many works on the macroeconomic effects of an IT regime, a relatively 
small number of empirical studies have been conducted on its impacts on the central bank’s 
institutional structure reforms, particularly on CBI and CBT. Mishkin (1999) and Batini and 
Laxton (2007) discuss that an IT adoption would promote greater de facto or de jure 
independence of the central bank since its adoption focuses on price stability and is 
associated with less political pressure to implement expansionary policies. Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) suggest that an IT regime is associated with a greater increase in 
transparency and accountability. To the best of our knowledge, few comprehensive empirical 
studies have been conducted regarding the impacts of an IT regime on transparency and the 
independence of central banks (CBT and CBI). In addition, the central banks’ institutional 
reform has become more important for developing countries that often face economic and 
financial instability as well as political pressures. Thus, this study attempts to extend the 
present IT-related literature by addressing such issues in both advanced and developing 
countries and to discuss the difference between them. 
 
 
                                                          
36Several works have studied the effects of IT regimes on some macroeconomic conditions other than inflation, 
inflation volatility, and output volatility. For example, Lin (2010) shows that the IT regime reduces levels of 
real and nominal exchange rate volatility, while increasing international reserves in developing countries, 
although it intensifies exchange rate instability and reduces international reserves in advanced economies. 
Lucotte (2012) indicates that IT regimes have a positive significant effect on tax revenue collection in 
developing countries. Kadria and Aissa (2016) conclude that an IT regime can help reduce budget deficits in 
developing economies. Balima et al. (2017) show that IT adoption reduces levels of sovereign debt risk. 
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4.3 Empirical analysis 
4.3.1 Methodology 
Following Ball and Sheridan (2005), previous studies on the effects of IT regimes have 
applied the difference-in-differences (DID) method (Goncalves & Salles, 2008; Batini & 
Laxon, 2007; Thornton, 2016). However, the DID method can suffer from identification 
problems related to the timing of the adoption of IT among non-IT countries as well as from 
self-selectivity problems related to policy adoption (Bertrand et al., 2004; Lin & Ye, 2007). 
Recently, several studies have employed the propensity score matching (PSM) framework 
to mitigate such problems (Vega & Winkelried, 2005; Lin & Ye, 2007, 2009; Lin, 2010; de 
Mendonca & de Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Samarina et al., 2014). The PSM method is a 
statistical matching technique that estimates the effect of a treatment by taking into account 
observed covariates that predict receiving the treatment, and it attempts to mitigate biases 
resulting from the presence of confounding variables in estimates of treatment effects 
obtained from simple comparisons of the outcomes between units with treatment versus 
those without treatment. A country’s decision to adopt an IT regime can be endogenous since 
the policy approach is often influenced by various macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and 
institutional conditions. 
This study evaluates the IT effects on CBI and CBT over 83 advanced and developing 
countries during the period from 1998 to 2010, by applying the entropy balancing method. 
Entropy balancing is employed to select the best matches for the treated groups and to 
estimate the ATT, a method defined by Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing can be 
applied to observational studies with a binary treatment and works as a reweighting scheme 
that incorporates covariate balance at a level specified by a researcher. Since entropy 
balancing is a method of combining matching and regression analysis, it has some 
advantages compared to other treatment effect estimators (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 
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2016).37Among them, one crucial advantage is that entropy balancing is non-parametric in 
the sense that no empirical model for either the outcome variable or the selection into 
treatment needs to be specified to decrease potential types of misspecification.  The 
advantage of entropy balancing over regression-based analysis is that entropy balancing can 
avoid multicollinearity since the reweighting scheme orthogonalizes the covariates subject 
to a treatment indicator. Another advantage compared to other matching methods is that 
entropy balancing ensures a high balance of covariates between treatment and control groups 
even in small samples. Entropy balancing assigns the vector of weights to the control units 
and allows the involvement of any non-negative values to create an artificial control group 
that represents the perfect image of the treatment group. Thus, the entropy balancing 
approach can be seen as a generalization of conventional matching approaches.38 
Entropy balancing is a two-step procedure. The first step is to compute the weights, 
which are assigned to units not subject to treatment, and the weights are selected to satisfy 
prespecified balanced constraints, including the sample moments of pretreatment 
characteristics, by remaining at the same time as close as possible to uniform base weights. 
In this study, the balanced constraints necessitate equal means (first sample moment) of 
covariates across the treatment and control group to ensure that the control units are as 
similar as possible to the units of treatment. As the second step, we regress the outcome of 
our interest (CBI or CBT) on treatment (IT dummy) to estimate the treatment effect on the 
                                                          
37 Entropy balancing also has several limitations over other matching methods, such as propensity score 
matching. Among them, one limitation is that there exists no weighting solution if the balancing constraints are 
not consistent. The second limitation can occur when the balanced constraints are consistent but there are no 
set of positive weights that satisfy the balanced constraints. The last limitation is that the solution includes an 
extreme adjustment to the weights of some control units due to a limited overlapping area. Particularly, if only 
few control units are similar to the treatment units, these control units may obtain more large weights. Moreover, 
a small number of highly weighted control units increases the value of variance for the subsequent analysis and 
may be uncomfortable for the user (Hainmueller, 2012). It should be noted that more fundamental problems 
include the argument that matching approaches are an appropriate method to overcome the selection bias 
caused by observables and to estimate the average treatment effect in observational studies. However, these 
matching approaches can control only for observable selection biases and may generate unreliable results if 
unobservable biases exist, i.e., systematical differences between members and non-members. 
38  Hainmueller (2012), using Monte Carlo simulations and empirical applications, argues that entropy 
balancing outperforms other matching methods in terms of estimation bias and mean square error. 
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treated (ATT) by using a weighted OLS regression after obtaining entropy balancing weights 
in the first step. Our interest is to evaluate the ATT as follows: 
 
             ATT = E[Y(1)|T = 1] − E[Y(0)|T = 1], 
 
where Y(∙) is the outcome variable (CBI or CBT),T indicates whether a country adopted an 
IT regime (T = 1) or not (T = 0), E[Y(1)|T = 1] is the expected value of the outcome after 
treatment that is actually observed, and E[Y(0)|T = 1] is the counterfactual outcome, i.e., 
the expected value of the outcome that would have been observed if the IT country had not 
adopted an IT regime in the same country. A crucial problem concerns the difficulty of 
estimating the ATT because of the unobservable value of E[Y(0)|T = 1] . As the 
counterfactual outcome is not observable, we need a proper substitute to estimate the ATT. 
When a country’s choice of an IT regime is random, the ATT can be estimated from 
differences between the groups of the IT countries (treatment) and non-IT countries (control) 
in the sample means of the outcome variable. However, IT regime selection is not random 
in the sense that such a choice is systematically correlated with a set of observable covariates 
that also affect the outcome variable, thereby creating problems in the selection of 
observables (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al., 1998). To mitigate such a problem, 
we apply the entropy balancing to mimic a randomized experiment by balancing the 
treatment and control observations based on observed similar characteristics (covariates) as 
follows: 
              ATT = E[Y(1)|T = 1, X = x] − E[Y(0)|T = 0, X = x], 
 
where E[Y(1)|T = 1, X = x]  and E[Y(0)|T = 0, X = x] are the potential outcomes of the IT 
and non-IT countries given some covariates, and  X  is the matrix of the country’s 
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characteristics (covariates) that are expected to drive IT regime selection. The covariates 
include the one-year lagged inflation rate. Some studies, including Truman (2003), Lin and 
Ye (2009), Masson et al. (1997), and Minella et al. (2003), suggest that a country tends to 
adopt an IT regime when its inflation rate is at a reasonably low level because announcing a 
target rate that is significantly different than the actual inflation rate can cause its central 
bank to lose credibility. We also consider real GDP per capita growth to capture a country’s 
level of macroeconomic conditions, which is expected to be a precondition for the adoption 
of IT (Truman, 2003; Lin & Ye, 2007).  
The pretreatment characteristics also incorporate broad money growth. The high 
levels of broad money growth are expected to decrease the likelihood of IT adoption because 
of the presence of strong inflationary pressures. In addition, fiscal balance is also included 
in the model. As noted in Mishkin (2004) and de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza 
(2012), under a government’s balanced budget, debt monetization or government budget 
financing by a central bank is not needed, particularly for developing countries. Thus, sound 
fiscal conditions can be a precondition for the adoption of an IT regime. However, studies 
on fiscal theory of price levels initiated by Woodford (2001) suggest that as the 
determination of price levels is a fiscal phenomenon, the control of money is not sufficient 
for determining paths of inflation. In this case, the presence of sound fiscal conditions 
implies less inflationary pressure, which can reduce the motivations for IT adoption. 
To control for economic conditions related to external conditions, we incorporate the 
flexibility of exchange rates, trade openness, and financial openness as pretreatment 
covariates. Some studies, including Hu (2006), find that the flexibility of exchange rates 
enhances a country’s motivations for adopting IT regimes. The exchange rate nominal 
anchor should be subordinate to IT because the rigidity of exchange rates is not suitable for 
IT policies in the long run (Brenner & Sokoler, 2010). In addition, trade openness or 
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integration with international markets reduces the inflation biases of central banks (Romer, 
1993; Rogoff, 2003), which might not necessitate the adoption of an IT regime. Moreover, 
financial integration can affect the nature of central bank monetary conduct, including 
motivations to adopt IT policies in the midst of globalization processes (de Mendonca & de 
Guimaraes e Souza, 2012; Mishkin, 2004; Samarina et al., 2014; Truman, 2003). Data on 
inflation, real GDP per capita, broad money, imports and exports were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), while data on fiscal balances are 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO). Trade openness is calculated from the 
ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. We use the de facto exchange rate 
arrangement classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to define the exchange 
rate flexibility.39 To measure the degrees of financial openness, we use the Chinn-Ito capital 
account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2008).  
Concerning the IT dummy used as a dependent variable in the model, a clear 
consensus has not been reached on the exact date by which each country has implemented 
an IT regime, although the correct identification of adoption years is crucial to evaluate the 
effects of an IT regime. Vega and Winkelried (2005) propose two types of IT adoption dates, 
namely, soft and full-fledged adoption dates, and they define soft IT as a simple 
announcement of numerical inflation targets; they define a transition to a complete IT regime 
(i.e., the partial adoption of an IT regime) and full-fledged IT as a complete IT regime (i.e., 
the explicit adoption of an IT regime in the absence of nominal anchors other than inflation 
                                                          
39  In general, two different classifications are used as measures of exchange rate regimes. As a de jure 
classification, the International Monetary Fund publishes the self-reported exchange rate regime statuses of 
member countries. However, a country’s actual choice of exchange rate regimes often differs from its self-
reported status. Thus, many studies use the de facto classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
Although countries, particularly developing countries, facing ‘fear to floating’ conditions (Calvo & Reinhart, 
2002) may officially announce the adoption of a floating regime, they often involve foreign market 
intervention; therefore, in practice, their actual regimes can be viewed as managed exchange rate regimes. 
Hence, we also use a de facto exchange rate regime classification. According to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) 
classification, the fine grid classification includes fourteen categories, and the coarse grid version aggregates 
these into five categories. By using the coarse grid classification, we construct the classification of the exchange 
rate flexibility with three categories (fixed, intermediate, and flexible). 
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targets). Similarly, Rose (2007) proposes two types of adoption dates (default and 
conservative dates) that are nearly consistent with the adoption dates of Vega and Winkelried 
(2005). In this study, we use two types of adoption years (‘loose’ and ‘strict’ adoption years) 
that correspond to the soft and full-fledged adoption dates, respectively, proposed by Vega 
and Winkelried (2005), as in the studies of de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) 
and Samaria et al. (2014).  
4.3.2 Central bank independence and transparency 
There are many types of methods used to determine the indices of CBI and CBT, as 
mentioned in the previous section. Most studies measure CBI based on central bank laws in 
place (legal) or the turnover rate of governors. Studies by Bade and Parkin (1978) may be 
the first attempt to construct measures of CBI. Cukierman et al. (1992) construct the most 
extensive set of measures of CBI (CWN index), covering four decades for 72 developed and 
developing countries. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) update measures of CBI over the 
period from 1998 to 2010 by adding some measures of legal aspects, such as limits on the 
reappointment of the CEO, provisions affecting the (re)appointment of other board members 
similar to those provisions affecting the CEO, restrictions on government representation on 
the board, and the intervention of the government in exchange rate policy formulation, into 
the original CWN’s criteria.40 By employing CWN’s criteria, Garriga (2016) also constructs 
de jure CBI measures, focusing on statutory measures and particularly on reforms affecting 
independence and their direction, in over 182 countries between 1970 and 2012.41 Garriga 
(2016) mentions that CWN’s criteria have some advantages over other criteria in Alesina et 
                                                          
40 The CWN criteria is based on legal independence, reflecting the independence of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of the central bank, its independence in policy formation, its objective or mandate, and the stringency 
of limits on its lending to the public sector.  
41Garriga (2016) also points out that reliance on a legal-based measure is useful for several reasons. First, a 
measure of statutory CBI allows collecting comparable cross-sectional data across observations. Second, and 
more importantly, the use of the measure depends on the research question for which it is used. Statutory 
measures of CBI are useful to assess governments’ institutional choices, that is, when and to what extent 
governments give independence to their central banks or limit them. 
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al. (1989) and Grilli et al. (1991). First, CWN’s criteria for coding are clear and easily 
replicable. Second, CWN’s component variables are exhaustive, which allows for further 
recodifications for other purposes and studies on particular components of the index 
(Banaian et al., 1998). Moreover, CWN’s criteria have been widely used for the construction 
of de jure CBI, and the larger cross-sectional and historical coverage allows for checking the 
reliability of the coding (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Bodea and Hick (2015) also update the 
CWN index for 78 countries from 1973 to 2008. They code the CBI based on the CWN 
original index, and the CBI scores are based on a weighted aggregated calculation of 16 
indicators in 4 categories: the CEO, policy formation, objectives, and limitations on lending 
to the government. Thus, this study uses the CBI constructed by Dincer and Eichengreen 
(2014) in the baseline models. For the robustness checks, we also use the two CBI indexes 
of Garriga (2016) and Bodea and Hicks (2015) as alternative measures of independence.  
For the measurement of CBT, Eijffinger and Gerrats (2006) use the classification 
based on five aspects of transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy, and 
operational transparency. Dincer and Eichengreen (2008, 2010) extend the CBT index of 
Eijffinger and Gerrats (2006), and Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) update their CBT index 
covering over 100 central banks and 13 periods that extend from 1998 to 2010. This study 
uses the CBT index of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Our sample includes 23 developed 
and 60 developing countries (83 countries in total), of which 22 countries are IT countries, 
and covers the period from 1998 to 2010. For the advanced countries, there are 12 IT 
countries in the treatment group and 11 non-IT countries in the control group. For the 
developing countries, there are 10 IT countries and 50 non-IT countries. We identify 
developed and developing countries based on the World Bank’s income classification. Table 
1 shows a list of IT countries with loose and strict adoption years, and Table 2 presents non-
IT countries in our sample.  
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4.3.3 Results 
Our main interest is to identify how IT adoption affects CBI and CBT over 83 developed 
and developing countries during the period from 1998 to 2010. We use the indices of CBI 
and CBT defined by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). For the robustness checks of the IT 
effects on CBI, we also use the CBI index of Garriga (2016) and Bodea and Hicks (2015). 
The higher values of the indices indicate the greater independence and transparency of a 
central bank. Concerning the timing of IT adoption, we use two different IT adoption years: 
‘loose’ and ‘strict’ adoption years.  
4.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics. Columns (1) and (2) present the sample means of 
all covariates across the treatment and potential control groups, respectively, and column (3) 
shows the difference in means between two groups with t-test statistics and p-values. As the 
descriptive statistics reveal that the pretreatment characteristics between treatment group (IT 
group) and control group (non-IT group) are different, it is important to choose an 
appropriate control group using a matching method before calculating the treatment effects; 
otherwise, the treatment effect estimation might be inaccurate. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present 
the sample means of all matching covariates, which are obtained through entropy balancing, 
across the treatment group and the synthetic control group, based on the loose and strict IT 
treatment indicators, respectively. As the similar average realizations of the pretreatment 
characteristics between the two groups confirm the efficacy of entropy balancing, all 
matching covariates may be well balanced. It implies that the control group in the subsequent 
empirical analysis consists of appropriate counterfactuals for the sample of observations 
subject to the IT adoption. 
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4.3.3.2 Average treatment effects 
We estimate the ATTs by applying weighted OLS after obtaining entropy balancing weights. 
Table 4.6 shows the estimated results for the indices of CBT and CBI. The first six columns 
report the results for the loose IT regime, and the last six columns show the results for the 
strict IT regime. We present the estimated ATTs for the models without and with control 
variables in the second-step regression for the full sample and each of the two sub-samples 
of developed and developing countries.42  First, concerning the IT effects on CBT, the 
estimated results highlight an important role of an IT regime in improving transparency for 
both advanced and developing countries, irrespective of the choice of the loose or strict IT 
regimes. Our findings suggest that the adoption of an IT regime enhances the transparency 
of central banks in both advanced and developing countries.  
The consensus view of policymakers and academicians is that an IT adoption helps 
improve the transparency of monetary policymaking, which would increase a central bank’s 
credibility and help lower inflation and the volatilities of inflation and real output (Bernanke 
et al., 1999; Mishkin, 1999; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Svensson, 1999). By 
assessing the direct effect of an IT adoption on the CBT index constructed by Dincer and 
Eijeena (2014), our study confirms the arguments of previous literatures relating to the IT 
effect on the transparency of monetary policymaking. Crowe (2010) conducts an empirical 
test of the IT impact on transparency by defining transparency as ‘the removal of information 
asymmetries’ and suggests that the introduction of an IT regime helps improve the private 
sector’s ability to forecast inflation and promote convergence in forecast errors. Given the 
argument that transparency helps reduce various forms of uncertainties private agents face, 
                                                          
42 In the weighted OLS regression, we additionally control for the covariates applied in the first step (covariate 
balancing regression) and country-effects, as in the works of Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016). This is 
equivalent to incorporating control variables in a randomized experiment and improves the efficiency of 
estimation. The results are shown in Tables 6-8. 
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our finding is also consistent with the finding of Crowe (2010) on the conventional view of 
the beneficial IT impact on transparency.  
Second, more interestingly, concerning the IT effects on CBI, the estimated results 
in Table 4.6 show a sharp contrast between advanced and developing countries in the IT 
effects on the index of CBI. Irrespective of the choice of the loose and strict IT regimes, IT 
adoption improves independence in advanced countries, while it reduces independence in 
developing countries. Table 4.7 and 4.8 present the ATTs by using the different CBI indices 
of Garriga (2016) and Bodea and Hicks (2015), and the results are generally consistent with 
the findings based on the baseline estimation with the use of the CBI index of Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014). Our findings of the different effects between developed and developing 
countries of an IT regime on CBI are related to different political and administrative relations 
between a central bank and government, including perhaps finance, planning ministries and 
political institutions, depending on the country’s development stage. Central banks in 
developing countries are generally influenced by political or governmental pressures in the 
conduct of monetary policy and might set inflation targets either by prior contract or in close 
coordination with the government. The negative IT effect on CBI in developing countries 
may reflect the argument in the political economy context that a central bank is granted 
stringent monetary authority in pursuit of price stability at the expense of losing 
independence from central authorities, including the government, the ministry of finance, 
and political institutions, which often tend to keep a central bank under the control of their 
authorities. Central authorities in developing countries give parts of the power to a central 
bank by allowing the central bank to control monetary policy (an IT regime) and to make it 
more transparent, but they at the same time attempt to keep the power by reducing the 
autonomy or independence of the central bank. 
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Moreover, Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) emphasize that delegating the autonomy 
to a central bank leads to greater credibility of monetary policy, but it reduces flexibility in 
monetary policymaking from the political perspective; therefore, the optimal level of CBI is 
determined by the balance between flexibility and credibility. Our results showing different 
IT effects on CBI between advanced and developing countries imply a crucial difference in 
the consequences on the credibility and flexibility of monetary policy conduct through 
changing the degree of independence of monetary authority. In advanced countries, the IT 
adoption increases the degree of monetary autonomy, thus enhancing the credibility of 
monetary policy at the expense of the loss of flexibility. In contrast, in developing countries, 
the IT adoption decreases the degree of monetary autonomy, thus enhancing flexibility in 
monetary policymaking at the expense of the loss of credibility. Politicians are less willing 
to subordinate other goals, such as growth and employment, to the fight against inflation 
(Goodman, 1991). This issue can be more apparent particularly in developing countries, in 
which less independent central banks generally conform to their government agendas. 
Political authorities in developing countries tend to emphasize short-term macroeconomic 
goals that may require greater flexibility of monetary policy. 
4.3.3.3 Heterogeneity in treatment effects 
Substantial heterogeneity in social and economic development is known to occur, especially 
in developing countries. Many studies have shown that the causes and consequences of IT 
adoption are associated with the various economic and institutional characteristics of 
developing countries (Carare & Stone, 2006; Fraga et al., 2003; Fry et al., 2000; Masson et 
al., 1997; Minella et al., 2003; Mishkin, 2004; Mishkin & Savastano, 2001; Svensson, 2002; 
Lin & Ye, 2009; Soe & Kakinaka, 2018). For example, Lin and Ye (2009) analyze the 
heterogeneities of the average treatment effects of the IT adoption on inflation and its 
variability. Examining the heterogeneous effects of the IT adoption on CBT and CBI is 
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critical for understanding policy evaluations in advanced and developing countries. This 
study also evaluates four possible sources of heterogeneities, partly following the work of 
Lin and Ye (2009). The first source concerns the time lagged effects of the IT adoption that 
is based on the argument that it often takes some time for monetary policy to be effective. 
The second and third sources concern the role of fiscal conditions and exchange rate 
arrangements, respectively, in determining the effects of the IT adoption.43 Mishkin (2004) 
and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) suggest that the performance of an IT regime would be 
influenced by government fiscal positions and levels of exchange rate flexibility. 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the estimated results of the three sources of the 
heterogeneous effects of the loose and strict IT regimes on our outcome variables of CBT 
and CBI, respectively. We include country- and time-specific effects in the models. The first 
four columns show the results for the full sample, and the second and last four columns 
present the estimated results for developed and developing countries, respectively. The first 
and second panels correspond to the results for the loose IT regime and the strict IT regime, 
respectively. First, to examine the role of the time length on IT effects, we include the 
interaction term of the IT dummy and the time length (year) from the IT adoption year.44 
                                                          
43 Lin and Ye (2009) evaluate the heterogeneous features of IT effects by taking into account four sources of 
heterogeneities: (1) the pre-conditions of an IT adoption (captured by the estimated propensity score from a 
probit regression), (2) time lagged effects, (3) fiscal conditions, and (4) exchange rate arrangements. Our 
baseline analysis of heterogeneous features considers three possible sources without the pre-conditions of an 
IT adoption. For the robustness checks, following the work of Lin and Ye (2009), we estimate propensity scores 
from a probit regression and include the estimated propensity score and interaction term of the IT regime and 
the difference between the estimated propensity score and its sample mean to evaluate how IT effects are 
dependent on the preconditions of the IT adoption. The results are consistent with the findings related to the 
three sources of heterogeneity in the baseline analysis (see Table A1 for the probit regression results and Tables 
A2 and A3 for heterogeneity in the treatment effects). The results related to the pre-conditions of an IT adoption 
are as follows. Concerning the IT effect on CBT, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the IT 
dummy and the difference between the estimated propensity score and its sample mean is significantly negative 
in advanced countries, while it is significantly positive in developing countries. Concerning the IT effect on 
CBI, the coefficient on that interaction is significantly negative in both developed and developing countries. 
These results indicate that an IT regime performs less effectively at enhancing transparency and independence 
in advanced countries with the high preconditions of the IT adoption, while the positive IT effect on 
transparency and the negative IT effect on independence are more apparent for developing countries with the 
high estimated propensity scores that reflect more favorable preconditions for the IT adoption. 
44As in Lin and Ye (2009), this study does not include the time length variable in the regression because the 
value of the time length variable is the same as the interaction term of the IT dummy and time length. 
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Second, we test the role of exchange rate arrangements in the heterogeneous IT effects by 
including the dummy for a flexibility of exchange rate and an interaction term of the IT 
dummy and the exchange rate flexibility in the models. Third, we incorporate fiscal balance 
and its interaction term with the IT dummy into the models to examine the role of a fiscal 
disciple on the IT effects. 
Concerning the IT effects on CBT, the results in Table 4.9 first show that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the IT dummy and the time length in developing 
countries are significantly negative, while those in advanced countries are insignificant, 
irrespective of the choice of the IT regime. In developing countries, the effectiveness of the 
IT regime on CBT is dependent on the time length since the IT adoption. An IT regime is 
likely to become less effective at enhancing transparency over time in developing countries. 
Second, the estimation results show that the coefficients on the interaction terms of the IT 
dummy and the exchange rate flexibility are negative in advanced countries but are positive 
in developing countries, although the results for the loose IT regime are less significant. 
Under higher flexibility of the exchange rate, the IT effect on CBT is less effective in 
advanced countries, but it is more pronounced in developing countries. Third, the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms of fiscal balance and the IT dummy are insignificant in 
advanced countries, implying that no clear evidence is observed for the heterogeneous IT 
effects on CBT in advanced countries in terms of fiscal positions. However, the results 
provide clear evidence that the coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly negative 
in developing countries. This implies that the IT effect on CBT is less effective in developing 
countries with a sound fiscal discipline, while it is more pronounced in developing countries 
facing issues related to weak fiscal discipline, such as large fiscal deficits. 
Regarding the IT effects on CBI, the results in Table 4.10 first present that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the IT dummy and the time length in developing 
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countries are significantly positive, while those in advanced countries are insignificant. The 
negative IT effects on CBI tend to diminish over time in developing countries. Second, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the IT dummy and the exchange rate flexibility are 
negative in advanced countries but are generally insignificant in developing countries. The 
higher flexibility of the exchange rate could cause the IT effect on CBI to be less effective 
in advanced countries than in developing countries. Third, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms of fiscal balance and the IT dummy are generally insignificant in advanced and 
developing countries, implying less clear evidence supporting the heterogeneous IT effects 
on CBI in terms of fiscal positions. In summary, our analysis presents some clear evidence 
of the heterogeneous features of the IT effects: (i) the positive IT effects on CBT and the 
negative IT effects on CBI tend to diminish over time in developing countries; (ii) the IT 
effects tend to become less effective at improving CBT and CBI in advanced countries due 
to the high flexibility of the exchange rate; (iii) the IT effects tend to become more effective 
at improving CBT in developing countries due to the high flexibility of the exchange rate; 
and (iv) the IT effects on CBT tend to become more substantial in developing countries with 
weak fiscal positions.  
4.3.4 Alternative methods 
For the robustness check of the empirical validity of the results from the entropy balancing 
method, we also conduct the standard panel data analysis as an alternative approach.45 
Following previous works, such as studies by Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), we estimate 
the following empirical model: 
             Yit = β0 + β1ITit + βj ∑ Xijtj + αi +  εit, 
                                                          
45 We also apply the propensity score matching (PSM) method to confirm the findings of the baseline method. 
The PSM results are generally consistent with the baseline results (see Table A4). In addition, the balancing 
conditions between treatment and control groups are also satisfied (see figures A1, A2, and A3). 
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where i denotes country and t denotes time (year); Y denotes the outcome of interest (CBT 
or CBI);  ITit is the IT adoption dummy; X stands for the set of seven control variables; αi  
is a country-specific effect; and εit is the error term. In addition, this study estimates the 
dynamic panel data model with one lag of the dependent variable as an independent variable 
to allow for a partial adjustment mechanism: 
 
              Yit = β0 + β1Yit−1 + β2ITit + βj ∑ Xijtj +  αi +  εit. 
 
One crucial limitation is that our dynamic panel models with some lags of the dependent 
variable as covariates and with unobserved panel level fixed or random effects may suffer 
from possible endogeneity problems. By construction, the lagged dependent variables are 
correlated with the unobserved panel level effects. In addition, as the explanatory variables 
are not strictly exogenous, they are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of 
the errors. For example, inflation targeting is assumed to be endogenous since causality may 
run in both directions between inflation targeting and CBT (CBI); therefore, these regressors 
may be correlated with the error term. Thus, the levels of CBT and CBI might influence the 
decision to adopt an IT regime. Moreover, the model may contain heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within individual units’ errors but not across them. In such cases, standard 
estimators could become inconsistent. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a consistent GMM 
estimator for such a model. However, the Arellano-Bond estimator performs poorly if the 
autoregressive parameters or the ratio of the variance of the panel level effect to the variance 
of idiosyncratic error are relatively large. Poor instruments in the difference GMM estimator 
cause the inefficient and biased coefficient estimates (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Bound et al., 
1995; Baltagi, 2008).  
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Following the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) 
develop a system GMM estimator that includes additional moment conditions, which is 
designed for panel data with many panels and short periods, under the assumption that there 
is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and the panel level effects are uncorrelated 
with the first-difference of the first observation of the dependent variable. The system GMM 
estimator combines the use of lagged levels of the series as instruments for the pre-
determined and endogenous variables in equations in first differences and the use of lagged 
differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels. The system 
GMM estimator derives more efficient results. Thus, this study employs the two-step system 
GMM estimator to estimate the empirical model. Lacking valid instruments for an IT regime, 
we cannot claim to have fully resolved all endogeneity issues, but the system GMM estimator 
mitigates some of them since this methodology is suitable for the adjustment process of the 
dependent variable with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous. 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present the estimated results of the standard panel estimators 
and the two-step system GMM estimators. Five types of estimation results based on the same 
control variables applied in the entropy balancing method are shown for each of different 
samples (full sample and two subsamples of advanced and developing countries). Columns 
(1), (6), and (11) show the OLS results, and columns (2), (7), and (12) report the OLS results 
of the models with one-year lagged control variables. Columns (3), (8), and (13) show the 
results of the fixed effects models, and columns (4), (9), and (14) present the results of the 
fixed effects models with one-year lagged control variables. Finally, columns (5), (10), and 
(15) show the results of the two-step system GMM estimation. When applying the system 
GMM estimators, we need to confirm the first- but not the second-order serial correlation. 
As the specification tests, the AR(1) and AR(2) statistics show that in every model, the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation cannot be rejected, but the null hypothesis 
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of no first-order serial correlation can be rejected, as required by the specification. In addition, 
as the Hansen tests for the exogeneity show that the J-statistic has a p-value greater than 0.10 
in all models, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous 
in the system GMM estimation, as required by the specification. 
Our empirical results of the standard panel and system GMM estimation present that 
the coefficients on the IT dummy are significantly positive in all models of CBT for the 
subsamples of advanced and developing countries, which confirms the empirical results from 
the entropy balancing approach that the adoption of IT helps increase the transparency of 
central banks in both advanced and developing countries. In addition, our results indicate 
that the coefficients on the IT dummy are significantly positive in all models of CBI for 
advanced countries, while they are significantly negative in all models of CBI for developing 
countries. The IT effects on the independence of central banks are different between 
advanced and developing countries: there is a positive IT effect in advanced countries and a 
negative IT effect in developing countries. These findings from the standard panel and 
system GMM estimation are also consistent with the results of the entropy balancing analysis 
in the previous subsection. Thus, our robustness checks confirm the empirical validity of the 
estimated results of the entropy balancing method. 
4 Conclusion 
This study has examined how an IT adoption relates to the credibility of the central bank, 
which is captured by its transparency and independence, over 83advanced and developing 
countries during the period from 1998 to 2010. This study has applied the entropy balancing 
method, which has recently been used to mitigate the self-selection bias although it may 
suffer from hidden biases derived from unobserved covariates or factors. Thus, to confirm 
the empirical validity of the results of our entropy balancing approach, this study has also 
applied the standard panel and dynamic panel methods as alternative methods. Our empirical 
89 
results have indicated that an IT adoption helps improve central bank transparency in both 
advanced and developing countries. Transition of monetary policy frameworks toward the 
adoption of an IT regime encourages financial regulators to implement administrative and 
institutional reforms such that the central bank provides the general public and financial 
markets with relevant information on its policy strategy, decisions, assessments, and their 
procedures in an open, clear, and timely manner. 
More importantly, our finding has also demonstrated that the IT effects on central 
bank independence differ between advanced countries and developing countries, although 
central bank independence is generally expected to be granted to central banks to shield them 
from short-term political pressures when they fulfill their mandate of ensuring price stability. 
In advanced countries, the IT adoption improves central bank independence while it reduces 
independence in developing countries. The different IT effects on central bank independence 
between advanced and developing countries would be related to different political and 
administrative relations between a central bank and government, perhaps including finance 
and planning ministries and political institutions, depending on the country’s development 
stage. In addition, the negative IT effect on independence in developing countries reflects 
the argument in the political economy context that central authorities in developing countries 
give parts of the power to a central bank by allowing the central bank to fully control 
monetary policy (an IT regime) and to make it more transparent. However, at the same time 
central authorities attempt to keep their power by reducing the autonomy or independence 
of the central bank. 
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Table 4.1. Inflation targeting countries and starting years 
Country Starting Year 
 Inflation targeting(loose) Inflation targeting(strict)   
Advanced countries 
Australia 1993 1994 
Canada 1991 1994 
Czech Republic 1998 1998 
Hungary 2001 2001 
Iceland 2001 2001 
Isreal 1992 1997 
Korea 1998 2001 
New Zealand 1990 1990 
Norway 2001 2001 
Poland 1999 1999 
Sweden 1993 1995 
United Kingdom 1993 1993 
Developing countries 
Armenia 2006 2006 
Colombia 2000 2000 
Indonesia 2005 2006 
Mexico 1995 2001 
Peru 2002 2002 
Philippines 2002 2002 
Romania 2005 2006 
South Africa 2000 2000 
Thailand 2000 2000 
Turkey  2002 2006 
Note: Targeting dates are taken from De Mendonca and De Guimaraes e Souza(2012), Thornton (2016), Rose 
(2007), and Lin and Ye(2009). 
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Table 4.2. Control group countries  
Advanced countries   
Bahama Oman Trinidad and Tobago 
Barbados Saudi Arbia United Arab Emirates 
Chile Seychelles United States of America 
Japan Singapore  
Developing countries   
Albania Guyana Nigeria 
Angola India Papua New Guinca 
Argentina Iraq Moldova 
Azerbaijan Jamaica Russia 
Belarus Jordan Samoa 
Belize Kenya Sierra Leone 
Bhutan Kyrgyzstan Solomon Islands 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Lao PDR Sri Lanka 
Botswana Lesotho Syria 
Bulgaria Macedonia Tanzania 
Cambodia Malawi Tunisia 
China Malaysia Uganda 
Croatia Maldives Vanuatu 
Cuba Mauritius Venezuela 
El Salvador Mongolia Yamen 
Fiji Mozambique Zambia 
Georgia Namibia  
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Loose IT     Strict IT     
 (1) (2) (3) = (2) – (1) (1) (2) (3) = (2) – (1) 
 Treatment Control Difference t-test p-value Treatment Control Difference t-test p-value 
Inflation (lag) 4.584 7.305 2.721 5.217 0.000 3.896 7.506 3.610 8.639 0.000 
GDP per capita growth  0.026 0.035 0.009 3.037 0.001 0.025 0.035 0.010 3.569 0.000 
Broad money growth 12.501 18.241 5.740 5.173 0.000 12.150 18.276 6.126 5.460 0.000 
Fiscal balance -1.421 -1.674 -0.253 -0.710 0.239 -1.324 -1.704 -0.380 -1.072 0.142 
Exchange rate regime 1.990 1.282 -0.708 -16.299 0.000 1.971 1.301 -0.670 -15.249 0.000 
Trade openness 72.089 94.838 22.749 7.257 0.000 72.842 94.218 21.376 6.785 0.000 
Financial openness 1.045 0.295 -0.750 -6.775 0.000 1.105 0.285 -0.820 -7.395 0.000 
Observations 214 570    205 579    
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Table 4.4. Covariate balancing (Loose IT) 
 Full sample  Advanced countries Developing countries 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Before 
Inflation (lag) 
 
4.584 
 
7.305 
 
3.171 
 
3.211 
 
6.816 
 
8.230 
GDP per capita growth  0.026 0.035 0.023 0.018 0.030 0.038 
Broad money growth 12.500 18.24 11.520 8.802 14.050 20.370 
Fiscal balance -1.421 -1.674 -1.132 0.609 -1.877 -2.189 
Exchange rate regime 1.991 1.282 1.977 1.571 2.012 1.217 
Trade openness 72.090 94.84 76.990 118 64.350 89.600 
Financial openness 1.045 0.295 1.548 1.171 0.252 0.097 
After 
Inflation (lag) 
 
4.584 
 
4.584 
 
3.171 
 
3.170 
 
6.816 
 
6.816 
GDP per capita growth 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.030 0.031 
Broad money growth 12.500 12.500 11.520 11.520 14.050 14.050 
Fiscal balance -1.421 -1.421 -1.132 -1.132 -1.877 -1.877 
Exchange rate regime 1.991 1.991 1.977 1.977 2.012 2.012 
Trade openness 72.090 72.090 76.990 76.990 64.350 64.360 
Financial openness 1.045 1.045 1.548 1.548 0.252 0.252 
Weighted obs. 214 214 131 131 83 83 
Notes: Year dummy are included but not reported.  
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Table 4.5. Covariate balancing (Strict IT) 
 Full sample  Advanced countries Developing countries 
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Before 
Inflation (lag) 
 
3.896 
 
7.507 
 
3.155 
 
3.229 
 
5.154 
 
8.477 
GDP per capita growth  0.025 0.035 0.022 0.019 0.029 0.039 
Broad money growth 12.150 18.280 11.290 9.131 13.610 20.350 
Fiscal balance -1.324 -1.704 -1.191 0.648 -1.550 -2.237 
Exchange rate regime 1.971 1.301 1.977 1.579 1.961 1.237 
Trade openness 72.840 94.220 77.150 117.100 65.530 89.040 
Financial openness 1.105 0.285 1.583 1.137 0.294 0.092 
After 
Inflation (lag) 
 
3.896 
 
3.897 
 
3.155 
 
3.155 
 
5.154 
 
5.153 
GDP per capita growth 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.029 0.029 
Broad money growth 12.150 12.150 11.290 11.290 13.610 13.610 
Fiscal balance -1.324 -1.325 -1.191 -1.190 -1.550 -1.551 
Exchange rate regime 1.971 1.971 1.977 1.977 1.961 1.960 
Trade openness 72.840 72.840 77.150 77.190 65.530 65.520 
Financial openness 1.105 1.105 1.583 1.582 0.294 0.295 
Weighted obs. 205 205 129 129 76 76 
Notes: Year dummy are included but not reported.  
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Table 4.6. Treatment effects of IT on central bank transparency and independence index 
 Loose IT      Strict IT      
 Full sample Advanced countries Developing countries Full sample Advanced countries Developing countries 
 Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls 
Transparency 
IT dummy 
 
 
3.378*** 
(0.344) 
 
1.545*** 
(0.281) 
 
3.654*** 
(0.525) 
 
2.391*** 
(0.653) 
 
2.732*** 
(0.315) 
 
1.160*** 
(0.451) 
 
3.414*** 
(0.350) 
 
1.027*** 
(0.243) 
 
3.761*** 
(0.478) 
 
0.605 
(0.513) 
 
2.726*** 
(0.356) 
 
0.782*** 
(0.291) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 784 784 236 236 548 548 784 784 236 236 548 548 
Independence             
IT dummy 0.408** 
(0.206) 
1.050*** 
(0.364) 
1.894*** 
(0.231) 
3.426*** 
(0.334) 
-1.494*** 
(0.320) 
-0.141** 
(0.066) 
0.375* 
(0.207) 
0.769*** 
(0.298) 
1.844*** 
(0.224) 
1.533*** 
(0.486) 
-1.700*** 
(0.337) 
-0.105* 
(0.060) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 781 781 235 235 546 546 781 781 235 235 546 546 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. Constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Following Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), we include all covariates in the weighted regression. In addition, country-fixed and time-fixed effects are controlled in the weighted regression to 
address the panel structure since entropy balancing model combines a reweighting scheme with a regression analysis.  The inclusion of country-fixed effects can control for potential unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries as well as time-invariant country-specific characteristics. 
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Table 4.7. Treatment effects of IT on Garriga’s (2016) central bank independence index 
 Loose IT      Strict IT      
 Full Sample Advanced countries Developing countries Full sample Advanced countries Developing 
countries 
 Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls 
Independence             
IT dummy 0.563*** 
(0.188) 
0.750** 
(0.345) 
1.019*** 
(0.210) 
2.774*** 
(0.331) 
-0.401 
(0.339) 
-0.560*** 
(0.158) 
0.481** 
(0.190) 
0.498* 
(0.281) 
1.070*** 
(0.211) 
1.181*** 
(0.422) 
-0.725** 
(0.345) 
-0.304** 
(0.127) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 773 773 236 236 537 537 773 773 236 236 537 537 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. Constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 
significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. Following Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), we include all covariates in the weighted regression. In addition, country-fixed and time-fixed 
effects are controlled in the weighted regression to address the panel structure since entropy balancing model combines a reweighting scheme with a regression analysis.  The inclusion of country-
fixed effects can control for potential unobserved heterogeneity across countries as well as time-invariant country-specific characteristics. 
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Table 4.8. Treatment effects of IT on Bodea and Hicks’s (2015) central bank independence index 
 Loose IT      Strict IT      
 Full Sample Advanced countries Developing countries Full sample Advanced countries Developing countries 
 Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls Baseline Controls 
Independence             
IT dummy 0.938*** 
(0.182) 
0.232 
(0.149) 
1.394*** 
(0.226) 
1.651*** 
(0.375) 
0.171 
(0.356) 
-0.384** 
(0.182) 
0.895*** 
(0.185) 
0.116 
(0.119) 
1.425*** 
(0.223) 
0.609** 
(0.263) 
-0.133 
(0.368) 
-0.280* 
(0.165) 
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country-effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 737 737 210 210 527 527 737 737 210 210 527 527 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. Constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 
significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. Following Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), we include all covariates in the weighted regression. In addition, country-fixed and time-fixed 
effects are controlled in the weighted regression to address the panel structure since entropy balancing model combines a reweighting scheme with a regression analysis.  The inclusion of country-
fixed effects can control for potential unobserved heterogeneity across countries as well as time-invariant country-specific characteristics. 
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Table 4.9. Heterogeneity in the treatment effects (Transparency) 
 Full sample   Advanced countries  Developing countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
1.556*** 
(0.282) 
 
0.511 
(0.502) 
 
1.581*** 
(0.291) 
 
2.403*** 
(0.655) 
 
3.405** 
(1.393) 
 
2.354*** 
(0.603) 
 
1.156*** 
(0.438) 
 
0.376 
(0.786) 
 
0.978** 
(0.428) 
IT*Time 
 
0.011 
(0.014) 
  0.003 
(0.020) 
  -0.064** 
(0.031) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
 -0.173 
(0.131) 
  1.355* 
(0.754) 
  -0.735*** 
(0.232) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
 0.587** 
(0.237) 
  -0.839 
(0.734) 
  0.426 
(0.360) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
  0.011 
(0.009) 
  0.040** 
(0.017) 
  0.009 
(0.022) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
  -0.012 
(0.020) 
  -0.037 
(0.029) 
  -0.122*** 
(0.040) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 784 784 784 236 236 236 548 548 548 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.997*** 
(0.250) 
 
-0.171 
(0.520) 
 
1.022*** 
(0.253) 
 
0.609 
(0.515) 
 
3.659** 
(1.773) 
 
0.643 
(0.523) 
 
0.782*** 
(0.276) 
 
-0.705 
(0.647) 
 
0.653** 
(0.282) 
IT*Time 
 
0.023 
(0.023) 
  -0.006 
(0.036) 
  -0.099** 
(0.049) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
 -0.177 
(0.133) 
  2.527*** 
(0.858) 
  -0.810*** 
(0.202) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
 0.647*** 
(0.244) 
  -1.817** 
(0.734) 
  0.769*** 
(0.282) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
  0.008 
(0.009) 
  0.031** 
(0.016) 
  0.003 
(0.024) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
  0.003 
(0.021) 
  -0.023 
(0.037) 
  -0.123*** 
(0.043) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 784 784 784 236 236 236 548 548 548 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. The covariates applied in the covariate balancing regression and constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.10. Heterogeneity in the treatment effects (Independence) 
 Full sample   Advanced countries  Developing countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
1.039*** 
(0.363) 
 
1.391*** 
(0.371) 
 
0.938*** 
(0.309) 
 
3.402*** 
(0.331) 
 
5.171** 
(0.768) 
 
3.429*** 
(0.339) 
 
-0.138** 
(0.065) 
 
0.203 
(0.159) 
 
-0.157** 
(0.077) 
IT*Time 
 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
  -0.006 
(0.004) 
  0.031** 
(0.014) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
 0.153** 
(0.066) 
  1.592*** 
(0.229) 
  0.034 
(0.054) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
 -0.194** 
(0.097) 
  -1.442** 
(0.565) 
  -0.187* 
(0.103) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
  -0.005 
(0.005) 
  0.003 
(0.005) 
  0.003 
(0.004) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
  0.038** 
(0.017) 
  0.004 
(0.017) 
  -0.010 
(0.014) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 781 781 781 235 235 235 546 546 546 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.770*** 
(0.299) 
 
1.229*** 
(0.343) 
 
0.678*** 
(0.244) 
 
1.532*** 
(0.487) 
 
6.751*** 
(0.802) 
 
1.562*** 
(0.479) 
 
-0.105* 
(0.059) 
 
0.204 
(0.164) 
 
-0.116* 
(0.070) 
IT*Time 
 
-0.0003 
(0.010) 
  0.002 
(0.014) 
  0.058*** 
(0.022) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
 0.183*** 
(0.069) 
  3.195*** 
(0.435) 
  0.017 
(0.050) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
 -0.248*** 
(0.095) 
  -3.106*** 
(0.420) 
  -0.160* 
(0.097) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
  -0.005 
(0.005) 
  0.001 
(0.005) 
  0.002 
(0.005) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
  0.041** 
(0.019) 
  -0.017 
(0.019) 
  -0.011 
(0.019) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 781 781 781 235 235 235 546 546 546 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. The covariates applied in the covariate balancing regression and constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.11. Panel estimates (Transparency) 
 Full sample     Advanced countries   Developing countries 
 OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
3.490*** 
(0.205) 
 
4.020*** 
(0.203) 
 
2.181*** 
(0.430) 
 
2.116*** 
(0.455) 
 
1.227** 
(0.469) 
 
4.281*** 
(0.242) 
 
4.374*** 
(0.247) 
 
1.824* 
(0.876) 
 
1.934** 
(0.724) 
 
2.641** 
(1.219) 
 
3.269*** 
(0.230) 
 
3.262*** 
(0.221) 
 
2.309*** 
(0.428) 
 
2.212*** 
(0.421) 
 
0.914** 
(0.423) 
Inflation (lag) 
 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.085*** 
(0.024) 
-0.056** 
(0.023) 
-0.074** 
(0.028) 
-0.071** 
(0.027) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
GDP per capita growth 1.291 
(1.644) 
0.331 
(1.551) 
0.427 
(1.221) 
-0.310 
(1.065) 
0.901* 
(0.491) 
-5.611 
(4.189) 
-4.417 
(4.341) 
-2.270 
(3.318) 
-1.087 
(3.095) 
-0.489 
(1.809) 
1.787 
(1.673) 
0.091 
(1.643) 
0.574 
(1.140) 
-0.573 
(0.942) 
1.106* 
(0.617) 
Broad money growth -0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Fiscal balance 
 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.129*** 
(0.021) 
-0.128*** 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Exchange rate regime 1.160*** 
(0.121) 
1.150*** 
(0.118) 
0.083 
(0.173) 
0.075 
(0.183) 
0.116 
(0.128) 
1.185*** 
(0.202) 
1.118*** 
(0.211) 
0.810 
(0.478) 
0.578* 
(0.328) 
0.359 
(0.784) 
0.468*** 
(0.140) 
0.525*** 
(0.129) 
-0.061 
(0.135) 
-0.084 
(0.144) 
-0.003 
(0.095) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Financial openness 0.346*** 
(0.050) 
0.337*** 
(0.051) 
-0.031 
(0.106) 
-0.026 
(0.128) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
0.803*** 
(0.096) 
0.816*** 
(0.098) 
0.057 
(0.208) 
0.216 
(0.294) 
0.082 
(0.208) 
-0.022 
(0.055) 
-0.037 
(0.056) 
-0.123 
(0.082) 
-0.159** 
(0.079) 
-0.017 
(0.036) 
Transparency (lag) - - - - 0.802*** - - - - 0.729*** - - - - 0.836*** 
     (0.060)     (0.163)     (0.081) 
Constant 
 
1.610*** 
(0.349) 
1.608*** 
(0.348) 
5.098*** 
(0.526) 
5.135*** 
(0.550) 
0.688*** 
(0.192) 
3.330*** 
(0.652) 
4.277*** 
(0.624) 
5.514*** 
(1.505) 
5.452*** 
(1.457) 
0.157 
(0.575) 
1.611*** 
(0.348) 
1.560*** 
(0.331) 
4.632*** 
(0.388) 
4.771*** 
(0.379) 
0.680** 
(0.290) 
No. of Obs. 784 768 784 768 784 236 235 236 235 236 548 533 548 533 548 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.59 - 0.78 0.77 0.61 0.62 - 0.65 0.46 0.65 0.64 - 
AR(2) test - - - - 0.90 - - - - 0.12 - - - - 0.15 
Sargan test - - - - 0.55 - - - - 0.41 - - - - 0.32 
Hansen test - - - - 0.51 - - - - 0.13 - - - - 0.24 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
3.942*** 
(0.208) 
 
4.031*** 
(0.206) 
 
1.567*** 
(0.414) 
 
1.494*** 
(0.435) 
 
1.107 
(0.770) 
 
4.176*** 
(0.249) 
 
4.312*** 
(0.252) 
 
1.283 
(0.812) 
 
1.527** 
(0.665) 
 
1.010** 
(0.477) 
 
3.155*** 
(0.247) 
 
3.152*** 
(0.244) 
 
1.704*** 
(0.451) 
 
1.538*** 
(0.486) 
 
0.689*** 
(0.311) 
Inflation (lag) 
 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.084*** 
(0.024) 
-0.053** 
(0.024) 
-0.076** 
(0.030) 
-0.074** 
(0.029) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
GDP per capita growth 2.111 
(1.658) 
0.412 
(1.601) 
1.030 
(1.231) 
-0.059 
(1.116) 
1.064* 
(0.576) 
-3.044 
(4.435) 
-4.642 
(4.698) 
-1.634 
(3.215) 
-1.669 
(3.042) 
0.446 
(1.228) 
2.418 
(1.697) 
0.343 
(1.697) 
1.213 
(1.197) 
-0.127 
(1.058) 
1.734*** 
(0.526) 
Broad money growth -0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
Fiscal balance 
 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
-0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.126*** 
(0.021) 
-0.122*** 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.026) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Exchange rate regime 1.271*** 
(0.122) 
1.266*** 
(0.118) 
0.150 
(0.188) 
0.124 
(0.194) 
0.237* 
(0.131) 
1.285*** 
(0.212) 
1.262*** 
(0.221) 
0.982* 
(0.534) 
0.810** 
(0.386) 
0.231 
(0.227) 
0.634*** 
(0.148) 
0.669*** 
(0.139) 
-0.003 
(0.150) 
-0.073 
(0.153) 
0.112 
(0.082) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Financial openness 0.339*** 
(0.050) 
0.329*** 
(0.052) 
-0.041 
(0.114) 
-0.035 
(0.135) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
0.756*** 
(0.101) 
0.754*** 
(0.102) 
0.018 
(0.235) 
0.133 
(0.289) 
0.057 
(0.095) 
-0.008 
(0.055) 
-0.024 
(0.056) 
-0.133 
(0.083) 
-0.155* 
(0.081) 
-0.011 
(0.033) 
Transparency (lag) - - - - 0.766*** 
(0.110) 
- - - - 0.836*** 
(0.080) 
- - - - 0.807*** 
(0.042) 
Constant 
 
1.517*** 
(0.352) 
1.491*** 
(0.351) 
5.204*** 
(0.548) 
5.253*** 
(0.581) 
0.767** 
(0.308) 
3.358*** 
(0.666) 
4.043*** 
(0.634) 
5.575*** 
(1.529) 
5.230*** 
(1.548) 
0.455 
(0.438) 
1.405*** 
(0.367) 
1.363*** 
(0.357) 
4.683*** 
(0.401) 
4.883*** 
(0.402) 
0.642*** 
(0.191) 
No. of Obs. 784 768 784 768 784 236 235 236 235 236 548 533 548 533 548 
R-squared 0.62 0.56 0.58 0.57 - 0.77 0.77 0.60 0.61 - 0.43 0.44 0.62 0.61 - 
AR(2) test - - - - 0.81 - - - - 0.11 - - - - 0.13 
Sargan test - - - - 0.30 - - - - 0.102 - - - - 0.22 
Hansen test - - - - 0.17 - - - - 0.21 - - - - 0.39 
Notes: Year dummy are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.12. Panel estimates (Independence) 
 Full sample Advanced countries  Developing countries  
 OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM OLS Lag FE Lag/FE GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.297 
(0.189) 
 
0.295 
(0.187) 
 
0.896* 
(0.527) 
 
0.997 
(0.614) 
 
0.501*** 
(0.189) 
 
2.042*** 
(0.238) 
 
2.109*** 
(0.238) 
 
3.347*** 
(0.565) 
 
3.478*** 
(0.587) 
 
1.007** 
(0.358) 
 
-0.859*** 
(0.255) 
 
-0.803*** 
(0.256) 
 
-0.156 
(0.165) 
 
-0.282* 
(0.162) 
 
-1.012* 
(0.545) 
Inflation (lag) 
 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.095*** 
(0.025) 
0.102*** 
(0.029) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.340*** 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.023) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
GDP per capita growth 3.315* 
(1.997) 
4.096** 
(1.906) 
0.345 
(0.659) 
0.382 
(0.633) 
0.010 
(0.378) 
-4.317 
(3.472) 
-3.504 
(3.418) 
-0.427 
(0.736) 
0.095 
(0.535) 
-0.449 
(1.130) 
1.210 
(2.132) 
2.185 
(2.084) 
0.703 
(0.546) 
1.038** 
(0.447) 
0.290 
(0.774) 
Broad money growth 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Fiscal balance 
 
-0.033* 
(0.017) 
-0.035** 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.065*** 
(0.020) 
-0.070*** 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.062*** 
(0.022) 
0.058*** 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.021 
(0.017) 
Exchange rate regime -0.537*** 
(0.127) 
-0.523*** 
(0.127) 
0.220** 
(0.107) 
0.179* 
(0.099) 
-0.159* 
(0.088) 
-0.697*** 
(0.174) 
-0.714*** 
(0.169) 
0.295 
(0.200) 
0.112 
(0.119) 
-0.104 
(0.192) 
0.168 
(0.170) 
0.172 
(0.168) 
0.173 
(0.112) 
0.168* 
(0.010) 
0.189 
(0.188) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Financial openness 0.146*** 
(0.049) 
0.160*** 
(0.050) 
-0.114 
(0.128) 
-0.037 
(0.127) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
0.319*** 
(0.074) 
0.306*** 
(0.070) 
-0.122 
(0.079) 
-0.060 
(0.061) 
-0.002 
(0.069) 
0.314*** 
(0.066) 
0.331*** 
(0.066) 
-0.148 
(0.153) 
-0.045 
(0.161) 
0.180* 
(0.104) 
Independence (lag) - - - - 0.890*** 
(0.034) 
- - - - 0.876** 
(0.024) 
- - - - 0.385 
(0.266) 
Constant 
 
4.401*** 
(0.358) 
4.446*** 
(0.395) 
3.770*** 
(0.312) 
3.930*** 
(0.275) 
0.518*** 
(0.180) 
2.106*** 
(0.577) 
2.864*** 
(0.514) 
1.119* 
(0.590) 
1.378*** 
(0.467) 
0.009 
(0.284) 
4.647*** 
(0.449) 
4.708*** 
(0.497) 
4.593*** 
(0.235) 
4.758*** 
(0.160) 
3.117* 
(1.572) 
No. of Obs. 781 765 781 765 776 235 234 235 234 233 546 531 546 531 543 
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.17 - 0.34 0.35 0.71 0.71 - 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.11 - 
AR (2) test - - - - 0.18 - - - - 0.40 - - - - 0.38 
Sargan test - - - - 0.81 - - - - 0.77 - - - - 0.85 
Hansen test - - - - 0.30 - - - - 0.28 - - - - 0.84 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.215 
(0.193) 
 
0.226 
(0.191) 
 
0.650 
(0.431) 
 
0.706 
(0.485) 
 
0.476*** 
(0.176) 
 
1.981*** 
(0.237) 
 
2.049*** 
(0.237) 
 
2.504*** 
(0.804) 
 
2.684*** 
(0.728) 
 
1.116** 
(0.517) 
 
-1.124*** 
(0.258) 
 
-1.058*** 
(0.263) 
 
-0.204 
(0.126) 
 
-0.278* 
(0.157) 
 
-0.999* 
(0.552) 
Inflation (lag) 
 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.095*** 
(0.025) 
0.103*** 
(0.030) 
0.028*** 
(0.009) 
0.033** 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.026) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
GDP per capita growth 3.358* 
(1.993) 
4.092** 
(1.902) 
0.595 
(0.588) 
0.499 
(0.610) 
0.154 
(0.402) 
-3.031 
(3.570) 
-3.515 
(3.674) 
0.796 
(1.287) 
-0.941* 
(0.481) 
-0.570 
(1.074) 
0.954 
(2.142) 
2.022 
(2.094) 
0.653 
(0.519) 
0.987** 
(0.424) 
0.075 
(0.735) 
Broad money growth 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Fiscal balance 
 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.035** 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.063*** 
(0.020) 
-0.067*** 
(0.020) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.067*** 
(0.022) 
0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
Exchange rate regime -0.506*** 
(0.124) 
-0.496*** 
(0.123) 
0.248** 
(0.117) 
0.201* 
(0.105) 
-0.139* 
(0.082) 
-0.648*** 
(0.175) 
-0.641*** 
(0.174) 
0.597 
(0.395) 
0.531 
(0.322) 
-0.214 
(0.322) 
0.208 
(0.162) 
0.212 
(0.161) 
0.171 
(0.109) 
0.169* 
(0.100) 
0.147 
(0.201) 
Trade openness 
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Financial openness 0.150*** 
(0.050) 
0.163*** 
(0.050) 
-0.118 
(0.128) 
-0.041 
(0.128) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
0.296*** 
(0.076) 
0.277*** 
(0.073) 
-0.196 
(0.127) 
-0.207 
(0.112) 
0.032 
(0.116) 
0.322*** 
(0.066) 
0.338*** 
(0.066) 
-0.147 
(0.153) 
-0.046 
(0.162) 
0.184* 
(0.106) 
Independence (lag) - - - - 0.890*** 
(0.034) 
- - - - 0.786*** 
(0.093) 
- - - - 0.352 
(0.261) 
Constant 
 
4.392*** 
(0.359) 
4.437*** 
(0.396) 
3.812*** 
(0.321) 
3.985*** 
(0.277) 
0.503*** 
(0.173) 
2.658*** 
(0.505) 
2.902*** 
(0.523) 
1.176 
(0.731) 
1.015* 
(0.557) 
0.386 
(0.552) 
4.668*** 
(0.441) 
4.710*** 
(0.485) 
4.613*** 
(0.235) 
4.764*** 
(0.161) 
3.326** 
(1.583) 
No. of Obs. 781 765 781 765 776 235 234 235 234 233 546 531 546 531 543 
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.15 - 0.33 0.34 0.57 0.58 - 0.10 0.1 0.13 0.11 - 
AR (2) test - - - - 0.19 - - - - 0.37 - - - - 0.36 
Sargan test - - - - 0.81 - - - - 0.19 - - - - 0.87 
Hansen test - - - - 0.27 - - - - 0.17 - - - - 0.87 
Notes: Year dummy are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Table A1. Estimates of propensity scores (probit model) 
 Full sample Advanced countries Developing countries 
 Loose IT Strict IT Loose IT Strict IT Loose IT Strict IT 
Inflation (lag) -0.022*** 
(0.008) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.016) 
GDP per capita growth  -0.060 
(1.454) 
-0.996 
(1.491) 
7.678** 
(3.260) 
5.964* 
(3.227) 
-0.811 
(2.709) 
-2.140 
(3.094) 
Broad money growth -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.012) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
Fiscal balance 0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.026* 
(0.015) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.058*** 
(0.021) 
0.083*** 
(0.023) 
Exchange rate regime 0.981*** 
(0.096) 
0.897*** 
(0.095) 
0.447*** 
(0.156) 
0.377** 
(0.155) 
1.648*** 
(0.180) 
1.554*** 
(0.193) 
Trade openness -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Financial openness 0.183*** 
(0.039) 
0.188*** 
(0.039) 
0.093 
(0.063) 
0.131** 
(0.064) 
0.347*** 
(0.069) 
0.350*** 
(0.075) 
No. of obs. 784 784 236 236 548 517 
Pseudo-R2 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.14 0.42 0.42 
Notes: Constant terms and year trend are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 
5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table A2. Heterogeneity in the treatment effects (Transparency) 
 Full sample   Advanced countries  Developing countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
1.273*** 
(0.335) 
 
1.557*** 
(0.283) 
 
0.477 
(0.522) 
 
1.581*** 
(0.291) 
 
2.143*** 
(0.616) 
 
2.435*** 
(0.639) 
 
3.478** 
(1.354) 
 
2.378*** 
(0.588) 
 
0.593 
(0.476) 
 
1.058** 
(0.436) 
 
0.144 
(0.750) 
 
0.894** 
(0.429) 
PS -1.975 
(1.699) 
-0.392 
(1.362) 
-0.825 
(1.417) 
0.060 
(1.310) 
-1.766 
(1.653) 
-3.540** 
(1.754) 
-3.556** 
(1.722) 
-3.490** 
(1.719) 
3.049* 
(1.635) 
4.405*** 
(1.647) 
3.927** 
(1.645) 
3.747** 
(1.610) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg) 1.521** 
(0.717) 
   -3.005*** 
(1.123) 
   1.160* 
(0.640) 
   
IT*Time 
 
 0.011 
(0.015) 
   0.006 
(0.020) 
   -0.079** 
(0.031) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.073 
(0.383) 
   1.998** 
(0.805) 
   -2.817*** 
(0.871) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.607** 
(0.253) 
   -0.880 
(0.708) 
   0.506 
(0.338) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
   0.011 
(0.012) 
   0.010 
(0.022) 
   -0.053 
(0.034) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
   -0.012 
(0.020) 
   -0.037 
(0.028) 
   -0.123*** 
(0.041) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 784 784 784 784 236 236 236 236 548 548 548 548 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.670** 
(0.289) 
 
1.001*** 
(0.251) 
 
-0.239 
(0.545) 
 
1.024*** 
(0.254) 
 
0.514 
(0.458) 
 
0.575 
(0.527) 
 
3.823** 
(1.752) 
 
0.608 
(0.533) 
 
-0.026 
(0.345) 
 
0.578** 
(0.275) 
 
-1.020* 
(0.560) 
 
0.477* 
(0.285) 
PS -2.900** 
(1.461) 
-0.709 
(1.235) 
-1.217 
(1.342) 
-0.472 
(1.207) 
-0.444 
(2.527) 
-1.657 
(2.567) 
-3.448 
(2.529) 
-1.779 
(2.517) 
4.554*** 
(1.423) 
6.309*** 
(1.395) 
6.187*** 
(1.287) 
5.784*** 
(1.369) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg) 2.315*** 
(0.697) 
   -3.796** 
(1.387) 
   1.962*** 
(0.606) 
   
IT*Time 
 
 0.025 
(0.024) 
   -0.006 
(0.035) 
   -0.113** 
(0.048) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.145 
(0.325) 
   3.158** 
(0.997) 
   -3.874*** 
(0.612) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.690*** 
(0.266) 
   -1.958** 
(0.899) 
   0.828*** 
(0.229) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
   0.011 
(0.012) 
   0.014 
(0.030) 
   -0.139*** 
(0.041) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
   0.004 
(0.021) 
   -0.024 
(0.037) 
   -0.113*** 
(0.042) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 784 784 784 784 236 236 236 236 517 517 517 517 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. The covariates applied in the covariate balancing regression and constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table A3. Heterogeneity in the treatment effects (Independence) 
 Full sample   Advanced countries  Developing countries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loose IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
1.016*** 
(0.321) 
 
1.043*** 
(0.362) 
 
1.343*** 
(0.371) 
 
0.925*** 
(0.305) 
 
3.397*** 
(0.345) 
 
3.399*** 
(0.330) 
 
5.168*** 
(0.770) 
 
3.428*** 
(0.338) 
 
0.038 
(0.059) 
 
-0.150** 
(0.070) 
 
0.160 
(0.135) 
 
-0.175** 
(0.084) 
PS -1.564** 
(0.728) 
-1.129** 
(0.523) 
-1.136** 
(0.499) 
-2.074*** 
(0.547) 
0.429 
(0.360) 
0.294 
(0.434) 
0.150 
(0.436) 
0.246 
(0.425) 
1.056* 
(0.579) 
0.523 
(0.451) 
0.713 
(0.468) 
0.802 
(0.513) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg) 0.201 
(0.517) 
   -0.315 
(0.361) 
   -0.472** 
(0.199) 
   
IT*Time 
 
 -0.010* 
(0.005) 
   -0.006 
(0.004) 
   0.030** 
(0.013) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.492*** 
(0.163) 
   1.564*** 
(0.597) 
   -0.344 
(0.248) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
  -0.165* 
(0.096) 
   -1.440** 
(0.567) 
   -0.172* 
(0.093) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
   0.008 
(0.006) 
   0.005 
(0.005) 
   -0.011 
(0.010) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
   0.044** 
(0.018) 
   0.004 
(0.017) 
   -0.011 
(0.014) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 781 781 781 781 235 235 235 235 546 546 546 546 
Strict IT 
IT dummy 
 
 
0.732*** 
(0.251) 
 
0.776*** 
(0.298) 
 
1.191*** 
(0.343) 
 
0.684*** 
(0.242) 
 
1.572*** 
(0.406) 
 
1.617*** 
(0.469) 
 
6.691*** 
(0.796) 
 
1.642*** 
(0.462) 
 
0.002 
(0.066) 
 
-0.128* 
(0.067) 
 
0.162 
(0.142) 
 
-0.142* 
(0.079) 
PS -1.252* 
(0.658) 
-0.964** 
(0.408) 
-0.677* 
(0.380) 
-1.433*** 
(0.396) 
5.022*** 
(1.709) 
4.099** 
(1.590) 
1.247 
(0.959) 
3.995** 
(1.580) 
1.186** 
(0.599) 
0.711* 
(0.427) 
0.834* 
(0.460) 
0.853* 
(0.482) 
IT*(PS-PS_avg) 0.299 
(0.584) 
   -3.015*** 
(0.662) 
   -0.432* 
(0.229) 
   
IT*Time 
 
 0.003 
(0.010) 
   0.004 
(0.014) 
   0.056*** 
(0.021) 
  
Exchange rate regime 
 
  0.362*** 
(0.118) 
   2.967*** 
(0.478) 
   -0.396* 
(0.226) 
 
IT*Exchange rate regime 
 
  -0.224** 
(0.096) 
   -3.055*** 
(0.423) 
   -0.152* 
(0.091) 
 
Fiscal balance 
 
   0.005 
(0.005) 
   0.040** 
(0.016) 
   -0.019 
(0.012) 
IT*Fiscal balance 
 
   0.045** 
(0.019) 
   -0.014 
(0.019) 
   -0.009 
(0.018) 
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 781 781 781 781 235 235 235 235 517 517 517 517 
Notes: Table shows the ATTs obtained by weighted least squares regressions. The covariates applied in the covariate balancing regression and constant terms are included but not reported. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table A4. Estimates of the treatment effects (PSM) 
 Loose IT   Strict IT   
 Full sample Advanced countries Developing countries Full sample Advanced countries  Developing countries 
Transparency 3.631*** 
(0.322) 
4.415*** 
(0.563) 
2.671*** 
(0.319) 
3.581*** 
(0.313) 
4.859*** 
(0.575) 
2.910*** 
(0.356) 
 
No. of observation 784 236 548 784 236 517 
Independence 
(Dincer & Eichengreen) 
-0.805*** 
(0.297) 
1.815*** 
(0.356) 
-0.955*** 
(0.371) 
-0.704** 
(0.295) 
1.774*** 
(0.379) 
-1.552*** 
(0.390) 
 
No. of observation 781 235 546 781 235 517 
  Notes: The analytical standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level of 10 %, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Figure A1: Balancing condition (Full Sample)  
 
(a) Loose IT regime 
 
(b) Strict IT regime 
 
0
2
4
6
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
e
n
s
it
y
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
0
5
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
e
n
s
it
y
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
107 
 
 
Figure A2: Balancing condition (Advanced countries)  
 
(a) Loose IT regime 
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Figure A3: Balancing condition (Developing countries)  
 
(a) Loose IT regime 
 
(b) Strict IT regime 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
Since an IT regime has been widely adopted not only in advanced countries but also in 
developing countries as a monetary policy strategy, the policy makers and researches 
discusses the beneficial effects of the IT adoption on macroeconomic performance 
theoretically and empirically. Many empirical studies mainly examine the impacts of an IT 
regime on inflation, inflation volatility, and output volatility applying different 
methodologies including the DID and PSM methods. Generally, they suggest that an IT 
regime helps improve macroeconomic performance with low inflation, and the stability of 
inflation and output in developing countries while there is no clear evidence of a beneficial 
IT effect in advanced countries. However, the IT adoption might have several effects in 
various contexts. Thus, this dissertation has attempted to examine how an IT regime is 
related to domestic economy, external economy, and the institutional structure.  
The first study has investigated the IT effects on income velocity which is related to 
domestic economy, over 84 developing countries from the period 1990 to 2013. Although 
an IT regime has become popular even in developing countries, many developing countries 
are still adopting monetary aggregates targeting due to unmatured money and financial 
markets. However, monetary aggregates targeting is often ineffective with the frequently 
failure of macroeconomic stability. Unstable income velocity is one of the main reasons for 
ineffective monetary aggregates targeting (Mishkin, 2006). According to Park (1970), 
income velocity is more volatile in developing countries than in advanced countries. Thus, 
stability of income velocity is crucial to achieve macroeconomic stability under monetary 
aggregates targeting. Taylor (2000) highlights that monetary targeting and inflation targeting 
can coexist and monetary aggregates would be an appropriate instrument to achieve inflation 
target in developing countries due to real interest rate uncertainty. If an IT regime helps 
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stabilize income velocity, monetary authorities can justify monetary aggregates targeting as 
an effective policy measure under an IT regime. Thus, the first study has attempted to 
examine the relationship between an IT regime and income velocity in developing countries.  
The second study has examined the impacts of an IT regime on exchange market 
pressure which is related to external economy, over 101 developing countries from the period 
1990 to 2014. Developing countries have often experienced foreign exchange market 
instability. Since foreign exchange markets are closely related to external conditions of an 
economy, foreign exchange market turmoil often induce the instability of external economy 
so that a sound monetary policy arrangement is important to absorb foreign exchange market 
pressures for their macroeconomic stability. If IT regime helps stabilize the exchange market 
pressures, policy makers will achieve the favorable external conditions and macroeconomic 
stability under an IT regime. Thus, the second study has attempted to investigate the 
relationship between an IT regime and exchange market pressure in developing countries.  
The third study has analyzed the impacts of an IT regime on the credibility of the 
central bank which is captured by its transparency and independence, over 83 advanced and 
developing countries during the period from 1998 to 2010. Achieving macroeconomic and 
financial stability requires monetary policy credibility, which is closely related to 
institutional structure and their reforms so that many countries have been implementing the 
institutional reforms to achieve credibility. In addition, Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002) 
and Eijffinger et al. (2006) argue that central banks` monetary policy credibility is closely 
related to institutional reforms on (i) independence from the government and (ii) 
transparency to the public. At the same time, the IT adoption is one of the crucial monetary 
policy frameworks, which is expected to increase the monetary policy credibility. If an IT 
regime induces central bank credibility, policy makers will achieve favorable 
macroeconomic outcomes under an IT regime. Thus, the third study has attempted to 
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investigate the relationship between an IT regime and credibility of the central banks in 
advanced and developing countries.  
This dissertation has applied the propensity score matching (PSM) and entropy 
balancing methods to discuss three contents: the first content is to examine the impact of an 
IT regime on income velocity volatility in developing countries, the second content is to 
examine the impact of an IT regime on exchange market pressure in developing countries, 
and the third content is to investigate the impact of an IT regime on the credibility of the 
central bank in advanced and developing countries. The first study has applied the PSM 
method to examine whether IT helps stabilize income velocity variability. The PSM method 
has commonly been used to eliminate self-selection bias, although it may suffer from issues 
related to small samples as well as hidden biases derived from unobserved covariates or 
factors (Pearl, 2000).  
To confirm the empirical validity of our PSM results, this study has also applied 
another method widely used in IT-related studies, the DID method. The empirical results of 
both methods have indicated that IT would help stabilize income velocity in developing 
countries. Thus, our findings have shown clear support for Taylor’s (2000) argument that 
monetary authorities in developing economies would prefer using monetary policy rule with 
monetary aggregates to achieve inflation targets under stable income velocity. In addition, 
our empirical results regarding IT effects on income velocity have highlighted that monetary 
authorities can pursue monetary aggregates as an effective policy measure under an IT 
regime. Moreover, our decomposition analysis of income velocity variability has provided 
evidences that IT lessens volatilities of inflation, real output growth, and money growth. 
Furthermore, our analysis of heterogeneous effects has revealed that an IT regime would be 
effective in reducing income velocity volatility under the favorable preconditions of IT 
adoption and floating exchange rate regime application. The time length also influences the 
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effectiveness of an IT regime, and IT is likely to become more effective in lowering income 
velocity volatility over time. 
The second study has also applied the PSM method to examine whether an IT regime 
helps stabilize EMP and its two components. The empirical results have indicated that an IT 
regime would help stabilize EMP. In addition, our analysis has provided evidences that an 
IT regime lessens volatility of changes in international reserves, while our results show no 
clear evidence that an IT regime affects exchange rate variability. These findings suggest 
that the policy commitment to an IT regime improves the credibility of monetary policy 
conduct. Under an IT regime, central banks would not be required to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market. More interestingly, our findings have also shown that an IT regime is more 
beneficial for middle-income developing countries rather than for low-income developing 
countries. 
The PSM method has been applied in the first study and the second study as the 
baseline approach. However, the ATT estimated from the PSM method can still suffer from 
biased results in the presence of misspecification in the propensity score model (Robins et 
al., 2007; Wooldridge, 2007, 2010). Thus, recent empirical studies apply entropy balancing 
method to build balanced samples in observational studies where the control group data can 
be reweighted to match the covariate moments in the treatment group (Neuenkirch & 
Neumeier, 2016). Compared to other matching methods, the entropy balancing has some 
advantages such as less misspecification problems, and higher balance of covariates between 
treatment and control groups (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016). Therefore, the third study has 
used the entropy balancing method as the baseline method. To confirm the validity of the 
entropy balancing results, this study also has applied the standard panel and dynamic panel 
methods as well as the PSM method.  
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The empirical results have suggested that IT adoption helps improve transparency in 
both advanced and developing countries. More interestingly, the IT impacts on independence 
are different between advanced countries and developing countries, although central bank 
independence is generally expected to be granted to central banks to shield them from short-
term political pressures when they fulfill their mandate of ensuring price stability. An IT 
regime increases independence in advanced countries, but lowers independence in 
developing countries. The possible reasons for different IT effects on independence between 
advanced and developing countries would be related to different political and administrative 
connections between a central bank and government, depending on the development stage. 
In addition, the negative effect of an IT regime on independence in developing countries 
may reflect the argument in the political economy context that central banks are granted 
stringent monetary authority in pursuit of price stability at the expense of losing 
independence from political authorities that often tend to keep central banks under their 
authority. The alternative methods (standard panel estimators, dynamic panel estimator and 
the PSM method) have also confirmed the empirical validity of the results of the entropy 
balancing results.  
The third study have evaluated the heterogenous features of an IT adoption, our 
analysis shows (i) the positive IT effects on CBT and the negative IT effects on CBI tend to 
diminish over time in developing countries; (ii) the IT effects tend to become less effective 
at improving CBT and CBI in advanced countries due to the high flexibility of the exchange 
rate; (iii) the IT effects tend to become more effective at improving CBT in developing 
countries due to the high flexibility of the exchange rate; and (iv) the IT effects on CBT tend 
to become more substantial in developing countries with weak fiscal positions.  
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